Lovelady v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 6, 2026
• Docket: 25-2720
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 6 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CRYSTAL LOVELADY, No. 25-2720 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 4:23-cv-00136-AMM v. MEMORANDUM*

EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC.,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Angela M. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 4, 2026** Phoenix, Arizona

Before: HAWKINS, BYBEE, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff Crystal Lovelady sued Experian Information Solutions, Inc.

(“Experian”), alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. She claims that

Experian failed to follow reasonable procedures to ensure the accuracy of her

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). consumer report as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). She further claims that

when she disputed the information in the report, Experian failed to conduct a

reasonable reinvestigation as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). Underlying

both claims is Lovelady’s allegation that Experian is erroneously reporting that she

has joint contractual liability for a medical debt entered into by her husband (“Mr.

Lovelady”) that was sent to collection. The district court granted summary

judgment to Experian, holding that Lovelady had failed to make a prima facie case

for relief because the report was accurate as a matter of law.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Shaw v.

Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 891 F.3d 749, 755 (9th Cir. 2018). Summary judgment

is appropriate where the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). A motion for summary judgment cannot be defeated by mere

conclusory allegations unsupported by evidence. Angel v. Seattle-First Nat’l Bank,

653 F.2d 1293, 1299 (9th Cir. 1981).

To state a prima facie case for relief for either of her claims, Lovelady must

show that the information in her report is inaccurate. Shaw, 891 F.3d at 756.

Information in a consumer report is inaccurate “where it either is patently incorrect

or is misleading in such a way and to such an extent that it can be expected to

adversely affect credit decisions [i.e., it is materially misleading].” Id. (citation

2 25-2720 modified).

Lovelady first argues that the report is patently incorrect because the code

Experian used to report the debt indicates that she is contractually liable for a joint

account. She argues that the term “joint account” has a specific meaning in the

context of credit reporting that denotes direct contractual responsibility for the

account (i.e., that she was a party to the contract with the medical provider, an

endodontist). Because she was not a party to the contract with the endodontist, she

argues that she cannot be a joint account holder of the debt, so the report was

patently incorrect for identifying her as one.

Lovelady has offered no evidence that, in the context of her credit report, the

term “joint account” would be understood to signify that she was a party to the

contract with the endodontist that is the source of the reported debt. “Contractual

responsibility for [a] joint account” could reasonably be understood to cover any

situation in which a consumer enters into a contract that makes her jointly liable

for a debt. Lovelady concedes that she has community responsibility for the debt

by virtue of her marriage to Mr. Lovelady, an act that created a contract between

the two. Even though she is not a party to the contract with the endodontist, she is

a party to a contract with Mr. Lovelady through which she agreed to be jointly

liable for any community debts he assumes. And Arizona is a community property

state that treats necessary medical expenses as community property. Samaritan

3 25-2720 Health Sys. v. Caldwell, 957 P.2d 1373, 1375–76 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).

Accordingly, Lovelady is contractually liable for the debt, which could reasonably

be described as a joint account. For this reason, the report was not patently false.

Lovelady also argues that the report is misleading in two ways.

First, she argues that by identifying her as having debt in collection for

which she has “joint contractual liability,” Experian is (incorrectly) implying that

she contracted with the endodontist to be liable for the debt and that she breached

that contract (i.e., it led lenders to believe that she was not creditworthy because

she breached personal obligations, when it was her husband who breached his

personal obligations). Although the term “joint contractual liability” is arguably

ambiguous because it can describe liability that was assumed in different ways, to

survive summary judgment, Lovelady must provide some evidence that the code

would be misunderstood in the way she argues it might. The only support

Lovelady provides for her argument that the report would be misleading to

creditors are examples discussing the meaning of the term “joint account” in the

context of credit cards. Those are insufficient to show that Experian’s report

would lead creditors to reach an erroneous conclusion about the origin of her

liability for the debt, as opposed to simply putting them on notice that she is jointly

liable for the debt and leaving unspecified the source of her liability.

Second, Lovelady argues that the report was materially misleading because

4 25-2720 it “overstated the extent of [her] liability for the . . . account” by implying that she

is personally liable for the full amount, when her liability is in fact limited to the

extent of her and her husband’s community property. Even assuming that this is

the impression that this report gives, it does not seem to be misleading at all. She

is, in fact, jointly liable for the full amount of the debt.1 Lovelady does not explain

why the fact that the debt can only be satisfied with community property would be

material to creditors, let alone provide evidence to support any argument that it is.

Because there is no genuine factual dispute regarding whether Experian’s

report was patently false or materially misleading, Lovelady has failed to state a

prima facie claim for relief and summary judgment in favor of Experian was

appropriate.

AFFIRMED.

1 Similarly, contrary to Lovelady’s contentions, the possibility that she might need to be sued for the debt for it to actually be collected from her does not change the fact that she owes the debt.

5 25-2720