Lovelace v. Pollan

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
• Decided: September 9, 2024
• Docket: 24-60075
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Case: 24-60075 Document: 38-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/09/2024

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________ United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit No. 24-60075 Summary Calendar FILED September 9, 2024 ____________ Lyle W. Cayce John Lovelace, Jr., Clerk

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Greg Pollan, Sheriff; Andy Eubanks, Jail Administrator,

Defendants—Appellees. ______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi USDC No. 3:22-CV-209 ______________________________

Before Barksdale, Haynes, and Wilson, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * Proceeding pro se, including on appeal, John Lovelace, Jr., Mississippi Department of Corrections # 121893, filed this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Calhoun County, Mississippi, Jail, the Calhoun County Circuit Court, Sheriff Greg Pollan, and jail administrator Andy

_____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 24-60075 Document: 38-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/09/2024

No. 24-60075

Eubanks. After dismissing the circuit court and jail, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Pollan and Eubanks. Although pro se briefs are liberally construed, pro se litigants must brief challenges to a district court judgment for this court to consider them. E.g., Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993). Arguments not briefed are deemed abandoned. See Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987); Mapes v. Bishop, 541 F.3d 582, 584 (5th Cir. 2008). Along that line, Lovelace has abandoned any challenge to the district court’s dismissal of the county jail and circuit court. To the extent Lovelace’s brief seeks to incorporate by reference contentions made in the district court, the effort is unavailing. See Yohey, 985 F.2d at 224–25. Our court reviews a summary judgment de novo. E.g., Cuadra v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 812 (5th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When, as here, however, defendants assert qualified immunity in a summary-judgment motion, “the burden then shifts to the plaintiff, who must rebut the defense”. Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). To overcome qualified immunity, Lovelace must show: defendants violated a constitutional or statutory right; and the right was “clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct”. Cleveland v. Bell, 938 F.3d 672, 675–76 (5th Cir. 2019). Lovelace neither identifies a genuine dispute of material fact nor shows that the district court applied the law erroneously. Although he contends the court erred by not addressing a seizure that occurred after his arrest, our court has held the Fourth Amendment inapplicable to a pretrial detainee who was lawfully arrested. See Jones v. City of Jackson, 203 F.3d

2 Case: 24-60075 Document: 38-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 09/09/2024

875, 880 (5th Cir. 2000). In the alternative, he fails to “point out clearly established law”. In short, he does not overcome qualified immunity. Tucker v. City of Shreveport, 998 F.3d 165, 173 (5th Cir. 2021). The district court’s dismissal of Lovelace’s action constitutes a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated in part on other grounds by Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 537 (2015) (explaining “three strikes” procedure under § 1915(g)). Lovelace is warned that, if he accumulates three strikes, he may not proceed in forma pauperis in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility, unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See § 1915(g). AFFIRMED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.