26CA0238 Loveall v ICAO 09-10-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 26CA0238 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 20961-2025
Steven Loveall, Petitioner, v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado, Respondent.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Sullivan and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced September 10, 2026
Steven Loveall, Pro Se No Appearance for Respondent
¶1 Steven Loveall appeals a final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (the Panel) affirming a hearing officer’s decision disqualifying him from receiving unemployment benefits after he separated from his job at the Colorado Public Defender’s office (the employer). We affirm the Panel’s order.
I. Background
¶2 Loveall worked as a criminal defense investigator for the employer. In early February 2025, he received his annual performance evaluation and was placed on a performance improvement plan (PIP). Shortly thereafter, he took approved leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). On or around February 11, 2025, his supervisor saw signs that Loveall was working on cases and instructed him not to work while on leave.
¶3 At the beginning of March, Loveall began approved leave under Colorado’s Family and Medical Leave Insurance (FAMLI). At the end of March, he went to his office in the employer’s building to “check on his cases” and take home personal items.
¶4 On April 1, 2025, the employer suspended Loveall’s digital access to its electronic records. The next day, the employer’s human resource (HR) representative emailed Loveall that his leave
2
was scheduled to end at the end of that month. She attached a “Fitness to Return to Work” form (the RTW form) for completion. Loveall never completed it.
¶5 A few days later, the office door code was changed because another employee left her employment. Loveall was not officially informed about the door code change, but he learned about it from a coworker. In mid-April, Loveall emailed the HR representative to ask about a reasonable accommodation request he had submitted earlier that month. The representative acknowledged that his request was made and that the employer was working on it. She also reminded Loveall that his physician still needed to complete the RTW form and indicate any work restrictions. On April 25, Loveall emailed his supervisor that he was resigning that day. He said the work environment had “shifted significantly” and it was “impossible” for him to continue. He added that “I imagine anyone in my shoes would feel the same. I have to step away immediately.”
¶6 Loveall applied for unemployment benefits, but a deputy for the Colorado Division of Unemployment Insurance determined that he was disqualified from receiving benefits under section 8-73- 108(5)(e)(XXII), C.R.S. 2026 (quitting employment for personal
3
reasons). Loveall requested a hearing to contest the deputy’s determination. The hearing officer affirmed the disqualification but relied on section 8-73-108(5)(e)(I) (quitting employment because of dissatisfaction with prevailing rates of pay in the industry, standard hours of work, standard working conditions, or working conditions that generally prevail for others doing the same work). Loveall appealed the hearing officer’s decision, and the Panel affirmed.
II. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
¶7 The hearing officer serves as the fact finder in unemployment benefits cases. See Eckart v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 775 P.2d 97, 99 (Colo. App. 1989). A claimant’s entitlement to benefits depends on the reason the claimant separated from his employment — a factual matter for the hearing officer to resolve. Id. We may not disturb the hearing officer’s factual findings if they are “supported by substantial evidence or reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.” Yotes, Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2013 COA 124, ¶ 10.
¶8 We review de novo ultimate conclusions of fact and legal conclusions. Commc’ns Workers of Am. 7717 v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2012 COA 148, ¶ 7; Cath. Health Initiatives Colo. v.
4
Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2021 COA 48, ¶ 14. Whether a claimant is at fault for the separation from employment is an ultimate legal conclusion. Mesa Cnty. Pub. Libr. Dist. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2017 CO 78, ¶ 17.
¶9 We may set aside the Panel’s decision only if (1) the Panel acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the decision was procured by fraud; (3) the findings of fact do not support the decision; or (4) the decision is erroneous as a matter of law. § 8-74- 107(6)(a)-(d), C.R.S. 2026.
III. Analysis
¶ 10 On appeal, representing himself, Loveall argues:
• The Panel misapplied the “constructive discharge framework” under recent case law and section 8-73-
108(4)(c).
• The Panel erroneously analyzed the employer’s interference with protected FAMLI leave.
• The hearing officer erred by not ruling on his “Motion For Adverse Inference.”
• The hearing officer and Panel erred in allocating the burden of proof.
5
• The hearing officer’s decision, affirmed by the Panel, was unsupported by substantial evidence.
¶ 11 We disagree with these contentions and affirm the Panel’s order.
A. Constructive Discharge
¶ 12 Loveall first argues that his job separation was a constructive discharge, citing Potts v. Gaia Children, LLC, 2024 COA 58. In Potts, a former employee brought an action in the district court against her employer for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Id. at ¶ 1. A division of this court considered the doctrine of constructive discharge, which requires an employee to “establish deliberate action on the part of an employer that makes or allows an employee’s working conditions to become so difficult or intolerable that the employee has no other choice but to resign.” Id. at ¶ 27. The division noted that under this doctrine, “[e]mployees cannot simply ‘quit and sue.’” Id. at ¶ 28. Instead, “the conditions giving rise to the resignation must be sufficiently extraordinary and egregious to overcome the normal motivation of competent, diligent, and reasonable employees to remain on the job to earn livelihoods.” Id. Thus, the “proper focus is on whether the
6
resignation was coerced.” Id. The division in Potts ultimately concluded that the employee had not stated a claim for constructive discharge. Id. at ¶ 30.
¶ 13 We reject Loveall’s argument that the Panel should have applied Potts, a case brought in district court under wrongful discharge law, to this unemployment benefits case. “[T]he unemployment statutory scheme was developed to allow a hearing officer discretion to determine the reason for a claimant’s job separation and whether the claimant was at fault.” Keil v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 847 P.2d 235, 239 (Colo. App. 1993). “For the most part, it has been considered to be an organic statute, basically standing alone.” Id. Further, “the purpose of the unemployment statute and case law has been to keep the law and procedures as streamlined as possible.” Id. Grafting the “scope of the civil wrongful discharge area of law” onto the unemployment statutes “would unnecessarily encumber the unemployment statutory scheme.” Id.
¶ 14 Loveall then argues that the Panel should have applied the “objective, cumulative constructive-discharge framework mandated by section 8-73-108(4)(c).” That section, however, requires benefits
7
only when the hearing officer determines that the claimant separated from employment due to objectively unsatisfactory working conditions. See Yotes, Inc., ¶ 12.
¶ 15 Whether working conditions are unsatisfactory is determined by an objective standard. Rodco Sys., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 981 P.2d 699, 701-02 (Colo. App. 1999). A claimant’s subjective statements of discomfort are insufficient to establish unsatisfactory or hazardous working conditions. Id. The objectively unsatisfactory working conditions must exist, and be likely to continue, at the time of the employee’s separation. Yotes, Inc., ¶ 26.
¶ 16 Loveall points to several circumstances to support his claim that his working conditions were objectively unsatisfactory. For example, he argues that the employer was aware of his complaints filed with the Colorado Civil Rights Division and Equal Employment Commission alleging harassment by supervisory personnel. He contends that he was put on the PIP in retaliation for those complaints. He also asserts that his employer violated his rights by “locking him out” of access to the office and electronic files. He further alleges that the employer refused to grant him a reasonable accommodation. We are not persuaded.
8
¶ 17 First, while Loveall argues that his working conditions worsened because he filed harassment complaints, the record shows that the PIP, with an overall “needs improvement” rating, was drafted before his supervisors were aware of the complaints. We agree with the Panel that being put on the PIP was not an objectively unsatisfactory working condition, especially in this case where the hearing officer found that Loveall was put on a PIP the previous year.
¶ 18 Second, although Loveall contends that he was unfairly targeted by a “lock out,” the HR representative testified that disabling an employee’s access to electronic files was not unusual, especially with an employee such as Loveall who was advised not to work while on leave. Additionally, the record amply supports the hearing officer’s finding that the access code to the worksite was changed due to another employee’s departure. In light of those circumstances, Loveall did not show that the employer’s actions constituted an objectively unsatisfactory working condition.
¶ 19 Next, regarding the reasonable accommodation request, the evidence supported the hearing officer’s finding that the request was never actually denied. Indeed, during the hearing, Loveall
9
admitted that he “didn’t have a belief that [the request] would be denied.” The employer representative also testified that she sent Loveall an email, to his personal email address, “trying to inquire about the return to work date,” and that she “didn’t hear a response to that.” She explained that she wanted to get information from his doctor about any restrictions so the employer could assess the need for accommodations. We reject Loveall’s contention that these actions created an objectively unsatisfactory working condition.
¶ 20 Moreover, during the hearing, the hearing officer asked Loveall whether physical or mental health issues prevented Loveall’s ability to do his work in a satisfactory manner, and Loveall responded “no.” The hearing officer asked whether Loveall thought he was treated differently than other criminal investigators, and he responded, “[W]ell, I think so, yes.” That response indicates a subjective, rather than objective, dissatisfaction with working conditions, which is insufficient under section 8-73-108(4)(c). See Rodco, 981 P.2d at 702 (subjective statements of discomfort are not sufficient).
10
B. Interference With FAMLI
¶ 21 The Panel rejected Loveall’s arguments that the employer’s actions interfered with his rights protected by FAMLI.
¶ 22 Under section 8-13.3-509(3), C.R.S. 2026, it is unlawful for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of, or the attempt to exercise, any right protected under FAMLI. As the Panel observed, several subsections of section 8-13.3-509 describe specific employer actions that interfere with a worker taking FAMLI leave. Subsection (2) prohibits the cancellation of health insurance due to the taking of leave. Subsection (3) prohibits the denial of a worker’s attempt to exercise the rights to a medical leave. Subsection (4) prohibits retaliatory personnel actions that impede the rights to apply for FAMLI leave benefits, to communicate an intent to file a claim, or to participate in an investigation regarding the exercise of rights under the statute. We conclude that the Panel correctly determined that none of those circumstances occurred here.
¶ 23 We also agree with the Panel that Loveall’s ability to take leave was not impeded. The employer undisputedly approved the leave. Loveall admits in his brief that the employer was expecting him to
11
return when the leave ended. But Loveall resigned before returning. Loveall cites no case law supporting his argument that the employer’s actions of “locking him out” while on leave interfered with him taking that leave. The employer representatives credibly testified that employees are not supposed to be working during leave. The Panel correctly concluded that the employer’s actions “had no practical effect on Loveall’s employment while he was off work on medical leave.”
C. Motion for Adverse Inference
¶ 24 The day before Loveall’s hearing, he sent seventy-eight pages of documents to the hearing officer and the employer. The employer’s representative testified that she personally had not received those pages. The hearing officer continued the hearing “just because seventy-eight pages is a lot to digest in one day.” The hearing was continued to November 6, over Loveall’s objection.
¶ 25 Loveall then filed a “Motion for Adverse Inference,” alleging that the employer falsely represented that it had not received the pages. He argued that the hearing officer should sanction the employer by immediately ruling for Loveall. At the continued hearing, the hearing officer acknowledged the motion but did not
12
rule on it, noting that she had no authority to sanction the employer.
¶ 26 The Panel evaluated and rejected Loveall’s argument regarding his motion. The Panel noted that the hearing officer acknowledged that she had received the pages, and accepted Loveall’s assertion that the pages had been received by the employer’s third-party administrator. The Panel concluded that the hearing officer granted the continuance because the evidence was voluminous and the testifying witnesses had not reviewed it. The hearing officer said, “if these documents were only sent within the last day or two, the employer does have a right to look them over and share it with their witnesses. So I don’t think that is an unfair thing to allow them to do that.” The hearing officer also agreed to admit the seventy-eight pages as evidence for the continued hearing.
¶ 27 After reviewing the record, we agree with the Panel that the hearing officer did not err in her decision to continue the hearing. See Ward v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 916 P.2d 605, 608 (Colo. App. 1995) (the hearing officer has discretion to determine the order and manner of presentation of witnesses and evidence). We also
13
agree with the Panel’s conclusion that Loveall did not adequately describe how he was prejudiced by the continuance.
D. Burden of Proof
¶ 28 Loveall argues that the employer did not meet its burden of proof because it failed to produce “IT or security logs documenting digital disablement,” a “written policy on lockouts,” and “documentation identifying decision makers.” We are not persuaded.
¶ 29 A claimant has the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of entitlement to unemployment benefits. Ward, 916 P.2d at 607. He meets this burden by showing that he was in covered employment and that the separation from employment was for reasons which, if proven, would justify an award of benefits. Id. The burden then shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the claimant’s termination was for a reason that would disqualify the claimant from the receipt of benefits. Id. The claimant then must present evidence to justify the acts that led to the separation and show that he is entitled to benefits. Id.
¶ 30 Assuming without deciding that Loveall satisfied his initial burden, the employer met its burden to show disqualification under
14
section 8-73-108(5)(e)(I). The employer sufficiently showed, through documentation and testimony, that Loveall quit because he was subjectively dissatisfied with standard working conditions, or working conditions that generally prevail for others doing the same work. See Arias v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 850 P.2d 161, 163 (Colo. App. 1993) (if the claimant’s job separation was caused by unsatisfactory working conditions, he is entitled to an award only if the conditions were less favorable to him than conditions prevailing among similar workers). We discern no error in the Panel’s conclusion that the employer met its burden to show disqualification under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(1), and that Loveall did not meet his burden to demonstrate that he was entitled to benefits under section 8-73-108(4)(c).
E. Substantial Evidence
¶ 31 Finally, Loveall argues that the Panel erred by affirming the hearing officer’s decision because it was not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
¶ 32 The Panel’s order was thirteen pages long and extensively cited to testimony and documents in the record. It concluded that Loveall’s claimed “barriers to his continued work” were not
15
permanent. For instance, when Loveall was asked during the hearing whether he was aware that he could not return to work prior to completing the RTW form, he responded, “Oh yes, absolutely.” While he alleged that he was asked to complete the form prematurely, there was nothing preventing him from completing it and returning to work at the end of his leave. Instead, he chose to submit his resignation on April 25. We conclude that the hearing officer’s decision, as affirmed by the Panel, is supported by substantial evidence. See Cole v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 964 P.2d 617, 619 (Colo. App. 1998) (holding that, while a claimant may have had “subjectively compelling personal reasons for quitting,” she was not entitled to unemployment benefits “unless she established that her separation was essentially involuntary under the objective circumstances shown”).
IV. Disposition
¶ 33 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE SULLIVAN and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.