Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Co. v. Graham

24 N.E. 668, 124 Ind. 89, 1890 Ind. LEXIS 278
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedMay 27, 1890
DocketNo. 14,225
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 24 N.E. 668 (Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Co. v. Graham) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Co. v. Graham, 24 N.E. 668, 124 Ind. 89, 1890 Ind. LEXIS 278 (Ind. 1890).

Opinion

Olds, J.

This was an action brought by the appellee against the appellant for negligently causing the death of appellee’s decedent. The death of Miller occurred while he was repairing a tunnel on appellant’s line of railroad in Greene county, Indiana, caused by the falling of stone and dirt, and the giving way of the timbers.

There was a trial by a jury, and a special verdict returned, and judgment rendered on the special verdict in favor of the appellee.

Numerous errors are assigned, but the only ones discussed are the overruling of appellant’s demurrer to the first and second paragraphs of complaint, upon which paragraphs the trial was had, and the ruling of the court in overruling the appellant’s motion for judgment on the special verdict.

It is contended that each paragraph of the complaint is bad, for the reason that it clearly appears from each of them that the work in which the deceased was engaged was necessarily hazardous, and that the deceased assumed the risk resulting from falling stone and dirt, and that at least the complaint does not show that the danger could not have been known to the deceased by the use of ordinary diligence on his part.

The complaint is not subject to the objections urged to it. It alleges the insufficiency of the braces and the dangerous condition of the tunnel, and that it had long remained in such condition, and that the appellant knowingly allowed [91]*91it to become and remain in such condition; that the defendant well knew the dangerous condition of the tunnel, and that its condition was not visible by ordinary observation; that the appellant, without any fault whatever on the part of the deceased, and without any warning to him of the character or condition of the supports, braces or walls, or of the danger at said point, ordered deceased to work at the place where he was injured and killed, and exposed him to the perils and hazards of falling timbers, stories and dirt; that said deceased at the time was wholly free from fault on his part, and wholly ignorant of the condition or character of said tunnel, rocks, dirt and support at said point and at said time.

The allegations of. the complaint, and each paragraph thereof, are clearly sufficient to avoid the objections urged against them.

The jury, in their special verdict,'found the following facts:

“ That the defendant (the appellant) was a duly organized corporation operating the road, etc.; that the said Alonzo Miller died by reason of the injuries received in the tunnel ; that he left surviving him as his sole heirs his wife, who had born to her a child, the issue of said marriage, the day following the burial of the deceased.
“ That the said tunnel, on the line of defendant’s road, in July, 1886, was badly out of repair by reason of the supports, which were of wood 10 by 12 inches square, and caps of the same size, breaking down and falling in, together with the dirt and stones above and about them at the east end of said tunnel; that the defendant corporation left the management and control of the repairs thus going on in said tunnel to one George Richards, a boss and foreman; that said George Richards, foreman, on .the day of the killing of Alonzo Miller, and prior to that time, and during the month of July, 1886, was in the employ of the defendant, and as defendant’s foreman, superintending the repairs and work going on [92]*92in said tunnel, ordering, directing and giving instructions to the men therein employed and at work, and at the time of the killing of said Miller the said Richards, foreman, was the sole and only agent of the defendant in said tunnel exercising authority or having power over said Miller and said men ; that said Richards had employed said Miller, deceased, and said men, for the defendant; that when said men were paid Richards paid them for the defendant as defendant’s agent and foreman, and that when men were discharged Richards was the man who discharged them ; that said Richards was knowingly permitted by the defendant to exercise full authority at said time over said men ; that he had power to employ, oversee and dischai’ge men.
“ That said Richards had been engaged on said road and in and about said tunnel for about nine years, and had charge, for several years prior to the killing of said Miller, of the bents, timbers, uprights and supports in said tunnel, and was thoroughly familiar therewith, and was fully advised of the dangerous character of said supports and of the sides and walls of said tunnel at, near and about the point where the said Miller was killed.
That said Miller was employed as a common day laborer in the year 1886 by said Richards, defendant’s foreman, to work in and out of said tunnel; that on the day of said Miller’s death he was at work on the outside of said tunnel, at the west end thereof, shovelling dirt, together with other men employed by said Richards; that while so at work said Richards ordered him into the tunnel to work to help the bridge men ; that at said time said Richards had the superintendency of two gangs of men as foreman, one a gang of bridge men or carpenters, and the other common laborers, to which last said Miller belonged, but was frequently called upon and required by said Richards to help the bridge carpenters.
That upon the day of his death, by the order of Richai-ds, Miller went into the tunnel about 135 feet from the east [93]*93end thereof, and assisted the carpenters in raising a bent; that said bent was raised and put up under the supervision and direction of said Richards, foreman, for defendant, and said Richards was the only foreman, engineer, master mechanic or road master of the defendant in or about said tunnel ; that at said point the old bents in said tunnel -were of oak timber, 10 by 12 inches square, and the caps were of the same size, and the new bents were 12 by 12 inches square, and the caps 12 by 14 inches square ; that said Richards at the time knew that the old bents were too light, and insufficient for the purpose, and for that reason the same was being repaired and new timbers being put in at that time at that place • that at that point it was so dark that many of the employees were using miners’ lamps.
“ That about six feet west of the new bent which Miller assisted to put in, there was the post, the upright piece supporting an old bent, and prior to said day there had been attached timbers, called bagging, with .dirt behind them, which served to support and brace the walls and stone in the rear behind the post) that on the morning of the day of the death of Miller, by order of Richards, bagging was removed, leaving the walls and sides of the tunnel at that point unsupported and unbraced.
That between the said post or upright piece of the old bent and the new bent, near where the bagging had been removed, and on the same side of the tunnel, by order of Richards, a hole, called a hitch, was being dug for the purpose of setting another bent next west of the other new one which Miller helped to raise, and was about three or four feet west of the old one referred to;

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Bluebook (online)
24 N.E. 668, 124 Ind. 89, 1890 Ind. LEXIS 278, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/louisville-new-albany-chicago-railway-co-v-graham-ind-1890.