Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. White's Administrator

180 S.W. 353, 167 Ky. 244, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 831
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedDecember 9, 1915
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 180 S.W. 353 (Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. White's Administrator) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. White's Administrator, 180 S.W. 353, 167 Ky. 244, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 831 (Ky. Ct. App. 1915).

Opinion

[245]*245Opinion op the Court by

Judge Carroll

Affirming.

This appeal is prosecuted from a judgment of the Shelby Circuit Court awarding the appellee five thousand dollars damages against the appellant for the death of Warren White.

The only ground relied on for reversal- is that the trial court should have directed a- verdict for the appellant on the ground that the negligence of the decedent was the proximate cause of the accident which resulted in his death.

The facts of the case are as follows: A carload of freight, contained in what is known as a box car, was shipped from Louisville to Shelbyville, Ky. In this car there were several bundles of ordinary house doors, all of them weighing about 1,100 pounds. These bundles of doors when load,ed in the car at Louisville were' set up on the end one bundle against the other, and against the side of the car, the bottoms of the doors resting on the floor of the car and the tops nearly reaching the roof of the car. After these doors had been so placed in the car a large quantity of other merchandise was also placed in the car, and this merchandise, or at least some of it, was piled up against the doors, thus preventing them from falling, as it appears they would have done if not protected by the merchandise. When the car reached Shelbyville and was placed on the siding for the purpose of being unloaded, the merchandise, or, at any rate, that part of it that was against the doors, had been taken out when the decedent, who was working for the consignee of the doors, went into the car by the invitation, if not request, of the station agent of the appellant, for the purpose of taking the doors out of the car; and just'as he had commenced, or while he was in the act of removing them, the doors that were then unsupported by any merchandise fell on him, killing him instantly.

The action against the appellant .by the administrator of decedent was rested on the ground that it was the duty of the appellant to have used ordinary care to have the doors in a reasonably safe condition to be unloaded by the decedent, and so if at the time he went into the car for the purpose of unloading them, it negligently failed to have the doors in a reasonably safe condition to be removed, and as a direct result of its negli[246]*246gence in this respect the decedent, while in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety, was struck and killed by the fálling of the doors, his administrator was entitled to recover damages for his' death.

That a railroad company may be héld liable in damages for injuries caused by its failure to exercise ordinary care to keep its premises and cars to which it invites persons having business with it, in a reasonably safe condition for their use while there engaged in the business they have been invited or requested to attend to, has been announced by this court in more than one case. '

In L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Freppon, 134 Ky., 650, Freppon, an employe, of the Henderson Tobacco Extract Co., was injured by a defective door on a car of the railroad company while he was attempting to open the door for the purpose of getting coke out which had been consigned to his employer. Holding that under the facts of that case the railroad company was liable, the court said:

“When a carrier delivers a car to a consignor to be loaded, or a consignee to be unloaded, it must have the car in a reasonably safe condition for the purpose for which it is intended to be used. In the absence of an express agreement, the law will raise an implied contract to this effect, and, under and by virtue of this implied contract, a recovery for a breach of it may be had b^ any person injured while engaged in loading or unloading’ the ear and exercising ordinary care for his own safety.
“Ther duties and obligations of a common- carrier to the public are not suspended during the time that its cars are being used by its patrons for purposes of loading or unloading. When it delivers a car for this purpose and invites its customers to use it, it undertakes that the car is in a reasonably safe condition to be used for the purposes intended.” To the same effect are L & N. R. R. Co. v. Burch, 155 Ky., 245, and Franklin’s Admr. v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 155 Ky., 594.

The decedent was under no duty to inspect or examine the car or its contents for the purpose of discovering whether either of them was in safe condition.- He had been invited to enter the car by the railroad company, and the full measure of his duty was to exercise ordinary care for his own safety. But, of course,- if he • saw a [247]*247danger he conld not voluntarily or heedlessly go into it, because this would not be exercising ordinary care for. his own,safety. Likewise, if by, his own acts he inten-, tionally or negligently converted a safe place, into one. that he knew, or in the , exercise of ordinary care should have known, was dangerous, the railroad company would not be liable, for the thing that caused the injury would be the act of the decedent and not the act of the railroad company.

We, therefore, come to a more careful consideration of the evidence for the purpose of ascertaining whether, the falling of the doors and the respiting injury was due to the negligence of the railroad company or to the failure of the decedent to exercise ordinary care for his own safety.

There seems to-be no..serious-dispute as.to the fact that these bundles of doors, standing perpendicularly, against the wall of the car, were liable to fall at any time when the merchandise piled against them was removed. When it was removed there was nothing to keep the. doors from falling, as they were standing directly upright. Appreciating the fact that the position of the doors, standing as they, were unprotected by merchandise, made the interior of the car unsafe for persons having the right to be there, the railroad company puts its claim for a directed verdict distinctly on the ground that the decedent, after the outside bundle of doors had been set out at the bottom several inches, so that the top of it leaned against the inside bundles, thereby preventing any of them from falling, voluntarily so moved the outside bundle as to change it from its leaning-position, thus producing the dangerous condition that caused the doors to fall.

The evidence shows that some two or three hours before the decedent was killed a man named McGinnis went into the car. He said that after removing the merchandise that was against the doors, he saw that these doors were standing directly upright. That his attention was called to them by Lee, the station agent of the railroad company. Asked what Lee said, he answered: “Why, I moved those two bundles of sash around to-the end of the two rows-of doors, and Mr. Lee, as I let loose of the sash, holloed;- 'Look out; the doors are falling!’ Q. What were those doors doing at the time you caught them? A. They were falling. Q.[248]*248When you removed that sash, how long was it before the doors began to fall? A. When I removed the sash I was in front of the doors; Just as soon as I took the sash out the doors began to fall, and Mr. Lee began to hollo at me, and I caught them. Q. What did you do after you caught the doors? A. I took the two front bundles in each row and walked them out and leaned them against the next bundles of doors. I did not do anything to the other doors.

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Bluebook (online)
180 S.W. 353, 167 Ky. 244, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 831, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/louisville-nashville-railroad-v-whites-administrator-kyctapp-1915.