Mr. Justice McKenna,
after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
A motion is made to dismiss the writ of error, on the ground that no Federal question was raised in the state courts or decided by them.. In opposition to the motion plaintiff in error Contends" that the allegations of the bill and its denial thereof sufficiently raise a Federal question, and that the courts of .the1 State, in rehdering judgment against plaintiff in error, necessarily decided that, question. And it is.. further con-tendéd that even if those courts did not pass on the Federal question, their failure..or .refusal to do so is equivalent to a detíisión against the .Federal rights involved. A number of cases'are cited to sustain these propositions. But is the basis of the propositions sound? In other words,, was a Federal question raised, ór, if raised, ignored? First, as to1 the pleadings. The bill charges. a breach of the contracts of ship
ment by one or the other of the railway companies who, the '.bill alleges, were connecting common carriers, and as such bound by the contracts and the law relative to common' carriers to receive and forward to destination the goods shipped in good order and in a reasonable time. Plaintiff in error admitted that it was a common carrier in some States, but •was not a connecting and ultimate carrier of the corn in question, denied that it was bound by the contracts, and denied that “it was' bound by law” to receive the com and-forward and deliver it .to its ultimate destination. And this denial, 'it is insisted, raised a Federal question, We do not think so. The denial was of a legal conclusion resulting from the facts alleged, and added nothing to them. Besides, if. a party relies upon a Federal right, he must specially set it up, and a denial of liability under the law is not a compliance with that requirement. ' For this we need- not cite cases.
Was'a Federal question decided or-ignored? To answer the question a review of the proceedings is necessary. The chancery court held that, as between the complainant and plaintiff in error, there was tío liability upon the part of .the latter.'- The rights of the railway companies, between Themselves, the court said, need not be determined.'. • The opinion and findings of the Chancery Court of Appeals are very elaborate. They- state the issue, the proceedings in' and the judgment of .the chancery court and recite that—
“Now, it- appears that the Louisville and Nashville Railway denies any liability for its refusal to receive corn shipped over the Southern Railway after its arrival at Birmingham and" deliver it over its terrifinal tracks to the American Mill and Elevator Company, to whom the corn had been sold.
“Of course, this denial-is predicated upon the-idea1 that it was nots¿ connecting carrier in handling the shipments of corn involved in this case, or that it was under' any obligation respecting the same.”
Passing on these denials the court said- that at the time of the shipments the Southern Railway Company was placing
"shipments, as it was requested, upon the spur track of plaintiff in error, 'and that the latter was aecustóméd to receive them and remove them to places where they were to be -delivered; and this was its custom for years, and until about the time or just before the corn reached Birmingham, “it ..was a part of its business and a daily occurrence to receive and remove such cars of freight.” And this was done for all persons offering them and without discrimination. For this service it received compensation. The court, however, also found that plaintiff in error “placed an embargo upon the receipt or handling of such cars., November 13,.. 1902, after the complainant had contracted to sell the carloads of corn and after most of them were shipped.”
The contention, of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company,'the court stated as follows:
“The contention of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, reduced to its simplest statement, is that it was not bound to receive these cars of corn and place them.
“This insistence on its part rests .upon the proposition that, in the matter of handling the cars of other roads in its yards or over its spur tracks, it was not a common carrier, but simply a private carrier, and that this being.so, it had the right to refuse to receive and handle these cars, and as a" corollary to this proposition, that it had the right to discriminate between freight arriving in Birmingham over its lines. and freight arriving over other lines, and could give preference between those that it chose to serve .in this business.”
The court decided against, the contention, and that the company, by reason of its practice in handling freight, “assumed with respect thereto the character of a common carrier, and hence incurred the duties and liabilities of such character.” The court added:
“The result is that we are of opinion that the Louisville and Nashville Railway Company was'bound, by virtue of its previous course of business, to accept these cars of corn and deliver them to their destination on its terminal or spur
tracks, and that by reason of its failure to do so, it is liable for all damages resulting from its failure, - . .
There was a petition for an additional finding of fact and a rehearing, which the court said would take in the neighborhood of one hundred pages of typewritten information to set out and answer in the form in which. they were presented. Some, however, were granted; some qualified. We give only those which we think are relevant. The fifteenth request was that,the court set out in full from the evidence, which was, it was said, uncontradicted, the conditions which caused the embargo to be laid by plaintiff in error against switching. The evidence was set out. The court, answering the request, said:
“The simple fact in connection with this matter is that the Louisville and Nashville Eailroad Company declined to receive these cars of corn and deliver them to .their destination on their spur or side tracks, because it deemed it to its advantage to use its said tracks for and in its own special business.”
The twenty-fifth request was-“that, the terminals and equipment of the Louisville and Nashville Eailroad Company at that time were sufficient under ordinary circumstances and conditions.” In granting this request the court remarked:
“The twenty-fifth request is granted, with the statement-that in our opinion, based upon the evidence as we construe it, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company could have handled this corn and delivered it to its destination much sooner than it did had it not preferred other business,' and even with that business, with the energetic appliance of all the means and facilities at its command.”
It will be seen from this statement of the case that there is not a word in it which refers to the Interstate Commerce Act or the assertion of any rights under that act.
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Mr. Justice McKenna,
after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
A motion is made to dismiss the writ of error, on the ground that no Federal question was raised in the state courts or decided by them.. In opposition to the motion plaintiff in error Contends" that the allegations of the bill and its denial thereof sufficiently raise a Federal question, and that the courts of .the1 State, in rehdering judgment against plaintiff in error, necessarily decided that, question. And it is.. further con-tendéd that even if those courts did not pass on the Federal question, their failure..or .refusal to do so is equivalent to a detíisión against the .Federal rights involved. A number of cases'are cited to sustain these propositions. But is the basis of the propositions sound? In other words,, was a Federal question raised, ór, if raised, ignored? First, as to1 the pleadings. The bill charges. a breach of the contracts of ship
ment by one or the other of the railway companies who, the '.bill alleges, were connecting common carriers, and as such bound by the contracts and the law relative to common' carriers to receive and forward to destination the goods shipped in good order and in a reasonable time. Plaintiff in error admitted that it was a common carrier in some States, but •was not a connecting and ultimate carrier of the corn in question, denied that it was bound by the contracts, and denied that “it was' bound by law” to receive the com and-forward and deliver it .to its ultimate destination. And this denial, 'it is insisted, raised a Federal question, We do not think so. The denial was of a legal conclusion resulting from the facts alleged, and added nothing to them. Besides, if. a party relies upon a Federal right, he must specially set it up, and a denial of liability under the law is not a compliance with that requirement. ' For this we need- not cite cases.
Was'a Federal question decided or-ignored? To answer the question a review of the proceedings is necessary. The chancery court held that, as between the complainant and plaintiff in error, there was tío liability upon the part of .the latter.'- The rights of the railway companies, between Themselves, the court said, need not be determined.'. • The opinion and findings of the Chancery Court of Appeals are very elaborate. They- state the issue, the proceedings in' and the judgment of .the chancery court and recite that—
“Now, it- appears that the Louisville and Nashville Railway denies any liability for its refusal to receive corn shipped over the Southern Railway after its arrival at Birmingham and" deliver it over its terrifinal tracks to the American Mill and Elevator Company, to whom the corn had been sold.
“Of course, this denial-is predicated upon the-idea1 that it was nots¿ connecting carrier in handling the shipments of corn involved in this case, or that it was under' any obligation respecting the same.”
Passing on these denials the court said- that at the time of the shipments the Southern Railway Company was placing
"shipments, as it was requested, upon the spur track of plaintiff in error, 'and that the latter was aecustóméd to receive them and remove them to places where they were to be -delivered; and this was its custom for years, and until about the time or just before the corn reached Birmingham, “it ..was a part of its business and a daily occurrence to receive and remove such cars of freight.” And this was done for all persons offering them and without discrimination. For this service it received compensation. The court, however, also found that plaintiff in error “placed an embargo upon the receipt or handling of such cars., November 13,.. 1902, after the complainant had contracted to sell the carloads of corn and after most of them were shipped.”
The contention, of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company,'the court stated as follows:
“The contention of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, reduced to its simplest statement, is that it was not bound to receive these cars of corn and place them.
“This insistence on its part rests .upon the proposition that, in the matter of handling the cars of other roads in its yards or over its spur tracks, it was not a common carrier, but simply a private carrier, and that this being.so, it had the right to refuse to receive and handle these cars, and as a" corollary to this proposition, that it had the right to discriminate between freight arriving in Birmingham over its lines. and freight arriving over other lines, and could give preference between those that it chose to serve .in this business.”
The court decided against, the contention, and that the company, by reason of its practice in handling freight, “assumed with respect thereto the character of a common carrier, and hence incurred the duties and liabilities of such character.” The court added:
“The result is that we are of opinion that the Louisville and Nashville Railway Company was'bound, by virtue of its previous course of business, to accept these cars of corn and deliver them to their destination on its terminal or spur
tracks, and that by reason of its failure to do so, it is liable for all damages resulting from its failure, - . .
There was a petition for an additional finding of fact and a rehearing, which the court said would take in the neighborhood of one hundred pages of typewritten information to set out and answer in the form in which. they were presented. Some, however, were granted; some qualified. We give only those which we think are relevant. The fifteenth request was that,the court set out in full from the evidence, which was, it was said, uncontradicted, the conditions which caused the embargo to be laid by plaintiff in error against switching. The evidence was set out. The court, answering the request, said:
“The simple fact in connection with this matter is that the Louisville and Nashville Eailroad Company declined to receive these cars of corn and deliver them to .their destination on their spur or side tracks, because it deemed it to its advantage to use its said tracks for and in its own special business.”
The twenty-fifth request was-“that, the terminals and equipment of the Louisville and Nashville Eailroad Company at that time were sufficient under ordinary circumstances and conditions.” In granting this request the court remarked:
“The twenty-fifth request is granted, with the statement-that in our opinion, based upon the evidence as we construe it, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company could have handled this corn and delivered it to its destination much sooner than it did had it not preferred other business,' and even with that business, with the energetic appliance of all the means and facilities at its command.”
It will be seen from this statement of the case that there is not a word in it which refers to the Interstate Commerce Act or the assertion of any rights under that act. Plaintiff in error accounts for the want of explicit statement on the ground that the action was instituted and tried, until the decision of the chancery court, upon the theory that the Southern Railway Company and plaintiff in error were “connecting car
riers,” and that this theory of the ease having been disproved and the appeal dismissed as to plaintiff in error, complainant (defendant in error) shifted its position, and under the broad practice and pleading in the state court was allowed, to proceed- and procure judgment upon the theory that plaintiff in error had discriminated against defendant in error by preferring its own business, that it had failed to' furnish equal facilities for interchange as to this shipment, and that, on account of its previous switching arrangements with the Southern Railway Company, it had no right- to refuse to “switch” the cars over its terminals. The rectird furnishes no justification for this contention. The bill charged the railroad companies as being connecting common carriers, plaintiff in error, being' the ultimate carrier, and that both were bound by the contracts made, and bound to carry the corn from the points of shipment to destination. Plaintiff in error denied these allegations, as we have seen, and on the issue thus formed proof was taken.
The chancery court found, it is true, in favor of plaintiff in error. The case was taken to the Court of Chancery Appeals, where it was heard, the record' recites, “upon the transcript of the record from the Chancery Court of Jefferson County and upon the assignments of error and briefs of counsel.” In other words, the Court of Chancery Appeals heard the case as made in the chancery court. What the Chancery Court of Appeals said of the issues and contentions of the parties we have already stated, and we need only repeat that the assignment of error by complainant (defendant in error) in the Chancery Court of Appeals was general, and showed no change in the theory upon which the case was brought and conducted. It was that the chancery court erred in holding that there was no liability on the part of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, and in refusing to hold that it was liable either alone or jointly with the other company. And the court said that the denial of plaintiff in error of liability was “predicated upon the idea that it was not a
connecting carrier in handling the shipments of corn involved in this case, or that it was under no obligations respecting the same.” It is true the court also said that plaintiff in error contended “that it had the right to discriminate between freight arriving -in Birmingham over its lines and freight arriving over other lines, and could give preference between those that it chose to serve in this business,” but this contention, it was also said, was “as a corollary” to the proposition that plaintiff in error was not a common carrier, but simply a private carrier. The court determined against this proposition, and in consequence adjudged plaintiff in error liable. In other words, the judgment of the court was in exact response to the pleading. Nor was there any change on appeal to the Supreme Court. The railroad company’s second assignment of error was (and it is the only one with which we can concern ourselves) that it was not “liable for any portion of the alleged damage to these various shipments, because under the facts of this case it was not a connecting carrier and was not bound to handle these shipments. ...”
There is in the printed record a certificate of the Chief Justice of the Súpleme Court of the State, given when the writ of error was applied for, to the effect that ..the Supreme Court of the State was of opinion “that the statutes and laws of Tennessee were not in conflict with the act of Congress regulating interstate commerce, and that the act of Congress did not control the shipments in controversy.” Counsel concedes the rule to be that the certificate of the presiding judge of a state court is insufficient to give us jurisdiction, but insists that it can make more certain and specific what is too general and indefinite in the record. There is no doubt of the rule, but there is nothing in this record to justify its application. There is nothing in the record .to specialize. It' is less open to conjecture than the certificate. As no Federal question was raised, the motion to dismiss must be granted.
It is so ordered.