Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Moran

146 S.W. 1131, 148 Ky. 418, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 476
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedMay 16, 1912
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 146 S.W. 1131 (Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Moran) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Moran, 146 S.W. 1131, 148 Ky. 418, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 476 (Ky. Ct. App. 1912).

Opinion

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Carroll —

Reversing.

The appellee, Moran, was the fireman, and W. F. Porter, the engineer, on a railroad engine that went through an open draw-bridge — that had been opened for the purpose of permitting a steamboat to pass through. The engineer, Porter, was killed, and Moran, the fireman, seriously injured. To recover damages for the injuries sustained Moran brought this action against the appellant company and upon a trial before a jury was awarded $4,000.

As the accident happened in the State of Tennessee, the rights of the plaintiff and the liability of the company are to be determined by the laws of that State. L. & N. R. Co. v. Smith, 135 Ky., 462. Under the laws of Tennessee, the engineer and fireman are fellow servants* and no recovery can be had by one on account of injuries sustained by the negligence of the other. L. & N. R. Co. v. Keiffer, 132 Ky., 419. This being so, the appellee rested his right to recover upon the negligence of the bridge tenders who had charge of the draw-bridge that was open at the time the injury complained of occurred, .although an unsuccessful effort was made to show negligence on the part of the conductor of the train.

We may, therefore, say, at the very outset, that whether or not appellee was entitled to recover damages depends entirely upon the question whether or not the bridge tenders were negligent in the performance of their duties, for, if they were not negligent, the appellee failed tó make out a case to go to the jury. Perceiving that this was the real question in the case, practically all of the evidence introduced in behalf of the appellee was directed by his counsel to establishing the negligence of these bridge tenders in two respects, first, in failing to give proper signals to the engineer that the draw-bridge was open, and second, in opening it when they knew it [420]*420was not necessary that it should be open and also knew that the train was-due.

On the other'hand, counsel for the 'railróád company prédicated their defense upon the proposition that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the engineer. It is true there is some attempt to show that appellee, Moran, whs guilty of negligence, but we do not think it necessary to take any time upon this issue as there is no evidence of his negligence in the record.

If the injuries sustained by appellee were the result solely of the negligence of the engineer, he can not’ recover ; but if they were the result solely of the negligence of the bridge tenders, or the concurring negligence of the engineer and the bridge tenders, he can recover. But, as the issue is sharply made as to whether the accident was due solely to the negligence of the engineer or solely to the negligence of the bridge tenders, wé may state that the decisive question in the case is — was- the accident due to the negligence of the engineer or the negligence of the bridge tenders?

The train to which the accident occurred was a passenger train coming north on its way from Paris, Tennessee, to Bowling Green, Kentucky, and consisted of an engine and five passenger coaches. The engine and two of the coaches went through the open bridge, while the other coaches remained standing on the track. The accident happened about eight o’clock in the evening, in September, 1906; and at the time, the train was a few minutes behind its regular schedule time. The bridge which spans Cumberland river is 675 feet long, the draw span being in the center of the river, with a stationary span on each end of the draw span. The stationary span on the south side of the fiver, from which the train was approaching, is 215 feet long, and there is a trestle extending south from this stationary span 2,200 feet. On the trestle and 329 feet from the south end of the draw span and 114 feet from the south end of the Stationary span, there is a stop board with the word “stop” on it.

The rules of the company, and which were put in evidence by appellee, regulating the movement of trains at this bridge, provide that:

“Enginemen will at all times when approaching draw bridges give four short blasts of the whistle when opposite the signal post situated one-half mile from [421]*421eaeh draw bridge. ■ A danger signal is displayed in the center of each draw.span,;inside the sp.an, at all times, except when removed, for ^passage of trains. 'A safety signal, as provided in rule 60, indicíales that draw is improper position for passage of trains. Enginemen of all trains must approach all draw bridges with .their trains under full control,-.and must not pass the signal post erected at eagh draw-bridge until the danger signal is removed and th,e' safety signal displayed, which must be done in their view, 'In case of failure to display these signals, as herein directed, enginemen must be governed by rule 65, and must know that the draw-bridge is in proper position .before proceeding. Trains must not exceed a speed of six miles per hour in passing draw bridges. Draw tenders must display the proper signals as provided in the foregoing rules and must not attempt to change signals from danger to safety until they know that enginemen can plainly see the change made.”

It is also shown, by the evidence of appellee that a white light raised, and lowered vertically is a safety signal, or a signal to move .ahead; or, as said in rule 60: “A lamp raised and lowered vertically is a signal to move ahead.” Another rule provides that:

“A signal imperfectly displayed, or the absence of a signal where a signal is usually shown, must be regarded as a danger signal.”

The rules also provide that a red light at night signifies danger, and means that the train must come to a stop.

The rules governing the opening of draw-bridges to permit the passage of boats are prescribed by the United States Government, and these rules among other things, provide that:

“Whenever a steamboat approaches any drawbridge, and desires to pass through the draw thereof, the officer or person in charge of said steamboat shall cause to be sounded when said boat is within twenty minutes run of the bridge four distinct blasts of the steam whistle, and shall repeat the same at intervals of five minutes until it is seen from the boat that the signal is understood on the bridge and that the bridge is being opened. Upon hearing the signal prescribed, the tenders or operators of the draw-bridge shall at once open the draw spans of the bridge for the prompt passage of said steamboat, provided; that the draw may not be opened [422]*422when there is a train, wagon or vehicle at the time passing over said draw span, or a train approaching so closely that it can not be safely stopped before reaching the bridge.”

The appellee in his own behalf testified that Porter, the engineer, after he came on the trestle, sounded four blasts of the whistle, calling for a signal from the bridge tenders, and in a moment afterwards sounded two short blasts, indicating that he had received the safety signal from the tenders. That when he called for the signal, the bridge tender picked up the red light, and the engineer released the brake, which he had put in service application shortly before giving the four blasts, the effect of which was to increase the speed of the train. That in a moment afterwards the emergency brakes were applied, and he then saw that the draw bridge was open, and jumped or attempted to jump from the engine. He was asked these questions:

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
146 S.W. 1131, 148 Ky. 418, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 476, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/louisville-nashville-railroad-v-moran-kyctapp-1912.