Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Kelton

112 Ala. 533
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedNovember 15, 1895
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 112 Ala. 533 (Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Kelton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Kelton, 112 Ala. 533 (Ala. 1895).

Opinion

HEAD, J.

In Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Ingram, 98 Ala. 395, following the former cases of M. & C. R. R. Co. v. Lyon, 62 Ala. 71, and A. G. S. R. R. Co. v. [537]*537Jones, 71 Ala. 487, we ruled that a railroad company injuring stock by the running of its train in the night-time at such rapid rate of speed that it is impossible, by the use of ordinary means and appliances, to stop the train and prevent the injury, within the distance in which the stock upon the track could be seen by the aid of the head-light was guilty of negligence, which, if it caused the injury, entitled the owner to recover. That decision has been followed in several eases. — L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Gentry, 103 Ala. 638 ; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Davis, Ib. 661; B. M. R. R. Co. v. Harris, 98 Ala. 326 ; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Cochran, 105 Ala. 354. We are now asked to reconsider and change that ruling. We have again considered it, and perceive the force of the elaborate and able argument of appellant’s counsel, but we are satisfied that the rule declared is right and decline to disturb it.

We think, however, that the first oral instruction of the court to which exception was reserved, while hypothesizing facts which constitute negligence within the rule of Ingram’s Case, was faulty in ignoring all causal relation between such negligence and the injury. If that negligence did not cause the injury, plaintiff, of course, could not recover on account of it. The instruction should have submitted that question to the jury.

The second and third oral instructions were free from error.

For the error in giving the first oral instruction, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

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Related

Louisville Nashville Railroad Co. v. Dailey
226 So. 2d 84 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1969)
Louisville Nashville Railroad Company v. Yates
81 So. 2d 620 (Alabama Court of Appeals, 1955)
Louisville Nashville Railroad Co. v. Moseley
81 So. 2d 318 (Alabama Court of Appeals, 1954)
Louisville N. R. Co. v. King
67 So. 2d 49 (Alabama Court of Appeals, 1953)
Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Fox
65 So. 917 (Alabama Court of Appeals, 1914)
Vicknair v. Louisiana Railway & Navigation Co.
11 Teiss. 76 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1913)
Weatherly v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway
51 So. 959 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1909)
Central of Georgia Ry. v. Larkins
142 Ala. 375 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1904)
Anniston Electric & Gas Co. v. Hewitt
139 Ala. 442 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1903)
Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Stark
126 Ala. 365 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1899)
Alabama Midland Railway Co. v. McGill
121 Ala. 230 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1898)

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Bluebook (online)
112 Ala. 533, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/louisville-nashville-railroad-v-kelton-ala-1895.