Louisville & N. R. v. Robin

135 F.2d 704, 1943 U.S. App. LEXIS 3358
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedMay 6, 1943
DocketNo. 10241
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 135 F.2d 704 (Louisville & N. R. v. Robin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Louisville & N. R. v. Robin, 135 F.2d 704, 1943 U.S. App. LEXIS 3358 (5th Cir. 1943).

Opinions

SIBLEY, Circuit Judge.

The Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company on November 28, 1938, filed a petition in the District Court for the appointment of a successor trustee to recover from the State of New York a fund of $10,890, which that State had taken over from a New York bank as an abandoned account. The fund was alleged to be the balance of a fund put into the hands of trustees by the Circuit Court in 1880 to be disbursed under a decree of the court, which balance was alleged now to belong to the petitioner. The Court appointed James A. Robin as successor trustee, he recovered the fund, and reported to the Court its history, and recommended that it be paid into the registry of the Court to be after five years, if unclaimed, covered into the Treasury of the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 852. The recommendation was pursuant to the prayer of an intervention filed by the District Attorney in behalf of the United States. The Railroad Company excepted .to the report, reasserting its claim to the fund. The Court found the facts to be as stated in the report and ordered the fund paid into the registry of the Court. The Railroad Company appeals.

The important facts in the report, briefly stated, are these: The New Orleans, Mobile and Texas Railroad Company, incorporated by the State of Alabama in 1866 to construct a railroad from Mobile to New Orleans, issued $4,000,000 of first mortgage bonds secured by a deed of trust on all its property, owned and to be owned, Morgan and Raynor being trustees in the deed of trust.. There was also a second mortgage, in which Ames and Williams were trustees. Defaults occurred July 1, 1874, and in 1879 Morgan and Raynor, under court order, took possession of and operated the railroad as trustees and receiv[705]*705ers. A sale of the railroad and all the mortgaged assets was made under decree of foreclosure of both mortgages on April 24, 1880, at which sale the properties were bought in on a bid of $4,000,000 by representatives of a bondholders’ committee holding $3,858,000 of the first mortgage bonds. The decree of sale provided that this committee might bid, and use the dividends payable on their bonds in part payment, with such additional sums of cash as might be required for the payment of expenses of the receivership and sale, and dividends due to others; and that any surplus from the sale should be paid to the trustees of the second mortgage. The bondholders’ committee had an agreement with the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company to issue $5,000,000 of its bonds, to be used in part to raise the necessary cash to finance the sale, and in part to be exchanged bond for bond, for the foreclosed first mortgage bonds, after which exchange “all the right, title and interest of said bondholders in the said railroad, franchises, equipment and property * * * shall become the absolute property of the purchasers or their assigns * * * and thereafter the new bonds shall be the complete and full measure of the interest of the bondholders.” The Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company was by this agreement also to take a fifty year lease of the railroad. Immediately after the sale the purchasers, representing the bondholders’ committee, obtained a new corporate charter under a statute of Alabama authorizing purchasers of a railroad so to do, with $4,000,000 capital stock to be fully paid by a transfer of the railroad properties of all sorts. Thereafter the sale of the railroad was confirmed by the Court, and at the direction of the bondholders’ committee, who had assigned their bid, the property was conveyed to the new corporation. The fifty year lease was then made to the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company; and the report states that all the assets of the new corporation, both real and personal, were later acquired by the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company so that it is the successor of the new company. We are not told how this was accomplished, nor whether the old first mortgage bonds deposited with the bondholders’ committee were ever acquired by the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company by exchange for new bonds of the latter company, as agreed.

On May 24, 1880, Morgan and Raynor, as receivers and trustees, made their report to the court, showing a full disposition of the proceeds of the sale, except that 132 of the first mortgage bonds had not been presented, nor had certain coupons maturing prior and subsequent to July 1, 1874, been presented, for all of which they were holding $109,882. It does not appear what the face of the coupons amounted to, for which $83,253 was retained, but the $26,629 held for the 132 bonds is stated to be “at the rate of $201.72 per bond to be paid and indorsed on each bond when presented.” From this it is evident that a dividend of only $201.72 on each bond of $1,000 was declared from the net proceeds of the sale. In December, 1887, the executors of Morgan and Raynor reported to the court that of the fund of $109,882, $73,-594 had been paid out to coupons, and $24,-612 had been paid on 122 bonds, leaving 10 bonds unpresented, for which $2,017 remained on hand. This, with the balance for coupons, made a fund of $11,675. Another trustee was appointed, who deposited this fund in the New York bank, paid it down to $10,887, and after living to the age of 104 years, died. Twelve years after his death the Bank, no one claiming the fund, turned it over to the State of New York as an abandoned account.

The appellant claims here that the part of the fund which is held to pay coupons maturing prior to July 1, 1874, was free money of the original debtor deposited by it to pay said coupons, which money now passes to appellant as the successor of the original railroad corporation, the coupon holders having lost their right to it by abandonment, limitation, or payment presumed after twenty years. The claim cannot be sustained. The order of June 1, 1880, establishing the fund of $109,882, expressly states that it is the remainder of the proceeds of sale, held for bondholders who did not join in the purchasing agreement, and was their “ratable share.” The trustees’ executors in their petition to the court refer to the balance then on hand as “the proportionate amount allowed and payable on each coupon or bond as fixed by said order and report.” There is nothing to show that any part of the fund was not the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged property, standing in the place of the property as security for the bonds and coupons. Moreover, if any of it were free funds of the debtor corporation, they be[706]*706long to its creditors rather than to a successor. Under the Alabama statute providing for reincorporation of a purchased railroad the new corporation succeeds to the franchises and faculties of the old corporation but not to its property or liabilities. Mobile & Montgomery Ry. Co. v. Steiner, McGehee & Co., 61 Ala. 559. Free funds would remain assets of the original corporation.

The entire proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged property, to which the lien of the mortgages is by a familiar principle transferred, belong to the first mortgage bond and coupon holders until they are paid in full, and then to the second mortgage bondholders. The net proceeds appear to have sufficed only for a dividend of .2017 per cent to the first mortgage creditors. If there are not so many bonds and coupons to be paid as were figured on, the balance on hand ought to be distributed as a second dividend. It does not revert to the mortgagor or its successor. The Court, having the funds in its hands as a res for distribution, has full jurisdiction to determine the distributees.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
135 F.2d 704, 1943 U.S. App. LEXIS 3358, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/louisville-n-r-v-robin-ca5-1943.