Louisville, Henderson & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Gregory's Admr.

133 S.W. 805, 141 Ky. 747, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 100
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedJanuary 26, 1911
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 133 S.W. 805 (Louisville, Henderson & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Gregory's Admr.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Louisville, Henderson & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Gregory's Admr., 133 S.W. 805, 141 Ky. 747, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 100 (Ky. Ct. App. 1911).

Opinion

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Carroll

Reversing.

This action was brought by the appellee to recover damages for the death of Emmett Gregory alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the appellant company while carrying him as a passenger over its road from Louisville to Cloverport.

There is a long trestle that runs nearly to the depot at Cloverport, and the usual announcement to passengers for Cloverport to leave the train is made just before the train gets on this trestle. On the night in question Cloverport” was called out by the trainmen at the usual place, and as the passengers for Cloverport, including Gregory, were getting ready to leave the train, [749]*749it suddenly stopped on the trestle. This unexpected stop was caused by the breaking of the air hose, thereby automatically applying the brakes to the wheels of the train. While the train was standing on the trestle, Gregory, who had gone out on the platform of the car, fell from it to the ground, receiving injuries from which he shortly died. The negligence charged consists, first, in permitting Gregory, who it is alleged was in a helpless state of intoxication, to go out on the platform when the train stopped on the trestle and remain there unprotected; second, in permitting the platform to be and remain covered with ice, and third, in permitting the air hose to become so defective as to break.

The answer placed in issue all the material averments of the petition, and pleaded contributory negligence.

Upon a trial before a jury a verdict was returned in-favor of the appellee for six thousand dollars. A reversal of the judgment on this verdict is asked for error in giving and refusing instructions; and the appellee also complains of the ruling of the trial court in refusing to submit to the jury in appropriate instructions the alleged negligence of the company in permitting ice to accumulate on the platform of its cars and in failing to have and keep its air hose in proper condition.

As a result of the rulings of the court the only issue of negligence submitted was in respect to the intoxicated condition of Gregory and the duty the trainmen owed to him. We have reached the conclusion, for reasons that will be hereafter stated, that the evidence failed to show that Gregory’s condition was such as to impose upon the train crew any greater care in protecting him than they exercised, and so, if this was the only issue in the case which should have been submitted to the jury, the appellant company was entitled to the peremptory instruction requested. But, notwithstanding this, if the company was negligent in permitting the platform of its cars to become covered with ice or in permitting its air hose to become in such a defective condition as to break, thereby suddenly stopping the train, and either of these causes contributed proximately to the death of Gregory, then the case should have been submitted to the jury upon these issues, although appellee may have failed to make out a case upon the question of neglect on the part of the company in taking proper care of Gregory. Having' this view of the matter, we will first consider the correctness of the rulings of the trial judge in refusing to sub[750]*750mit instructions upon the issues mentioned before taking-up the principal question in the case.

Gregory was riding in what is known as a chair car. There was attached to the rear end of this chair car a Pullman sleeper, and the car in front of it was an ordinary passenger car. The rear platform of the chair car was protected by vestibule doors, as this end was coupled to a vestibuled car; but the car in front was not equipped with vestibule doors, and so the vestibule doors on the front end of the chair ear in which Gregory was riding were not closed and could not be closed, except partially. The result of this was that the front platform of this-car was only protected from the weather in the usual way that platforms of cars without vestibule doors are protected, and it was through the door on this end of the car that passengers for way stations entered and made their exit. After the train left Louisville, from which place it started on its journey, it commenced to rain and freeze, and consequently the rain that fell on the front platform of the car formed a slippery surface on one side of the platform and on the car steps on that side, although it does not appear that the platform in .front of the door was covered with ice or in a slippery condition. But the failure to have this end of the car protected by vestibule doors -was not under the circumstances negligence, although there might be conditions in which it would be. (Elliott on Railroads, 2 Ed., Yol. 4, section 1589a.) A railroad company may run passenger cars without vestibule attachments, and there are no facts in this record from which it can be inferred that it was negligent in failing to have the front end of this car protected by vestibule doors or that the failure to so protect it contributed proximately to Gregory’s death. It is probable that if this end of the car had been protected by vestibule doors that.no rain, or ice would have gotten on the platform. But the railroad company did not owe Gregory the duty of having vestibule doors. His place was in the car and not on the platform, and if he had not remained on the platform no injury would have befallen him. It may also be conceded that under certain conditions and circumstances it would be negligence upon the part of the company to permit the platform or steps of its passenger cars to remain covered with ice, or in a slippery condition, and we can easily imagine a state of case in which the company would be liable for injury received by a passenger on account of the slippery condition of the platform or steps of its passenger [751]*751ears. But the facts of this case do not justify us in reaching the conclusion that the company was negligent as to Gregory in this respect. ■ How he came to fall is not known. It is possible that the slippery condition of a part of the platform contributed to bring about his fall; but, whether it did or not, is mere speculation. There is nothing to show that he would not have fallen if the platform had been entirely free from ice.

In respect to the breaking of the air hose, section 778 of the Kentucky Statutes provides that:

“No regular or other passenger train shall be run without an air-brake, or some equally effective appliance for controlling the speed of trains, which may be applied by the engineer to each car composing the train, and which shall, at all times, he kept in good condition and ready for use at the discretion of the engineer. * * *”

But there is no evidence that the breaking of the air hose was due to negligence on the part of the company. The evidence upon this subject is that the air hose was properly inspected and in good condition when the train left Louisville, and that no defects in it were discovered until it suddenly parted as the train was approaching Cloverport. It is true that if the air hose had not parted the train would not have stopped on the trestle; and also true that if it had not stopped on the trestle, Gregory would not have fallen from the train through the trestle. But, manifestly, the admission of these two propositions do not in any manner establish that the company was guilty of negligence as to Gregory on account of the condition of the air hose.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
133 S.W. 805, 141 Ky. 747, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 100, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/louisville-henderson-st-louis-railway-co-v-gregorys-admr-kyctapp-1911.