Louisville Bedding Co. v. Perfect Fit Industries, Inc.

151 F. Supp. 2d 818, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10560, 2001 WL 826080
District Court, W.D. Kentucky·Decided July 23, 2001·No. Civ.A. 98-560·Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

COFFMAN, District Judge.

This matter is before the court upon the parties’ Markman briefs (Record Nos. 109, 124, 127). A hearing was held before the court at Louisville on June 19-20, 2001. This hearing addressed the issues of claim interpretation remaining after this court accorded preclusive effect to Judge Charles R. Simpson’s interpretation of the ’322 patent’s claims in the Pillowtex litigation. 1 Having reviewed the record and being otherwise sufficiently advised, the court will now rule on those issues.

Background

The subject of this litigation is Louisville Bedding’s United States Patent No. 5,249,322 (“the ’322 patent”), which was issued on October 5, 1993, and is the third in a series of three patents. This patent covered the construction of a new type of mattress pad skirt, which was elasticized and attached to the mattress pad top in such a way as to make the stretch predominantly in the horizontal direction; the advantage was a more secure fit to the mattress, regardless of the mattress’s perimeter size or thickness. The ’322 patent has been the subject of previous litigation, including the aforementioned Pillowtex litigation as well as an action between the present parties, Louisville Bedding and Perfect Fit, in 1994, which resulted in a consent judgment. In the current action, Louisville Bedding accuses four Perfect *820 Fit mattress pad product types of literally infringing the claims of the ’322 patent. The plaintiff asserts literal infringement of independent claims 1, 11, and 34, and of independent method claims 21, 24, 27, 28, and 29.

As claim construction was not intended to be an exercise in redundancy, this court will confine its interpretation to the claims in which language is disputed and which comprised the parties’ Markman presentations. Further, having already determined that Judge Simpson’s claim interpretations of this patent in the Pillowtex litigation are to be given preclusive effect, this court will not address any attempted re-litigation by the plaintiff of the phrases he construed in product claims 1, 11, and 34 and method claim 28. Finally, it bears noting that the procedural posture of this case requires this court only to construe the disputed language in the claims; no dispositive motion is before the court, so that we need not address the ultimate issue of infringement or apply the claim constructions to the accused products.

Analysis

The hearing on claim construction in this case followed fast on the heels of the collateral estoppel hearing; understandably, portions of both parties’ presentations discussed issues which this court has determined are foreclosed by Judge Simpson’s previous rulings. 2 Specifically, the parties focused heavily on the term “elastic material,” as used in various claims of the patent. 3 While this court will not engage in re-litigation of this term or second-guess Judge Simpson’s construction, some clarification of the necessary consequences of that ruling is in order.

Judge Simpson construed two phrases of the ’322 patent claims in Pillowtex. The first is the phrase “elastic material attached to inelastic material in a plurality of spaced apart parallel lines of attachment,” which appears in Claims 1, 11, and 28. Judge Simpson construed this phrase to require that the fitted mattress cover must have embodied in its skirt a configuration of spaced-apart, parallel lines of attached elastic material; that is, that the elastic material itself must be configured in spaced-apart, parallel lines of attachment. The second phrase Judge Simpson construed appears in Claim 34, in the language “rows of elongated elastic cords extending in a longitudinal direction of the skirt....” Judge Simpson construed this phrase to mean that the fitted mattress cover must have embodied in it a plurality of elastic cords incorporated into the skirt material in rows. He rejected Louisville Bedding’s contentions that the rows could extend in “more or-less a straight line” (finding instead that “extending in a longitudinal direction of the skirt” limited the rows to straight lines), and that “rows” could mean “rows of stitches” (finding that the claim specifically described the configuration of the elongated elastic cords which are incorporated into a material).

Perfect Fit draws a number of conclusions from these rulings to which Louisville Bedding objects: specifically, that the “elastic material” must (1) take the form of strips, cords, yarns, threads, *821 strings and like-shaped materials (i.e., must be elongated); (2) be the attaching mechanism itself, that is, must be stitched into (not onto) the inelastic fabric; and (3) be spaced apart substantially over the width of the sidewall. Perfect Fit correctly infers the first two of these conclusions from Judge Simpson’s construction of the phrase “elastic material attached to inelastic material in a plurality of spaced apart parallel lines of attachment,” as describing the configuration of the elastic material itself, rather than the points at which the elastic material is attached. Judge Simpson’s use of the doctrine of claim differentiation to note that the “elastic material” contained in claims 1, 11 and 28 is not limited to the form of “elongated elastic cords” specified in Claim 34 is not inconsistent with Perfect Fit’s assertion; the elastic material may take forms other than cords. But Judge Simpson’s central construction, that the elastic material must take the described configuration — to be attached in spaced-apart, parallel lines of attachment — forecloses Louisville Bedding’s assertion that the patent encompasses a continuous sheet of elastic material, at least to the extent that continuous sheet is not comprised of elastic strips, yarns, etc. which attach themselves in spaced-apart, parallel lines of attachment. 4 This preclusion is further supported by Judge Simpson’s infringement analysis, in which he applied his construction to the product at issue in Pillowtex. He reasoned that “[t]he Lycra® yarns which represent the only possible material to constitute ‘elastic cords’ in the # 4059 skirt material are woven into the fibrous base material in an interconnecting pattern of loops which travel in all directions throughout the material. There are simply no rows of elastic cords in Pillowtex’s product.” Further, Perfect Fit correctly notes that the use of the term “in” rather than “by” or “with” in the phrase “elastic material attached to inelastic material in a plurality of spaced apart parallel lines of attachment” requires an elastic sewn into, not onto, an inelastic material; thus, it is clear that the elastic material must itself be the attaching mechanism.

Perfect Fit’s conclusion that the Pillowtex ruling requires the elastic material to be spaced apart substantially over the width of the sidewall is more tenuous.

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Louisville Bedding Co. v. Perfect Fit Industries, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 2d 818, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10560, 2001 WL 826080 (W.D. Ky. 2001).

151 F. Supp. 2d 818 (Louisville Bedding Co. v. Perfect Fit Industries, Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.