COLE, Judge.
The question presented on appeal is whether or not the evidence is sufficient to establish air contaminants discharged from an open burning on a solid waste disposal site reached undesirable levels.
BACKGROUND
The Pete Caldwell Drilling Company, Inc., defendant, operated a solid waste disposal in West Monroe, Louisiana pursuant to a valid permit. The activities on the site were to be conducted in accordance with an “interim operational plan” drafted by Walter (Pete) Caldwell tracking a Compliance Order issued September 24, 1981, by the Solid Waste Management Division of the Office of Environmental Affairs, Department of Natural Resources.
On August 2, 1983, a Compliance Order, based upon specific findings of fact, mandated the defendant,
“I.
To take all necessary steps to immediately extinguish any and all open burning of solid waste.
II.
To immediately take all necessary precautions to prevent open burning of solid waste in violation of the Regulations and the Act.
III.
To provide the Assistant Secretary, within 14 days of receipt of this ORDER, a detailed written report of steps taken in response to this ORDER.
IV.
To be hereby notified that failure or refusal to comply with this Compliance Order, and the provisions herein, will subject the Respondent to possible enforcement procedures under Section 1073 E of the Act which could result in the assessment of civil penalties in an amount not to exceed $50,000 for each day of continued noncompliance.”
On October 26, 1983, a meeting was held between the defendant and the assistant secretary of the Office of Environmental Affairs. As a result of this meeting an “assessment of penalty” was issued November 18, 1983, concluding defendant had failed to take the necessary action to extinguish the open burning on the landfill and allowed the fire to continue for an extended period in violation of section 11.2 of the Air Quality Regulations and La.R.S. 30:1087. The office assessed a penalty of $2,000. In [803]*803response, the defendant requested a de novo hearing which was held February 6, 1984, before Administrative Law Judge J. David McNeill, III. Judge McNeill filed findings and recommendations on March 5, 1984.1
[804]*804The defendant filed a motion for review of these findings and recommendations. As a result a public hearing was scheduled in Baton Rouge for May 24, 1984. Thereafter, on July 18, 1984, Secretary Patricia L. Norton ordered the following assessment of penalty:
“FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I.
An adjudicatory hearing was held on this matter after proper notice on February 6, 1984, by J. David McNeill, III, administrative law judge, who thereafter submitted a report entitled ‘Findings and Recommendations’ dated March 5, 1984.
II.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the report submitted in this matter by Mr. McNeill on March 5, 1984, are hereby incorporated herein and made a part hereof with the exception Findings of Fact Numbers 13 and 16.
III.
On Tuesday, August 2, 1983, Mr. Walter M. (Pete) Caldwell, III ordered the return of the earth moving equipment from the oilfield location to the disposal site at such time as the oilfield job had been completed. It arrived on site Wednesday afternoon, August 3, 1983.
IV.
In the absence of Mr. Walter M. (Pete) Caldwell, III, his brother, Don Caldwell had the authority to order earth moving equipment back from the oilfield job.
V.
An on-site investigation by employees of the Office of Environmental Affairs on or about July 29, through August 3, 1983, disclosed that despite previous warnings Respondent failed to take necessary action to extinguish an open burning at its landfill and allowed the fire to continue for an extended period, in violation of Section 11.2 of the Air Quality Regulations and Section 1087 of the Act.
VI.
Respondent has had a history of open burnings since 1981 and has failed to take all reasonable measures to prevent or halt such violations.
VII.
Although there was no direct risk to health or property, the fires and smoke were of sufficient gravity that various neighborhood residents complained to the Office.
VIII.
Respondent failed to report the violations and refused to take necessary steps to expeditiously extinguish the fire described in Paragraph V above.
IX.
A civil penalty under Section 1073 E of the Act may be assessed for the violations described hereinabove.
X.
After hearing, and upon reading the entire record in the matter and giving due consideration to all information and evidence presented concerning the factors required by law, and the report of the administrative law judge, a fine of $1,000 for each of six days of violations from July 29, 1983, through August 3, 1983, or $6,000 total is appropriate.
[805]*805ORDER
Based on the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, and the recommendations of the administrative law judge, Respondent is hereby ORDERED:
I.
To make payment in full of a civil penalty, which is hereby assessed as $6,000, to the Secretary, Department of Environmental Quality, no later than fifteen (15) days after this assessment becomes final.
II.
To be on notice that this assessment shall become final and shall not be subject to further review unless no later than thirty (30) days after receipt of this decision the Respondent files with the Secretary a motion for appeal to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit.
III.
To be on notice that upon the penalty assessed herein becoming final and the penalty, or any portion thereof, remaining unpaid, this matter shall be referred to the Attorney General for collection of the penalty plus all costs associated with that collection.”
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The defendant appeals from this decision in accordance with Rule 2 of the Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit. The Department of Environmental Quality argues the defendant’s appeal should be dismissed becausé in brief defendant assigns as error legal issues which were not designated as assignments of error in his application for appeal, as required by Rule 2 § l.2
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COLE, Judge.
The question presented on appeal is whether or not the evidence is sufficient to establish air contaminants discharged from an open burning on a solid waste disposal site reached undesirable levels.
BACKGROUND
The Pete Caldwell Drilling Company, Inc., defendant, operated a solid waste disposal in West Monroe, Louisiana pursuant to a valid permit. The activities on the site were to be conducted in accordance with an “interim operational plan” drafted by Walter (Pete) Caldwell tracking a Compliance Order issued September 24, 1981, by the Solid Waste Management Division of the Office of Environmental Affairs, Department of Natural Resources.
On August 2, 1983, a Compliance Order, based upon specific findings of fact, mandated the defendant,
“I.
To take all necessary steps to immediately extinguish any and all open burning of solid waste.
II.
To immediately take all necessary precautions to prevent open burning of solid waste in violation of the Regulations and the Act.
III.
To provide the Assistant Secretary, within 14 days of receipt of this ORDER, a detailed written report of steps taken in response to this ORDER.
IV.
To be hereby notified that failure or refusal to comply with this Compliance Order, and the provisions herein, will subject the Respondent to possible enforcement procedures under Section 1073 E of the Act which could result in the assessment of civil penalties in an amount not to exceed $50,000 for each day of continued noncompliance.”
On October 26, 1983, a meeting was held between the defendant and the assistant secretary of the Office of Environmental Affairs. As a result of this meeting an “assessment of penalty” was issued November 18, 1983, concluding defendant had failed to take the necessary action to extinguish the open burning on the landfill and allowed the fire to continue for an extended period in violation of section 11.2 of the Air Quality Regulations and La.R.S. 30:1087. The office assessed a penalty of $2,000. In [803]*803response, the defendant requested a de novo hearing which was held February 6, 1984, before Administrative Law Judge J. David McNeill, III. Judge McNeill filed findings and recommendations on March 5, 1984.1
[804]*804The defendant filed a motion for review of these findings and recommendations. As a result a public hearing was scheduled in Baton Rouge for May 24, 1984. Thereafter, on July 18, 1984, Secretary Patricia L. Norton ordered the following assessment of penalty:
“FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I.
An adjudicatory hearing was held on this matter after proper notice on February 6, 1984, by J. David McNeill, III, administrative law judge, who thereafter submitted a report entitled ‘Findings and Recommendations’ dated March 5, 1984.
II.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the report submitted in this matter by Mr. McNeill on March 5, 1984, are hereby incorporated herein and made a part hereof with the exception Findings of Fact Numbers 13 and 16.
III.
On Tuesday, August 2, 1983, Mr. Walter M. (Pete) Caldwell, III ordered the return of the earth moving equipment from the oilfield location to the disposal site at such time as the oilfield job had been completed. It arrived on site Wednesday afternoon, August 3, 1983.
IV.
In the absence of Mr. Walter M. (Pete) Caldwell, III, his brother, Don Caldwell had the authority to order earth moving equipment back from the oilfield job.
V.
An on-site investigation by employees of the Office of Environmental Affairs on or about July 29, through August 3, 1983, disclosed that despite previous warnings Respondent failed to take necessary action to extinguish an open burning at its landfill and allowed the fire to continue for an extended period, in violation of Section 11.2 of the Air Quality Regulations and Section 1087 of the Act.
VI.
Respondent has had a history of open burnings since 1981 and has failed to take all reasonable measures to prevent or halt such violations.
VII.
Although there was no direct risk to health or property, the fires and smoke were of sufficient gravity that various neighborhood residents complained to the Office.
VIII.
Respondent failed to report the violations and refused to take necessary steps to expeditiously extinguish the fire described in Paragraph V above.
IX.
A civil penalty under Section 1073 E of the Act may be assessed for the violations described hereinabove.
X.
After hearing, and upon reading the entire record in the matter and giving due consideration to all information and evidence presented concerning the factors required by law, and the report of the administrative law judge, a fine of $1,000 for each of six days of violations from July 29, 1983, through August 3, 1983, or $6,000 total is appropriate.
[805]*805ORDER
Based on the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, and the recommendations of the administrative law judge, Respondent is hereby ORDERED:
I.
To make payment in full of a civil penalty, which is hereby assessed as $6,000, to the Secretary, Department of Environmental Quality, no later than fifteen (15) days after this assessment becomes final.
II.
To be on notice that this assessment shall become final and shall not be subject to further review unless no later than thirty (30) days after receipt of this decision the Respondent files with the Secretary a motion for appeal to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit.
III.
To be on notice that upon the penalty assessed herein becoming final and the penalty, or any portion thereof, remaining unpaid, this matter shall be referred to the Attorney General for collection of the penalty plus all costs associated with that collection.”
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The defendant appeals from this decision in accordance with Rule 2 of the Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit. The Department of Environmental Quality argues the defendant’s appeal should be dismissed becausé in brief defendant assigns as error legal issues which were not designated as assignments of error in his application for appeal, as required by Rule 2 § l.2 While such an argument may be valid as to assignment of error number two contained in defendant’s brief, pertaining to the constitutionality of the legislative enactments and regulations, it is certainly ineffective as to the defendant’s assignments of error numbers 1 and 3 contained in defendant’s brief. Assignment of error number one states:
“The Department of Enviromental (sic) Quality erred by not dismissing the charges against Appellant for the reason that the Department failed to prove that the open burning at Appellants disposal was of an undesirable level creating air contaminants in violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes, 30:1083.” (Underscoring theirs.)
Assignment of error number three states:
“The decision of the Department of Enviromental (sic) Quality is contrary to the law and the evidence.”
These assignments in brief are derivatives of assignment of error number 2 contained within defendant’s application for appeal which states:
“The findings and recommendations of the Administrative Law Judge are in part factually incorrect and his recommenda[806]*806tions are contrary to the spirit and intent of the legislature in the creation of the Department of Environmental Quality as applied to the facts of this case.”
In conjunction with this assignment of error the defendant designated “the entire record and transcript to be necessary for appeal.” We conclude the questions are properly before this court for review. Further, because this court agrees the decision of the DEQ is contrary to law and the evidence, we pretermit any discussion of the constitutionality of the applicable laws.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
The DEQ found the defendant had violated Section 11.2 of the Air Quality Regulations and La.R.S. 30:1087. Section 11.2 states:
“No person shall cause or allow the outdoor burning of waste material or other combustible material on any property owned by him or under his control except as provided in Section 11.3 below.”
La.R.S. 30:1087 provides:
“A. No person shall:
(1) Discharge air contaminants or noise pollution into the air of this state in violation of regulations of the secretary or the terms of any permit, license, or variance issued hereunder.
(2) Violate any rule or regulation adopted by the secretary under this Part.
B. The provisions of this Part shall not apply to persons who burn agricultural by-products in the field in connection with the planting, harvesting, or processing of agricultural products, nor to controlled burning of cotton gin agricultural wastes in connection with cotton gin operations, nor to controlled burning in connection with timber stand management, nor to controlled burning of pastureland or marshland in connection with trapping or livestock production.”
A violation of section 11.2 occurred because “despite previous warning [defendant] failed to take necessary action to extinguish an open burning at its landfill and allowed the fire to continue for an extended period_” Conversely, a violation of La. R.S. 30:1087 occurred because the defendant was found to have violated section 11.2, a “rule or regulation adopted by the secretary under this Part.”
Although the DEQ found the above violations occurred because an outdoor burning took place, section 11.1 of the Air Quality Regulations provides:
“Purpose. It is the purpose of this section to control outdoor burning of waste or other combustible material to prevent undesirable levels of air contaminants in the atmosphere.”
Therefore, it is evident the authority of the DEQ to control outdoor burnings is derived from the legislative prohibition contained in La.R.S. 30:1084 that no person shall discharge “air contaminants.”
In State v. Union Tank Car Co., 439 So.2d 377 (La.1983), the court pronounced:
“While it is true that La.R.S. 30:1085 and 1087 proscribe the discharge of all contaminants, it is apparent from looking to the Air Control Act as a whole that the aim of the legislation is the prevention of emissions of ‘undesirable levels’ of contaminants. It is well-settled that the standards which must accompany a delegation of legislative authority need not necessarily be set forth in express terms if they might reasonably be inferred from the statutory scheme as a whole. State v. Arizona Mines Supply Co., 107 Ariz. 199, 484 P.2d 619 (Ariz.1971); and that courts will not impute meanings which will lead to absurd results or extend statutes to situations which the legislature never intended should be covered thereby. Smith v. Town of Vinton, 209 La. 587, 25 So.2d 237 (La.1946). Thus, the failure of the legislature to use the phrase ‘undesirable level’ in 30:1085 and 1087 does not defeat the statutory scheme, especially where it is clear from the Air Control Act itself that the legislature did not intend to proscribe the discharge of all air contaminants, however insignificant in quantity, but only those contaminants which reach ‘undesirable levels.’
[807]*807Under La.R.S. 30:1083(2), an ‘undesirable level’ of air contaminants is the presence in the atmosphere of such quantities and concentrations of contaminants as to appreciably injure human life beyond inconvenience, or as to materially injure or interfere with reasonable use of animal or plant life or property.” — at 383. (Underscoring ours.)
Likewise, sections 11.1 and 11.2 must be read in pari materia. Thus, a violation of section 11.2 will occur only when a person causes or allows the outdoor burning of waste material or other combustible material which results or is going to result in undesirable levels of air contaminants in the atmosphere. Surely, it could not have been the intention of the DEQ to proscribe every outdoor burning by adopting section 11.2.
In this instance, at every level of fact finding and scrutiny the DEQ never established the outdoor burning resulted or would result in undesirable levels of air contaminants, that is such quantities and concentrations of contaminants as to appreciably injure human life beyond inconvenience, or as to materially injure or interfere with reasonable use of animal or plant life or property.
In fact the DEQ reached an opposite conclusion. Judge McNeill in his “Consideration of Penalties and Recommendations” noted, “The violation herein was not serious as a threat to human life or health.” He further stated, “Beyond nuisance, there was little risk to human life or property.” In addition to adopting Judge McNeill’s findings, Secretary Norton found specifically:
“Although there was no direct risk to health or property, the fires and smoke were of sufficient gravity that various neighborhood residents complained to the Office.”
Therefore, no evidentiary basis for an assessment of penalty exists in this instance.3 Indeed, the decision of DEQ is contrary to the law and the evidence. Accordingly, the decision and order of the Secretary must be reversed. Costs of these proceedings are to be assessed against the Department of Environmental Quality in the amount of $50.00.
REVERSED.