Louisiana Crawfish Producers Assoc. v. Amerada Hess Corporation

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: July 12, 2006
• Docket: CA-0005-1156
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

05-1156

LOUISIANA CRAWFISH PRODUCERS ASSOCIATION—WEST, et al.

VERSUS

AMERADA HESS CORPORATION, et al.

************

APPEAL FROM THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ST. MARTIN, NO. 04-68,091, HONORABLE EDWARD M. LEONARD, JR., DISTRICT JUDGE

MICHAEL G. SULLIVAN JUDGE

Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Michael G. Sullivan, and Glenn B. Gremillion, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Joseph R. Joy, III Gordon J. Schoeffler Joseph Joy & Associates Post Office Box 4929 Lafayette, Louisiana 70502 (337) 232-8123 Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants: Louisiana Crawfish Producers Association—West, et al.

Leigh Haynie Attorney at Law 1009 Kidder Road Carencro, Louisiana 70520 (337) 886-9145 Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants: Louisiana Crawfish Producers Association—West, et al. Joseph E. LeBlanc, Jr. A. Louise Blanchard King, LeBlanc & Bland, P.L.L.C. 7500 San Felipe, Suite 800 Houston, Texas 77063 (713) 334-5644 Counsel for Defendant/Appellee: Amerada Hess Corporation

Elizabeth S. Wheeler King, LeBlanc & Bland, P.L.L.C. 201 St. Charles Avenue, 45th Floor New Orleans, Louisiana 70801 (225) 379-3330 Counsel for Defendant/Appellee: Amerada Hess Corporation

Stephen L. Williamson John T. Nesser, IV Charles M. Steen Steen & Williamson, L.L.C. Suite 1250 Energy Centre 1100 Poydras Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70163-1250 (504) 599-8440 Counsel for Defendants/Appellees: Sorrento Pipeline Company Enterprise Products Company

Joel A. Levy Levy & Levy 7577 Westbank Expressway Marrero, Louisiana 70072 (504) 340-2993 Counsel for Defendant/Appellee: Saba Dredging Company, Inc.

Raymond M. Allen Allen Law Office Post Office Box 3204 Lafayette, Louisiana 70502 (318) 232-9918 Counsel for Defendant/Appellee: Berry Brothers General Contractors

Richard A. Cozad Michael L. McAlpine Emma A. Mekinda McAlpine & Cozad 701 S. Peters Street, Suite 300 New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 (504) 561-0323 Counsel for Defendant/Appellee: Berry Brothers General Contractors James M. Funderburk Post Office Box 3017 Houma, Louisiana 70360 (985) 876-6410 Counsel for Defendant/Appellee: T. Baker Smith & Sons, Inc.

Burton P. Guidry Assistant Attorney General Post Office Box 94005, Cap. Station Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804-9005 (225) 326-6300 Counsel for Intervenor: State of Louisiana

Daniel G. Guidry Attorney at Law 324 South Main Street St. Martinville, Louisiana 70582 (337) 394-7116 Counsel for Defendants/Appellees: Furgo Chance, Inc. Sorrento Pipeline Company Enterprise Products Company

Albert M. Hand, Jr. Cook, Yancey, King & Galloway Post Office Box 22260 Shreveport, Louisiana 71120-2260 (318) 221-6277 Counsel for Defendant/Appellee: El Paso Field Services Management

Michael D. Hunt Steven J. Levine Phelps, Dunbar, LLC Post Office Box 4412 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821-4412 (225) 346-0285 Counsel for Defendants/Appellees: C. L. Jack Stelly & Associates, Inc. Morris Hebert, Inc.

Francis X. Neuner, Jr. Brandon W. Letulier Laborde & Neuner Post Office Box 52828 Lafayette, Louisiana 70505-2828 (337) 237-7000 Counsel for Defendant/Appellee: C. H. Fenstermaker & Associates Kai David Midboe Attorney at Law 214 Third Street, Suite 2B Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70801-1304 (225) 291-7300 Counsel for Defendant/Appellee: Florida Gas Transmission Company

Andre J. Mouledoux Jacques P. Degruy Attorneys at Law 701 Poydras Street, Suite 4250 New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 (504) 595-3000 Counsel for Defendant/Appellee: C. F. Bean, L.L.C.

Jerry A. Oubre Caffery, Oubre, Campbell & Garrison Post Office Drawer 12410 New Iberia, Louisiana 70562-2410 (337) 364-1816 Counsel for Defendant/Appellee: El Paso Field Services Management

Edwin G. Preis, Jr. Robert M. Kallam Casie L. Willis Preis, Kraft & Roy Post Office Drawer 94-C Lafayette, Louisiana 70509 (337) 237-6062 Counsel for Defendant/Appellee: C & C Technologies

Clement Story, III Louisiana Department of Justice 1885 N. Third Street, 7th Floor Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802 (225) 326-6705 Counsel for Intervenor: State of Louisiana

Roger E. Ishee Greg R. Mier Onebane Law Firm Post Office Box 3507 Lafayette, Louisiana 70502-3507 (337) 237-2660 Counsel for Defendant/Appellee: Denbury Resources, Inc. Joe B. Norman Stevia Marie Walther Kelly B. Becker Attorneys at Law 701 Poydras Street, Suite 5000 New Orleans, Louisiana 70139-5099 (504) 581-7979 Counsel for Defendants/Appellees: Texaco Petroleum Pipeline, LLC Texaco Pipelines, LLC

Lawrence P. Simon Jamie D. Rhymes Jason P. Bergeron Liskow & Lewis Post Office Box 52008 Lafayette, Louisiana 70505-2008 (318) 232-7424 Counsel for Defendant/Appellee: Hunt Oil Company SULLIVAN, Judge.

At issue in this appeal is whether Plaintiffs, who identify themselves as

commercial crawfishermen, have a state law cause of action arising out of the alleged

destruction of the “Buffalo Cove” fishing area in St. Martin Parish, Louisiana, due to

Defendants’ oilfield-related activities. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ state law

claims on an exception of no cause of action, but reserved their right to proceed under

maritime law. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Discussion of the Record

The Louisiana Crawfish Producers Association–West and over ninety of its

individual members sued eighteen named Defendants who were allegedly engaged

in oil and gas exploration, dredging and pipeline activities, or providing surveying

services for those conducting such activities. Plaintiffs alleged that in the course of

these activities Defendants created spoil banks and dams that have impeded the

natural flow of water in the Buffalo Cove area, resulting in stagnant water that has

destroyed the aquatic ecosystem and has eliminated or greatly diminished their ability

to catch crawfish in the area.1 Plaintiffs initially filed suit under state law,

specifically citing La.Civ.Code art. 667, then filed an amending petition seeking relief

under both state tort law and general maritime law. They sought damages for loss of

jobs, profits, wages, and earning capacity; loss of enjoyment of recreational use; and

inconvenience and mental distress.

After hearing numerous exceptions filed by Defendants, the trial court found

that Plaintiffs did not have a cause of action under state law, based primarily on their

inability to demonstrate a proprietary interest in either the land of Buffalo Cove or the

wild crawfish that they sought to catch. The trial court considered that its ruling

1 In their appellate brief, Plaintiffs identify the Buffalo Cove area as comprising 58,000 acres within the 595,000 acres of the Atchafalaya Basin. rendered any other exceptions moot, but it reserved to Plaintiffs the right to proceed

with any claims that they may have under maritime law.2 On appeal, Plaintiffs argue

that the trial court erred in concluding that they did not have a cause of action under

La.Civ.Code art. 2315 and La.Civ.Code art. 667.

Opinion

In Harp v. Pine Bluff Sand & Gravel Co., 98-1634, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir.

11/24/99), 750 So.2d 226, 229 (citations omitted), this court explained the function

of the exception of no cause of action as follows:

The function of an Exception of No Cause of Action is to test the legal sufficiency of a petition by determining whether the law affords a remedy on the facts alleged in the pleading. Any doubts must be resolved in favor of the sufficiency of the petition.

No evidence may be introduced to support or controvert the objection that the petition fails to state a cause of action. When a petition states a cause of action as to any ground or portion of the demand, the exception of no cause of action must be denied. A “cause of action” is an act by a Defendant which gives a Plaintiff a right to invoke a judicial interference on his behalf.

“In reviewing a trial court’s ruling sustaining an exception of no cause of

action, we conduct a de novo review because the exception raises a question of law

and the trial court’s decision is based only on the sufficiency of the petition.”

Schoeffler v. Drake Hunting Club, 05-499, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/4/06), 919 So.2d

822, 828.

The trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ state law claims is based upon the rule

of Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 48 S.Ct. 134 (1927), which,

broadly stated, operates to deny a plaintiff recovery for economic loss resulting from

physical damage to property in which he has no proprietary interest. Although

2 The trial court also denied an exception of improper cumulation of actions that is not at issue in this appeal.

2 Robins arose in a contractual setting, in that the charterer of a vessel was denied

recovery for its loss of use after the vessel was negligently damaged by the dry dock

operator, its application has not been confined to contract cases, but rather it has

become “a pragmatic limitation imposed by the Court upon the tort doctrine of

foreseeability.” Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V TESTBANK, 752 F.2d 1019, 1023

(5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903, 106 S.Ct. 3271 (1986).

In this appeal, plaintiffs argue that they fall within the exception to Robins

afforded to commercial fishermen, as recognized in the federal district court ruling

of Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V TESTBANK, 524 F.Supp. 1170 (E.D. La. 1981), and

in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974). Plaintiffs also rely upon

two other federal district court cases in which, they contend, other similarly-situated

claimants have recovered economic damages under state tort law. See Shaughnessy

v. PPG Indus., Inc., 795 F.Supp. 193 (W.D. La. 1992), and Maddox v. Int’l Paper

Co., 47 F.Supp. 829 (W.D. La. 1942). Defendants respond that Shaughnessy and

Maddox are distinguishable, in that those plaintiffs were riparian landowners as well,

and that the one Louisiana state court case to address this issue, Dempster v. Louis

Eymard Towing Co., Inc., 503 So.2d 99 (La.App. 5 Cir.), writ denied, 505 So.2d 1136

(La.1987), held that fishermen did not have a cause of action for economic loss

arising from the destruction of a fishing site. After reviewing the above

jurisprudence, and the many other cases cited by both sides to this controversy, we

find Defendants’ arguments to be persuasive.

In TESTBANK, 524 F.Supp. at 1173, the federal district court recognized that

claims for economic loss of commercial fishermen deserve special attention, as

“[t]raditionally, seamen have been recognized as favored in admiralty and their

3 economic interests require the fullest possible legal protection.” Accordingly, the

district court refused to dismiss the economic claims of commercial fishermen “even

in the absence of any proprietary rights over aquatic life.” Id. We note that the facts

of TESTBANK occurred in a purely maritime setting, as the damage to the commercial

fishing industry was caused by the collision of two vessels on a navigable waterway.

Also, the commercial fishermen in TESTBANK and in Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, appear

to be “Jones Act” seamen, subject to the “perils of the sea,” which is not the case

here. Similarly, Plaintiffs reliance on Poe v. PPG Industries, 00-1141 (La.App. 3 Cir.

3/28/01), 782 So.2d 1168, writ denied, 01-1239 (La. 6/22/01), 794 So.2d 801, is

misplaced, as this court clearly stated that it was applying maritime law in that case.

In Shaughnessy, 795 F.Supp. 193, the owner of a fishing and hunting guide

service filed suit when his bookings dropped significantly after the defendant,

described by the court as a “land based polluter,” allegedly contaminated the waters

in which his clients fished. Id. at 195. Although the court also concluded that the

plaintiff should be protected in the same manner as the commercial fisherman in

TESTBANK, 524 F.Supp. 1170, central to its analysis in permitting the suit to survive

summary judgment under state law was the plaintiff’s status as a riparian landowner.

In addition to applying La.Civ.Code art. 2315, the court concluded that the plaintiff

could recover under La.Civ.Code art. 656 as the owner of a servient estate whose

servitude has become more burdensome through the actions of the owner of the

dominant estate. That the plaintiff was a landowner led the court to observe:

“Economic damages to fishing businesses, combined with damage to a riparian estate

have often been found to be actionable in various jurisdictions.” Shaughnessy, 795

F.Supp. at 196 (emphasis added). As authority for allowing the case to proceed under

4 La.Civ.Code art. 2315, the court cited Maddox, 47 F.Supp. 829, a case in which the

plaintiff was also a riparian landowner.3

In Dempster, 503 So.2d 99, the court was presented with plaintiffs whose

positions are more analogous to those in the case sub judice. In that case, two

fishermen filed suit for the loss of a fishing site, seeking to recover for the loss of

their nets, the loss of the catch in the nets, and the loss of future profits from the use

of the fishing site. The fifth circuit affirmed summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’

economic damage claims based upon the same rationale applied by the trial court in

the present case: “[a]s plaintiff had no proprietary interest in the fish which were at

large in the waters, and no right to object to the state’s interfering with the exercise

of the fishing privilege granted, it has no right to complain and claim damages.” Id.

at 101 (quoting Vanacor v. Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, 483 So.2d 1127, 1130

(La.App. 5 Cir. 1986) (emphasis added) (alteration in original)). The court also

addressed one of Plaintiffs’ arguments herein, namely that regulatory cases such as

Vanacor cannot be applied to defeat their tort claims, by stating:

Although Vanacor, supra dealt with the ability of the state to regulate fishing, we also find it applicable to the instant case which concerns the rights of a tortfeasor to recover damages for the future loss of fish insofar as holding that the appellants have no proprietary interest in the fish at large in the state waters.

Dempster, 503 So.2d at 101 (emphasis added). Additionally, we note that the

supreme court reiterated the above principle in Louisiana Seafood Management

Council v. Louisiana Wildlife & Fisheries Commission, 97-1367, p. 8 (La. 5/19/98),

715 So.2d 387, 392, in finding that licensed commercial fishermen had no cause of

3 As shown in a later proceeding, Maddox v. International Paper Co., 105 F.Supp. 89 (W.D. La..1951), aff’d, 203 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1953), the plaintiff was allowed to recover for the total destruction of his fishing camp, the loss of improvements placed on his property, and the loss of the probable sale of two campsites.

5 action under the “taking clause” of the United States Constitution as to the loss of

fishing profits brought about by the state’s regulatory actions:

The lack of any property interest in the fish in the waters is well-settled, statutorily and judicially. See La.Civ.Code arts. 450, 452; La.Rev.Stat. 56:3. In LaBauve v. Louisiana Wildlife & Fisheries Comm’n, 444 F.Supp. 1370 (E.D.La.1978), the court explained that “fish which are at large in state waters are the property of the state, as public or common things;” that “an individual has no proprietary interest in the fish he is prevented from catching;” and that “an individual has no proprietary right to fish commercially in state waters.” 444 F.Supp. at 1378. Fishermen’s inability to establish a private property interest in free-swimming corporeal fish has precluded recovery under this theory. Douglas F. Britton, The Privatization of the American Fishery: Limitations, Recognitions, and the Public Trust, 3 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 217, 236 (1997) (noting that under these circumstances fishermen have been regarded as “possessing no compensable, or prosecutable, property interests” for takings claims purposes).

Plaintiffs also contend that they have a cause of action under La.Civ.Code art.

667,4 arguing that their fishing licenses place them in the category of “persons

holding rights derived from the landowner,” as were the successful oyster lessees in

Inabnet v. Exxon Corp., 93-681, p. 12 (La. 9/6/94), 642 So.2d 1243, 1251. We

disagree. As explained in Louisiana Seafood Management Council, 715 So.2d at 392

(emphasis added), a commercial fishing license is “a state-granted privilege subject

4 Louisiana Civil Code Article 667 (emphasis added) provides:

Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases, still he cannot make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any damage to him. However, if the work he makes on his estate deprives his neighbor of enjoyment or causes damage to him, he is answerable for damages only upon a showing that he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that his works would cause damage, that the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such reasonable care. Nothing in this Article shall preclude the court from the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an appropriate case. Nonetheless, the proprietor is answerable for damages without regard to his knowledge or his exercise of reasonable care, if the damage is caused by an ultrahazardous activity. An ultrahazardous activity as used in this Article is strictly limited to pile driving or blasting with explosives.

6 to such limitations as the state may impose in the exercise of its police power.” Thus,

a fishing license is issued by the state in the exercise of its regulatory and police

powers, as opposed to its capacity to lease a specific area of land as a landowner.

Further, as the court explained in Dumas v. Angus Chemical Co., 31,400, p. 16

(La.App. 2 Cir. 1/11/99), 728 So.2d 441, 451, writ denied, 99-751 (La. 4/30/99), 741

So.2d 19:

[N]ot every claimant is within the class of people to whom a duty is owed under Article 667. The term “proprietor” in Article 667 has been interpreted to apply not only to a landowner, but also to any person whose rights derive from the owner. Inabnet v. Exxon Corp., 93-0681 (La.9/6/94), 642 So.2d 1243. A landowner, however, does not owe a duty under Article 667 to everyone: “Persons that do not qualify as proprietors, such as guests, contractors, and members of the public, may have a variety of remedies against a landowner under the law of delictual obligations . . ., but not for violation of obligations established by Articles 667 and 668.” [A. N.] Yiannopoulos, [4 Civil Law Treatise (1997) Predial Servitudes], § 44.

Based upon the above, we find that the trial court properly granted Defendants’

exception of no cause of action as to Plaintiffs’ state law claims. Accordingly, the

judgment of the trial court is affirmed at Plaintiffs’ cost.