Louise Benjamine v. U.S. Bank National Association; and Does 1 through 50

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: June 2, 2026
• Docket: 3:26-cv-01443
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LOUISE BENJAMINE, an Individual, Case No.: 3:26-cv-01443-GPC-DDL

12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. • GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 14 U.S. BANK NATIONAL • GRANTING REQUEST FOR ASSOCIATION, a National Bank; and 15 JUDICIAL NOTICE DOES 1 through 50,

16 Defendant. [ECF No. 4] 17

18 On March 13, 2026, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Request for 19 Judicial Notice. ECF No. 4. The motion to dismiss has been fully briefed. ECF Nos. 6, 7. 20 The Court finds the matters suitable for decision on the papers. For the reasons below, the 21 Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss and request for judicial notice. 22 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 23 On November 7, 2022, Defendant U.S. Bank National Association (“Defendant”) 24 hired Plaintiff Louise Benjamine (“Plaintiff”) as a universal banker. ECF No. 1-3 25 (“Compl.”) ¶ 9. She was regularly scheduled to work approximately 35 to 40 hours per 26 27 1 week. Id. Plaintiff received recognition for her customer service and high customer 2 satisfaction ratings. Id. ¶ 10. 3 At some point, Plaintiff requested $10,000 to replenish her cash box. Id. ¶ 11. On 4 January 13, 2023, Rocio Reyes (“Reyes”), Plaintiff’s supervisor, denied Plaintiff the full 5 withdrawal amount and provided her only $5,000. Id. He also made a disrespectful 6 remark toward Plaintiff. Id. 7 Later, Plaintiff cashed a check for a customer, amounting to $7,040. Id. ¶ 12. 8 Because the amount was larger than the amount in her cash box, Plaintiff requested the 9 remaining funds from Reyes. Id. Instead of processing the request, Reyes confronted the 10 customer, “creating a hostile, discriminatory, and intimidating work environment for 11 Plaintiff.” Id. 12 On January 17, 2023, Plaintiff emailed a written complaint to Branch Manager 13 David LaCombe (“LaCombe”), reporting Reyes’ behavior. Id. ¶ 13. The complaint 14 described “ongoing workplace interference and discrimination, including her exclusion 15 from team communications that were conducted exclusively in Spanish.” Id. 16 On February 2, 2023, Reyes interrupted Plaintiff’s scheduled appointment with a 17 customer. Id. ¶ 14. The customer was concerned by Reyes’ conduct and independently 18 reported the incident to LaCombe. Id. 19 On February 6, 2023, Plaintiff sought assistance from Human Resources (“HR”). 20 Id. ¶ 15. Lacome discouraged Plaintiff from contacting HR and contacted a district 21 manager. Id. Plaintiff was then instructed to go home. Id. 22 On February 15, 2023, Defendant reassigned one of Plaintiff’s primary customer 23 service accounts. Id. ¶ 16. The reassignment reduced her access to sales and service 24 opportunities and negatively impacted her performance-based incentive compensation. 25 Id. On March 1, 2023, Plaintiff’s work schedule was reduced from between 35 and 40 26 27 1 hours per week to 25 hours per week, causing her financial hardship and hindering her 2 career opportunities. Id. ¶ 17. 3 On March 20, 2023, Defendant accused Plaintiff of adding her personal email 4 address to a customer account. Id. ¶ 18. She was not afforded a formal investigation, 5 explanation, or opportunity to respond. Id. On April 3, 2023, Defendant terminated 6 Plaintiff’s employment. Id. ¶ 19. 7 After her termination, Plaintiff applied for unemployment benefits and was denied. 8 Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff appealed the decision. Id. On May 10, 2023, the administrative law 9 judge ruled in Plaintiff’s favor. Id. ¶ 21. 10 On October 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with both the U.S. 11 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the California Civil Rights 12 Department (“CRD”). ECF No. 4-3 at 2-3.1 That same day, the CRD issued notice that it 13 would defer the investigation to the EEOC because of the dual-filing. Id. at 5. It also 14 notified Plaintiff of her right to sue and that a lawsuit on the matter should be filed 15 “within one year from the date of this notice.” Id. The notice also stated that the “one- 16 year period [would be] tolled during the pendency of the EEOC’s investigation.” Id. 17 On July 11, 2025, the EEOC granted Plaintiff’s request for a Notice of Right to 18 Sue, terminating its processing of the charge. Id. at 10. The notice stated that Plaintiff 19 was required to file her lawsuit within 90 days of receipt of the EEOC’s dismissal notice. 20 Id. It also warned that the “time limit for filing a lawsuit based on a claim under state law 21 may be different.” Id. 22 On December 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint of Employment Discrimination 23 before the CRD. Compl. at 25. Plaintiff also requested authorization to file a lawsuit. Id. 24

25 26 1 Throughout the order, the pagination for docketed documents is derived from the numbering generated by the ECF system. 27 1 at 22. The CRD provided the Right to Sue notice on December 19, 2025 and closed the 2 case. Id. at 23-24. 3 PROCEDURAL HISTORY 4 On December 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the 5 State of California for the County of San Diego. ECF No. 1-3. The complaint alleges 6 seven causes of action: (1) retaliation, Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.5, (2) retaliation, Cal. Gov’t 7 Code § 12940(h), (3) discrimination, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a), (4) failure to prevent 8 discrimination and retaliation, Cal. Gov’t Code 12940(k), (5) violation of Cal. Lab. Code 9 § 6310, (6) violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 6311, and (7) wrongful termination in violation 10 of public policy. See id. 11 On March 6, 2026, Defendant removed the case to this Court. ECF No. 1. On 12 March 13, 2026, Defendant filed this instant motion to dismiss. ECF No. 4 (“Mot.”). On 13 April 10, 2026, an opposition was filed. ECF No. 6 (“Opp.”). On April 24, 2026, a reply 14 was filed. ECF No. 7 (“Rep.”). 15 LEGAL STANDARD 16 Rule 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim 17 upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal under Rule 18 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient 19 facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Election Integrity Project Cal., Inc. v. Weber, 20 113 F.4th 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th 21 Cir. 2001)). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain a “short and 22 plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), 23 backed by sufficient facts that make the claim “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 24 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 25 (2007)). Plausibility requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 26 unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Rather, it requires enough factual content for the 27 1 court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 2 alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing the plausibility of a 3 complaint, courts must “accept all [factual] allegations in the complaint as true and 4 construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Dent v. Nat'l 5 Football League, 968 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. 6 Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2013)). But courts do not accept as 7 true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or 8 unreasonable inferences. Coronavirus Rep. v. Apple, Inc., 85 F.4th 948, 954 (9th Cir. 9 2023). Ultimately, the court must be able to “draw the reasonable inference that the 10 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. 11 Where a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless 12 the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged 13 pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 14 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture 15 Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). 16 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 17 Generally, on a motion to dismiss, courts will limit their review to the contents of 18 the complaint and may only consider extrinsic evidence that is properly presented as part 19 of the complaint. See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001). 20 However, under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a district court may take notice of facts 21 not subject to reasonable dispute that are capable of accurate and ready determination by 22 resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 23 Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of (1) Plaintiff’s October 30, 2023 24 Charge of Discrimination filed with the EEOC against U.S. Bank , ECF Doc. 4-3 at 2-3 25 (2) the CRD’s October 30, 2023 Notice to Complainant and Respondent and Notice to 26 Complainant of Right to Sue, ECF Doc. 4-3 at 5, (3) the EEOC’s December 13, 2023 27 1 Request for Information issued to Respondent U.S. Bank, ECF Doc. 4-3 at 7-8, (4) the 2 EEOC’s July 11, 2025 Notice of Right to Sue, ECF Doc. 4-3 at 10-11, (5) the September 3 6, 2022 Worksharing Agreement between the State of California Civil Rights Department 4 and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for Fiscal Year 2022, ECF 5 Doc. 4-3 at 13-20, and (6) the October 13, 2023 Fiscal Year 2024 Extension of 6 Worksharing Agreement, ECF Doc. 4-3 at 22. ECF No. 4-2. Plaintiff does not oppose the 7 request for judicial notice. Exhibits 1-6 are relevant to the instant case and are matters of 8 public record, so the Court may take judicial notice of them “without converting a motion 9 to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Lee, 250 F.3d at 689 (quotations and 10 citations omitted). 11 DISCUSSION 12 Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 13 Causes of Action. Mot. at 13. First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s FEHA claims (i.e., 14 Plaintiff’s Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action) should be dismissed for failure to 15 timely file suit. Id. at 19. Second, Defendant maintains that the Third and Fourth Cause of 16 Action “do not plausibly allege membership in a protected class, facts supporting a 17 reasonable inference of discriminatory animus, or any causal connection between 18 protected characteristic and an adverse employment action.” Id. at 13. Finally, Defendant 19 contends that the Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action fail to allege any adverse treatment 20 based on unsafe working conditions. ECF No. 24. Plaintiff contests each of Defendant’s 21 arguments. Opp. at 2. 22 I. Failure to Timely File Suit (Claims 2-4) 23 “[T]he one-year statute of limitations, commencing from the date of the right-to- 24 sue notice by the department to the person claiming to be aggrieved, shall be tolled 25 when…[a] charge of discrimination or harassment is timely filed concurrently with the 26 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the department.” Cal. Gov't Code § 27 1 12965(e)(1). “The time for commencing an action for which the statute of limitations is 2 tolled under paragraph (1) expires when the federal right-to-sue period to commence a 3 civil action expires, or one year from the date of the right-to-sue notice by the 4 department, whichever is later.” Id. § 12965(e)(2). 5 Here, the CRD’s right-to-sue notice was issued on October 30, 2023. ECF No. 4-3 6 at 5. On July 11, 2025, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue notice and stated that the lawsuit 7 be filed in federal or state court within 90 days of receipt. Id. at 10. Thus, the statute of 8 limitations was tolled to October 9, 2025. Mot. at 20. 9 Because Plaintiff did not file her complaint until December 19, 2025, Defendant 10 argues that her FEHA claims are time-barred. Id. Plaintiff does not contest that her 11 complaint was not timely filed in accordance with statute and the EEOC’s right-to-sue 12 notice. See Opp. at 2. However, she maintains that her FEHA claims are subject to 13 equitable tolling because she was acting pro se during the relevant time periods and 14 believed the 90-day deadline applied only to her federal claims. Id. at 3. 15 FEHA’s administrative time limits “are treated as equivalent to statutes of 16 limitations and are subject to equitable doctrines such as waiver, estoppel, and tolling.” 17 Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 900 (9th Cir. 2001). However, equitable 18 tolling is typically extended only sparingly, and courts are generally 19 “[un]forgiving…where the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in preserving [her] 20 legal rights.” Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990). 21 While there is no precise formula for equitable tolling, the equities tend to favor “a 22 discrimination plaintiff who (1) diligently pursued his claim; (2) was misinformed or 23 misled by the administrative agency responsible for processing his charge; (3) relied in 24 fact on the misinformation or misrepresentations of that agency, causing him to fail to 25 exhaust his administrative remedies; and (4) was acting pro se at the time.” Rodriguez, 26 265 F.3d at 902. Essentially, equitable tolling is warranted where the defendant induced 27 1 the filing delay. Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. 2 Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008); Khan v. SAP Labs, 3 LLC, No. 18-CV-07490-BLF, 2019 WL 5697928, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2019). 4 Here, Plaintiff does not meet the first three factors. First, Plaintiff does not present 5 any facts demonstrating diligence in pursuing her claims. See Opp. at 3. For example, she 6 does not provide any explanation for the delay in filing or what steps she was taking 7 during the 90-day window. Second, Plaintiff does not argue that she was misinformed or 8 misled by the EEOC or that she subsequently relied on any misinformation. See id. 9 Instead, the EEOC’s right-to-sue notice clearly stated a 90-day filing deadline and noted 10 that the time limit for state law claims might be different. ECF No. 4-3 at 10. 11 Plaintiff, however, relies on the fourth factor, only maintaining that she “was 12 acting pro se during the relevant time periods…[w]ithout understanding the system.” 13 Opp. at 3. Nonetheless, while Plaintiff was pro se during the relevant time period, “a pro 14 se petitioner's lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance 15 warranting equitable tolling.” Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1151 (9th Cir.2006); 16 see also Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005) (“But we have never 17 accepted pro se representation alone or procedural ignorance as an excuse for prolonged 18 inattention when a statute's clear policy calls for promptness.”). Thus, even pro se, 19 Plaintiff’s confusion with regards to § 12965(e)(2) also does not weigh in favor of 20 equitable tolling. 21 Thus, the Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action are not subject to equitable 22 tolling and are time-barred. 23 II. Failure to State a Claim (Claims 3-4) 24 Defendant argues that the Third and Fourth Causes of Action fail to state a claim. 25 Mot. at 13. As these claims are time-barred, the Court declines to consider these 26 arguments. 27 1 III. Labor Code §§ 6310, 6311 (Claims 5-6) 2 California Labor Code §§ 6310, 6311 protect employees from retaliation when 3 addressing unsafe working conditions. Specifically, Section 6310 protects an employee 4 from retaliatory termination for “(i) making a complaint to the division or governmental 5 agency with statutory responsibility with respect to employee safety or health; (ii) 6 instituting or testifying in a proceeding related to their rights; (iii) participating in an 7 occupational health and safety committee; and (iv) reporting a work-related fatality, 8 injury, illness or exercising any other rights protected by the Occupational Safety and 9 Health Act (“OSHA”).” Terry v. Nespresso USA, Inc., No. 2:24-CV-01506-HDV (SKX), 10 2024 WL 3993865, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2024) (emphasis in original); see Cal. Lab. 11 Code § 6310. In essence, “Section 6310 makes it unlawful to fire or otherwise retaliate 12 against an employee who makes a workplace safety complaint with government 13 agencies.” Lujan v. Minagar, 124 Cal. App. 4th 1040, 864 (2004). 14 Similarly, Section 6311 provides that “[n]o employee shall be laid off or 15 discharged for refusing to perform work” where the performance would create a 16 workplace safety violation and “the violation would create a real and apparent hazard to 17 the employee or their fellow employees.” Cal. Lab. Code § 6311. 18 Here, Plaintiff’s factual allegations do not relate to unsafe or hazardous working 19 conditions, which is the relevant “protected activity” under §§ 6310, 6311. See Cuevas v. 20 SkyWest Airlines, 17 F. Supp. 3d 956, 964 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff'd sub nom. Cuevas v. 21 SkyWest Airlines, Inc., 644 F. App'x 791 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding a protected activity 22 when Plaintiff reported the safety of aircraft ground equipment); Rodriguez v. Lab'y 23 Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (finding a protected activity 24 where the plaintiff reported overfilled biohazard bags and disinfection logs). Instead, the 25 complaint focuses on discriminatory treatment, such as “exclusion from team 26 communications that were conducted exclusively in Spanish.” Compl. ¶ 13. These types 27 1 || of activities are not protected under §§ 6310, 6311. See Badrh v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2 □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ 2023 WL 5532098, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2023) (“Badrh 3 || alleges retaliation for using medical leave and because of his religion and ethnicity...He 4 || does not allege that he was retaliated against for either reporting safety issues or refusing 5 work because of the safety issues.”); Terry v. Nespresso USA, Inc., No. 2:24-CV- 6 ||01506-HDV (SKX), 2024 WL 3993865, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2024) (“Even 7 || generously construed, the FAC simply does not include any allegations that go to any 8 || safety issue, health concern, or occupational standard violation.”). 9 Despite this, Plaintiff maintains that she made complaints to management 10 “regarding pressure and mandates to participate in illegal business practices and unsafe 11 || work conditions and hostile work environment,” which resulted in her termination. /d. { 12 || 72. However, this allegation is conclusory. Plaintiff does not explain what the illegal 13 || business practices or unsafe work conditions were and how they related to workplace 14 || safety. Without these additional factual allegations, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a 15 claim under §§ 6310, 6311. 16 CONCLUSION 17 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Defendant’s motion to dismiss 18 to the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action with leave to amend. 19 || The hearing set on June 5, 2026 shall be VACATED. Plaintiff shall file an amended 20 complaint within 21 days of the Court’s Order. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 ||Dated: June 2, 2026 <=

24 United States District Judge 25 26 27 10 28 3:26-ev-01443-GPC-DDL