[NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT] United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 98-1753
MARTHA MOISE LOUIS,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
FLAGSHIP AIRLINES, INC. D/B/A AMERICAN EAGLE, AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., AND ICALM GROUP, INC.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge, Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge, and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
Marian H. Glaser for appellant. Dennis J. Kelly with whom Mark J. Ventola and Christopher D. Engebretson were on brief for appellees.
February 5, 1999
COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge. After sustaining injuries while descending stairs from an airplane, Martha Moise Louis ("Louis") filed suit against the airline and its insurance adjuster, ICALM. The court: 1) dismissed the claim against ICALM for lack of personal jurisdiction; 2) denied Louis's motion to amend the complaint; and 3) denied her motion for post-judgment discovery regarding the identity of other possible defendants. Louis now appeals all three decisions. Because the court's rulings were entirely appropriate, we affirm. I. Background In the first leg of a journey to Haiti, Louis boarded an American Eagle ("American") commuter flight at Boston's Logan airport on January 6, 1994. The flight was subsequently canceled, and the passengers were asked to deplane. When descending the stairs to the tarmac, Louis slipped and fell on an icy patch. She declined American's offer to arrange and pay for immediate medical assistance. More than a year and a half later, in August 1995, her attorney sent a letter to American seeking a report of the incident. American responded in October 1995 that it was commencing an investigation of the accident and requested information about Louis's injuries. Her counsel sent the material on November 5, 1995. American forwarded the package to its insurance adjuster, ICALM, a New York corporation with its principal place of business in North Carolina. On November 20, 1995, ICALM sent Louis a letter requesting that she provide the medical and employment authorizations necessary to verify the nature and extent of her injuries. Louis provided the materials on January 29, 1996, two years and twenty-three days after the accident. After conducting its own investigation, ICALM denied her claim because the Warsaw Convention's two-year statute of limitations had expired. During the entire period, ICALM contacted Louis or her attorney four times: once to request the authorizations, twice to return calls from Louis's attorney, and once to inform Louis that her claim had been denied. Louis subsequently filed suit in Massachusetts against American for negligence and against ICALM for unfair or deceptive insurance practices. When both American and ICALM moved for summary judgment, the court dismissed the claim against American as barred by the statute of limitations. It also expressed doubt about its ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over ICALM, and asked Louis to file a supplemental memorandum detailing ICALM's relevant in-state activities. Louis filed both the supplemental memorandum and a motion to amend the complaint to add "Underwriters of Lloyd's of London" as a defendant. The court denied her motion to amend, and dismissed the claims against ICALM for lack of personal jurisdiction. Louis then filed a post-judgment discovery motion in an attempt the learn the names of other defendants who might not be covered by the same statute of limitations as American, but again the court denied her entreaty. II. Discussion The district court's opinions are lengthy and thoughtful, and we need not linger in our discussion of the issues. A. Personal Jurisdiction District courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants if "such jurisdiction is authorized by state statute or rule and its exercise does not offend due process." United Elec. Workers v. 163 Pleasant Street Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1086 (1st Cir. 1992). In relevant part the Massachusetts long-arm statute provides for personal jurisdiction over a defendant in another state if he: (a) transact[s] any business in [Massachusetts]; . . . (c) caus[es] tortious injury by an act or omission in [Massachusetts]; [or] (d) caus[es] tortious injury in [Massachusetts] by an act or omission outside [Massachusetts] if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in [Massachusetts]; Mass. Gen. L. ch. 223A, 3. In its opinion, the district court correctly found that none of these standards had been met. Subsection (a) requires the defendant to have transacted business in Massachusetts. ICALM, a New York corporation with its principal place of business in North Carolina, marketed its services to American, a Delaware corporation with principal places of business in Texas and Tennessee. ICALM has never maintained any presence in Massachusetts, nor is it registered to do business there. Its only contacts with Massachusetts arise from adjusting claims made by Massachusetts residents against its clients located elsewhere. Most cases exploring the reach of the "transacting business" language involve direct contractual relations between the parties. See, e.g., Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 625 N.E.2d 549, 553 (Mass. 1994). In non-contractual cases such as this one Massachusetts has required more than the four contacts that occurred here for its courts to exercise jurisdiction. See New Hampshire Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Markem Corp., 676 N.E.2d 809, 812 (Mass. 1997) (finding in action by third party that foreign insured had not transacted business in Massachusetts simply because foreign insurer had conducted some administration of insured's policies in Massachusetts). Even the most liberal interpretation of ICALM's in-state activities would not permit personal jurisdiction under this prong of the statute. Subsection (c) is equally inapplicable since it requires the tortious act to be within Massachusetts. The complaint alleged that ICALM delayed its investigation and failed to affirm or deny coverage within a reasonable time. ICALM's actions and alleged omissions, consisting solely of examining the related documents and denying coverage, took place entirely at its offices in North Carolina. Subsection (d) does allow a plaintiff to file suit for injuries in Massachusetts based on tortious acts or omissions outside the state. However, Louis's complaint cannot meet the other element of that subsection, which requires a finding that ICALM "regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from . . . services rendered, in [Massachusetts]." As stated earlier, ICALM does not do business in Massachusetts, or solicit business there. Nor does it derive substantial revenue from services rendered there. A finding that ICALM's two letters and two phone calls constituted a "persistent course of conduct" would stretch that term beyond all recognition. The long arm statute simply does not allow courts in Massachusetts to exercise jurisdiction over ICALM under the facts of this case, as the district court correctly ruled. B. Motion to amend After the court permitted Louis to fortify her filing with respect to ICALM's in-state activities, Louis filed a supplemental memorandum and a motion to amend the complaint to add "Underwriters of Lloyd's of London" as a defendant.
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[NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT] United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 98-1753
MARTHA MOISE LOUIS,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
FLAGSHIP AIRLINES, INC. D/B/A AMERICAN EAGLE, AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., AND ICALM GROUP, INC.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge, Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge, and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
Marian H. Glaser for appellant. Dennis J. Kelly with whom Mark J. Ventola and Christopher D. Engebretson were on brief for appellees.
February 5, 1999
COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge. After sustaining injuries while descending stairs from an airplane, Martha Moise Louis ("Louis") filed suit against the airline and its insurance adjuster, ICALM. The court: 1) dismissed the claim against ICALM for lack of personal jurisdiction; 2) denied Louis's motion to amend the complaint; and 3) denied her motion for post-judgment discovery regarding the identity of other possible defendants. Louis now appeals all three decisions. Because the court's rulings were entirely appropriate, we affirm. I. Background In the first leg of a journey to Haiti, Louis boarded an American Eagle ("American") commuter flight at Boston's Logan airport on January 6, 1994. The flight was subsequently canceled, and the passengers were asked to deplane. When descending the stairs to the tarmac, Louis slipped and fell on an icy patch. She declined American's offer to arrange and pay for immediate medical assistance. More than a year and a half later, in August 1995, her attorney sent a letter to American seeking a report of the incident. American responded in October 1995 that it was commencing an investigation of the accident and requested information about Louis's injuries. Her counsel sent the material on November 5, 1995. American forwarded the package to its insurance adjuster, ICALM, a New York corporation with its principal place of business in North Carolina. On November 20, 1995, ICALM sent Louis a letter requesting that she provide the medical and employment authorizations necessary to verify the nature and extent of her injuries. Louis provided the materials on January 29, 1996, two years and twenty-three days after the accident. After conducting its own investigation, ICALM denied her claim because the Warsaw Convention's two-year statute of limitations had expired. During the entire period, ICALM contacted Louis or her attorney four times: once to request the authorizations, twice to return calls from Louis's attorney, and once to inform Louis that her claim had been denied. Louis subsequently filed suit in Massachusetts against American for negligence and against ICALM for unfair or deceptive insurance practices. When both American and ICALM moved for summary judgment, the court dismissed the claim against American as barred by the statute of limitations. It also expressed doubt about its ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over ICALM, and asked Louis to file a supplemental memorandum detailing ICALM's relevant in-state activities. Louis filed both the supplemental memorandum and a motion to amend the complaint to add "Underwriters of Lloyd's of London" as a defendant. The court denied her motion to amend, and dismissed the claims against ICALM for lack of personal jurisdiction. Louis then filed a post-judgment discovery motion in an attempt the learn the names of other defendants who might not be covered by the same statute of limitations as American, but again the court denied her entreaty. II. Discussion The district court's opinions are lengthy and thoughtful, and we need not linger in our discussion of the issues. A. Personal Jurisdiction District courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants if "such jurisdiction is authorized by state statute or rule and its exercise does not offend due process." United Elec. Workers v. 163 Pleasant Street Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1086 (1st Cir. 1992). In relevant part the Massachusetts long-arm statute provides for personal jurisdiction over a defendant in another state if he: (a) transact[s] any business in [Massachusetts]; . . . (c) caus[es] tortious injury by an act or omission in [Massachusetts]; [or] (d) caus[es] tortious injury in [Massachusetts] by an act or omission outside [Massachusetts] if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in [Massachusetts]; Mass. Gen. L. ch. 223A, 3. In its opinion, the district court correctly found that none of these standards had been met. Subsection (a) requires the defendant to have transacted business in Massachusetts. ICALM, a New York corporation with its principal place of business in North Carolina, marketed its services to American, a Delaware corporation with principal places of business in Texas and Tennessee. ICALM has never maintained any presence in Massachusetts, nor is it registered to do business there. Its only contacts with Massachusetts arise from adjusting claims made by Massachusetts residents against its clients located elsewhere. Most cases exploring the reach of the "transacting business" language involve direct contractual relations between the parties. See, e.g., Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 625 N.E.2d 549, 553 (Mass. 1994). In non-contractual cases such as this one Massachusetts has required more than the four contacts that occurred here for its courts to exercise jurisdiction. See New Hampshire Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Markem Corp., 676 N.E.2d 809, 812 (Mass. 1997) (finding in action by third party that foreign insured had not transacted business in Massachusetts simply because foreign insurer had conducted some administration of insured's policies in Massachusetts). Even the most liberal interpretation of ICALM's in-state activities would not permit personal jurisdiction under this prong of the statute. Subsection (c) is equally inapplicable since it requires the tortious act to be within Massachusetts. The complaint alleged that ICALM delayed its investigation and failed to affirm or deny coverage within a reasonable time. ICALM's actions and alleged omissions, consisting solely of examining the related documents and denying coverage, took place entirely at its offices in North Carolina. Subsection (d) does allow a plaintiff to file suit for injuries in Massachusetts based on tortious acts or omissions outside the state. However, Louis's complaint cannot meet the other element of that subsection, which requires a finding that ICALM "regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from . . . services rendered, in [Massachusetts]." As stated earlier, ICALM does not do business in Massachusetts, or solicit business there. Nor does it derive substantial revenue from services rendered there. A finding that ICALM's two letters and two phone calls constituted a "persistent course of conduct" would stretch that term beyond all recognition. The long arm statute simply does not allow courts in Massachusetts to exercise jurisdiction over ICALM under the facts of this case, as the district court correctly ruled. B. Motion to amend After the court permitted Louis to fortify her filing with respect to ICALM's in-state activities, Louis filed a supplemental memorandum and a motion to amend the complaint to add "Underwriters of Lloyd's of London" as a defendant. Noting both that it was an attempt to delay the inevitable dismissal of the action against the current defendants and that Louis had learned about the insurance company's identity four months earlier, the court denied her motion. We review such a decision under an abuse of discretion standard, and "defer to the district court if any adequate reason for the denial is apparent on the record." Grantv. News Group Boston, Inc., 55 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1995). It is evident that the court did not abuse its discretion. A finding that Louis unduly delayed filing the motion is an adequate reason to deny it. See Acosta-Mestre v. Hilton Int'l of Puerto Rico, Inc., 156 F.3d 49, 51 (1st Cir. 1998). The action began on December 31, 1996. On October 1, 1997, Louis learned that Lloyd's was the insurer. However, she neglected to move to amend until February 19, 1998, fourteen months after the original complaint was filed and more than four months after she discovered the insurer's identity. The district court found that this four month wait constituted undue delay, especially in light of the court's intervening ruling that the claim against American was dismissed and the claims against ICALM would likely be as well. The district court's reason for denying her motion is sufficient. C. Post-Judgment Discovery Louis subsequently filed a motion asking the court to stay judgment, to reconsider and to permit discovery of other possible defendants. It was denied. The district court has considerable discretion in ruling on discovery motions and will be overruled only if it abused that discretion. Daigle v. Maine Med. Ctr., Inc., 14 F.3d 684, 692 (1st Cir. 1994); see also Mack v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 871 F.2d 179, 186 (1st Cir. 1989) (requiring the ruling to be "plainly wrong and result[] in substantial prejudice"). Since the district court succinctly and aptly disposed of this issue, we quote its language here at length: Essentially, plaintiff asks the court to stay the case until defendants, after the court has ruled that plaintiff does not have any legally cognizable claims against them, tell plaintiff who was the owner of the staircase on which plaintiff fell.
Plaintiff's request for discovery after a final judgment in this civil action, without even a contention that the requested discovery would be material to the outcome of this civil action, is simply unprecedented and has no support at law.
Because all three decisions challenged on appeal were entirely appropriate, the decision is affirmed.