Louis Randolph v. Brian Williams, Sr.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 17, 2023
• Docket: 22-15385
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 17 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LOUIS A. RANDOLPH, AKA Clyde Lewis, No. 22-15385

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:17-cv-00085-MMD-CLB v.

BRIAN WILLIAMS, Sr.; et al., MEMORANDUM*

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Miranda M. Du, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 13, 2023** San Francisco, California

Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Louis Randolph appeals pro se from the district court’s order adopting the

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendation to grant Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de

novo the district court’s summary judgment. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

Randolph alleges that while he was an inmate at the Southern Desert

Correctional Center: Defendant Reyes withheld food and served spoiled food in

retaliation (Count I); Defendants Harris, Ledingham, Dreesen, and Williams denied

Randolph’s right to freely exercise his religion by not allowing him to attend the Eid

Feast as is tradition in his Muslim faith (Count II); and Defendants violated

Randolph’s rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

(RLUIPA) and the First Amendment to freely exercise his religion, and

discriminated against him based on religion and race in violation of the Equal

Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by not affording him the same

religious dietary accommodations that inmates of other faiths receive (Count III).

Magistrate Judge Carla L. Baldwin issued a report pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)

and Nevada district court Local Rule IB 1-4 recommending summary judgment in

favor of Defendants on all counts. After considering Randolph’s timely filed

objection, the district court accepted the report in part, granting summary judgment

to Defendants on Counts II and III, but allowing Count I to go to a jury trial, which

returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. Randolph timely appealed, alleging that

the decisions should be vacated because the law clerk did not notify Randolph that

he could consent to a magistrate judge administering his case, and that he was not

served notice of consent as per Local Rule 26. He also alleges that he was prejudiced

2 and denied due process by having a magistrate judge make a recommendation on

Counts II and III rather than a jury.

While we construe a pro se litigant’s filings liberally, a brief must contain

specific and distinct allegations as to how defendants violated the law. Fed. R. App.

P. 28; Greenwood v. F.A.A., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994). Although Randolph’s

allegations, if true, are concerning, he fails to provide specific, distinct support for

his contentions that he never received notice, that did he did not consent to the

magistrate judge, that the magistrate judge was biased in favor of Defendants, and

that he was denied due process. In addition, Randolph raised these issues for the

first time on this appeal, which generally bars them from our consideration, and no

exception applies here—nor does Randolph argue that one should. United States v.

Carlson, 900 F.2d 1346, 1349 (9th Cir. 1990).

Even if we could consider his arguments, Randolph has not demonstrated that

he was prejudiced and that therefore the district court’s decision should be reversed.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule IB 3-2(b), a magistrate judge has

the authority to oversee proceedings and submit to a district court judge proposed

findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition of a motion for summary

judgment. Just that occurred here: the district court adopted the submitted report in

part. Though Randolph argues that he did not consent to the magistrate’s ability to

oversee the proceedings, and though Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73(b)(2) allows

3 any party to withhold consent to proceed before a magistrate judge, Randolph at no

point in the proceedings—including in his objection to the report—up until this

appeal argue that he did not consent to the magistrate judge. Nor does Randolph

offer a reason for any of these objections aside from the bald contention that the

magistrate judge was biased.

Similarly, Randolph’s claim that he was prejudiced because a judge, rather

than a jury, heard Counts II and III fails because Randolph did not prove that the

district court erred in accepting the magistrate’s findings to grant summary

judgment. A summary judgment proceeding does not deprive a losing party of the

right to a jury trial. In re Slatkin, 525 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2008); Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (there is no right to a jury trial where

the evidence is “so one sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”).

This appeal also appears to be the first time that Randolph argues that he was

not notified or served notice that he could consent to a magistrate judge. Though we

must consider as evidence a pro se plaintiff’s contentions offered in their pleadings

where such contentions are based on personal knowledge, Randolph offers no

support for these contentions. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004).

Meanwhile, we can infer from the trial court docket that Randolph was indeed

provided with the magistrate judge consent form as per local rules—and, in any case,

4 Randolph did not appear to contest the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction any time in

the proceedings thereafter until this appeal.

Lastly, Randolph also offers no evidence or explanation to support his

conclusory contention that Judge Baldwin was biased. “A showing of judicial bias

requires facts sufficient to create actual impropriety or an appearance of

impropriety,” none of which Randolph demonstrated. Greenway v. Schriro, 653

F.3d 790, 806 (9th Cir. 2011).

AFFIRMED.