Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Penney

4 So. 2d 167, 241 Ala. 602, 1941 Ala. LEXIS 189
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedOctober 9, 1941
Docket6 Div. 783.
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 4 So. 2d 167 (Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Penney) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Penney, 4 So. 2d 167, 241 Ala. 602, 1941 Ala. LEXIS 189 (Ala. 1941).

Opinion

BROWN, Justice.

This is an action of covenant for breach of warranty against incumbrances embodied in a deed executed by the defendant to the plaintiff on March 4, 1926, conveying to it “The East Half of Lot 16, and the West Half of Lot 17, in Block 98, *604 according to the present plan of Birmingham by the Elyton Land Company; said fractional lots together forming a rectangle fronting 50 feet on the Northern line of First Avenue, North, and extending back Northward 140 feet to the Southern line of First Alley, together with the buildings cmd improvements thereon(Italics supplied.)

The complaint consists of two counts. The first count avers that at the time of the execution and delivery of said conveyance “the property was encumbered by an easement in favor of the owners of the West Half of Lot 16, in said Block 98, which said easement consisted of the use for ingress and egress, of joint stairway erected on both sides of the dividing line between the East Half and West Half of Lot 16, Block 98, aforesaid, and also an easement of support arising out of the fact that the building located on the land conveyed by defendant to the plaintiff was constructed in such manner as to support and at the same time deprive [derive] support from the adjoining structure on the West Half of Lot 16, Block 98, that there was, and is no dividing wall between said portions of said structure, but said building is so constructed as that the removal of the structure located on the land conveyed - by the defendant to the Plaintiff would deprive the building on the adjoin-’ ing land of the support which it now enjoys, and plaintiff avers that by reason of the manner in which said building is constructed, and has been constructed and maintained for more than twenty (20) years, that the owner of the building located on the West Half of Lot 16, Block 98 thereby has an easement of support, and thereby the plaintiff is denied the full sovereignty, control and dominion over the property purchased by the plaintiff from the defendant.” (Italics supplied.)

The second count averred that there was a separate building on the two parcels or fractional lots, supported ’by a party-wall on the line between the properties of the coterminous proprietors and a common stairway for the use of both proprietors, otherwise said count was the same as the first.

The defendant pleaded the general issue, in short by consent, with leave to give in evidence matters if specially pleaded would preclude a recovery, and with like leave to plaintiff to reply.

There was a verdict for the plaintiff, followed by motion for new trial by defendant. The court granted the new trial and from that order this appeal is prosecuted.

The evidence is without dispute that the structure on .three fractional lots was a single building under one roof, that it was constructed in 1884 by the then owners, Green and McConnell, Green being the owner of the property with 50-foot frontage and McConnell the other 25-foot frontage fractional lot; that there was a party-wall constructed on the line between the coterminous proprietors, one phase of the evidence being to the effect that the wall was 13 inches thick, 10 inches on Green’s side and 3 inches on McConnell’s; another phase of the evidence was the wall was a 17-inch wall with 7 inches on the McConnell lot. The stairway led from the street entrance to the second floor, was approximately two-thirds on Green’s lot and one-third on McConnell’s. This stairway led into a seven foot hallway, from which there was a separate stairway to the third floor on each side, supported by the studded walls forming the hallway. The joists or girders over the first story rested on the side walls and the party-wall which did not rise above the ceiling over the first floor. The rooms on the first floor, as the evidence tends to show, were constructed for use as stores, and the second and third floors for rooming house. There are slight tendencies in the evidence that the rooms on the second floor, at the time of the sale and conveyance of the Green property to the plaintiff, were usable for rooming purposes and the plaintiff rented some of the rooms, availing itself of the stairway as a means of ingress and egress for its tenants.

The plaintiff adduced the testimony of expert realtors going to show that the common ■ stairway and party-wall was a detriment affecting the market value of the property from 10% upward. The verdict assessed plaintiff’s damages at 10% of the price plaintiff paid for the property, $13,-500.

The defendant’s evidence shows that the entire property, including the McConnell fractional lot was acquired and owned by one Thomas from whom defendant purchased the fractional lo.ts formerly owned by Green. Thomas still owns the other fractional lot. The defendant’s evidence further goes to show that the building was *605 poorly constructed, that lime and sand mortar was used in construction, that the walls were not tied together, and all the weight of the bujlding rested on the side walls and the party-wall. The roof of the entire structure rested on the joists .supporting the second floor. Time and exposure of one of the outside walls had rotted and eroded the mortar so that it could be picked out with a common lead pencil. The front wall had parted from the roof at the third and second floors, was leaning toward the street,-bulged in the center, and was dangerous and liable to fall. Termites and dry rot had ravaged the stringers to the stairways; the one leading from the first to the second floor had dropped down on one side and some of the steps or treads had apparently been pulled off and used for kindling by tramps and other mendicants who constantly inhabited the second floor, sleeping on old dirty matresses, in squalor and filth. The steps or treads on the stairways from the second to the third floor had rotted from the rains coming through the roof and the stringers were in dangerous condition of decay. The party-wall in the rear for a distance of thirty feet had fallen down. That the defendant had been notified by the city authorities of Birmingham that the place was dangerous and that he would have to repair or rase the building. That the building was worthless for the purposes for which it was constructed, and only had a small value for material that might be salvaged in tearing it down.

The evidence also goes to show that the property was purchased for the purpose of tearing away the building and using the lots for'rebuilding.

The evidence also 'shows that the property purchased by plaintiff was sold to Sokol Brothers who reconstructed the part of the building on the Green lot, and the lot with 25-foot frontage at the time of the trial was vacant and is being used for a parking lot.

The question of controlling importance presented on the trial, was, is said stairway and party-wall in its condition at the time of the conveyance an incumbrance on the title conveyed by the deed ?

There was not, as a matter of law, an easement attached to and running with the land.

“An easement has been defined as a liberty, privilege or advantage in land without profit, existing distinct from the ownership of the soil.” 9 R.C.L. 735, § 2; 17 Am.Jur. 923, § 2; Tuskegee Land & Security Co. v. Birmingham Realty Co., 161 Ala. 542, 49 So. 378, 23 L.R.A.,N.S., 992. (Italics supplied.)

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Garrison v. Alabama Power Company
807 So. 2d 567 (Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, 2001)
Gonzalez v. Naman
678 So. 2d 1152 (Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, 1996)
David Lee Boykin Family Trust v. Boykin
661 So. 2d 245 (Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, 1995)
West Town Plaza Associates, Ltd. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
619 So. 2d 1290 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1993)
Pelzer Homes, Inc. v. Alabama Power Co.
475 So. 2d 558 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1985)
Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Wm. T. Burton Industries, Inc.
217 So. 2d 188 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1968)
Kirkland v. Kirkland
198 So. 2d 771 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1967)
First Investment Co. v. State Fire Marshal
120 N.W.2d 549 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1963)
Roberts v. Monroe
75 So. 2d 492 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1954)
Stanley v. Barclay
46 So. 2d 210 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1950)
Alabama Power Co. v. Daily
18 So. 2d 142 (Alabama Court of Appeals, 1944)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
4 So. 2d 167, 241 Ala. 602, 1941 Ala. LEXIS 189, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/louis-pizitz-dry-goods-co-v-penney-ala-1941.