Louis Langley Pitts v. Bailey Anderson
This text of 2022 Ark. App. 505 (Louis Langley Pitts v. Bailey Anderson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Cite as 2022 Ark. App. 505 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION IV No. CV-21-524
LOUIS LANGLEY PITTS Opinion Delivered December 14, 2022 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 72CV-20-1698]
BAILEY ANDERSON HONORABLE BETH STOREY BRYAN, APPELLEE JUDGE
APPEAL DISMISSED
RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge
Louis Langley Pitts appeals the Washington County Circuit Court order denying his
motion to dismiss Bailey Anderson’s complaint. On appeal, Pitts argues that the circuit court
erred by finding that Anderson’s complaint was not barred by the statute of limitations. We
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
On August 11, 2020, Anderson transmitted a tort complaint against Pitts to the
Washington County Circuit Clerk using the electronic filing system. She received a
transmission receipt at 6:38 p.m. On August 12, Anderson received a rejection notice from
the electronic system. The reason for the rejection stated as follows: “COVER SHEET
NEEDS TO BE IN PDF FORM.” On that same day, Anderson resubmitted her tort
complaint. In her complaint, Anderson asserted claims for assault, battery, outrage, and false imprisonment against Pitts concerning an incident on August 11, 2019. She attached the
August 12, 2020 rejection notice.
On May 7, 2021, Pitts moved to dismiss Anderson’s complaint. He argued that
Anderson’s claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations in Arkansas Code
Annotated section 16-56-104(2) (Repl. 2005) because the incident occurred on August 11,
2019, and Anderson filed her complaint on August 12, 2020.
On May 26, Anderson responded to Pitts’s motion to dismiss. She argued that the
completed electronic transmission of her complaint on August 11, 2020, constituted a filing
pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 21. She attached the August 11, 2020
receipt from the electronic filing system stating that the complaint had been received. She
thus argued that the one-year statute of limitations did not bar her claims.
On August 17, the circuit court denied Pitts’s motion to dismiss. The court found
that Anderson’s submission of the complaint on August 11, 2020, constituted a filing and
thus that her claims were timely filed. The court’s order included a Rule 54(b) certificate. In
the certificate, the court listed the case’s procedural history, and it found that
[t]his is a matter regarding the interpretation of an administrative order issued by the Arkansas Supreme Court, and constitutes an exigent circumstance for which there is no just reason for delay as a ruling from the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreting and clarifying its own language will be dispositive as to Defendant’s requested relief. Requiring prolonged litigation while there is a need for the Arkansas Supreme Court to interpret its own administrative order(s) governing the action would cause the Court to incur unnecessary expense and time. Finally, this Court and the parties face a continued problem of incurring time and expense based on the belief a party failed to file a document, only to learn after the fact that the party’s submission was rejected.
2 On September 1, the court entered an amended order to include its signature. On September
8, Pitts filed a notice of appeal.
We must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Rule 2 of the Arkansas Rules of
Appellate Procedure–Civil (2020) lists the orders from which an appeal may be taken.
Generally, a party may appeal an order that dismisses the parties from the court, discharges
them from the action, or concludes their rights to the subject matter in controversy. See Plunk
v. State, 2012 Ark. 362 (per curiam); Evins v. Carvin, 2013 Ark. App. 185, 426 S.W.3d 549.
Our supreme court has held that when a circuit court denies a defendant’s motion to dismiss,
the denial is not a final judgment from which an appeal may be taken because the only matter
disposed of by the order is that the case should proceed to trial, and those matters put in
issue are not lost by continuing through a trial of the matter. See Plunk, 2012 Ark. 362; Evins,
2013 Ark. App. 185, 426 S.W.3d 549; see also C.P. v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 415, at 2 (“We
have long held that denial of a motion dismiss is not an appealable order.”). Even though an
issue on which a court renders a decision might be an important one, an appeal will be
premature if the decision does not, from a practical standpoint, conclude the merits of the
case. See Plunk, 2012 Ark. 362; Doe v. Union Pac. R.R., 323 Ark. 237, 914 S.W.2d 312 (1996).
Although denials of motions to dismiss are not generally appealable, the circuit court
in this case certified its decision for immediate appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Arkansas
Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the court’s order is not subject to Rule 54(b) certification.
The supreme court’s decision in Cannady v. St. Vincent Infirmary Medical Center, 2018 Ark.
35, 537 S.W.3d 259, is instructive.
3 In Cannady, the supreme court dismissed the appeal from an order denying summary
judgment as to an outrage claim even though a Rule 54(b) certificate had been issued. The
supreme court explained:
We find support for our conclusion in the language of Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1) itself, which provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination, supported by specific factual findings, that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.
(Emphasis added.)
Here, the circuit court made no final judgment regarding Cannady’s outrage claim but indicated only that material facts remained in dispute. Likewise, Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 2(a)(11) provides for a properly certified Rule 54(b)(1) appeal of
[a]n order or other form of decision which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties in a case involving multiple claims, multiple parties, or both, if the circuit court has directed entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties ....
Clearly, Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 2(a)(11) contemplates an appeal when the circuit court has entered a final judgment as to a claim or a party. Here, the circuit court made no final decision on the merits of Cannady’s outrage claim; rather, it simply determined that factual questions remained. Therefore, there is no final judgment to review. Accordingly, the cross-appeal is not properly before us and must be dismissed. Rule 54(b)(1) should not prevent a litigant from having his or her day in court.
Cannady, 2018 Ark. 35, at 12–13, 537 S.W.3d at 266.
4 We recently applied Cannady in Hudson Revocable Trust v. Evans, 2022 Ark. App. 394.
In Hudson, we held that the order denying summary judgment was not subject to certification
as a final order pursuant to Rule 54(b) because the circuit court made no final decision on
the merits of the claims but merely determined that factual questions remained. Id.
Even though the present case involves a motion to dismiss, Cannady and Hudson are
instructive.
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