Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-24-00256-CV
Louis A. Tsakiris Family Partnership, Ltd., Appellant
v.
Patrick Haskell, Appellee
On appeal from the 66th District Court of Hill County, Texas Judge A. Lee Harris, presiding Trial Court Cause No. CV075-23DC
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This appeal involves a dispute between Patrick Haskell and Louis A.
Tsakiris Family Partnership, Ltd. (Tsakiris LP)—two parties claiming that
they purchased the same fifty-two acres of real property from G.L. “Buck”
Harris. Following a jury trial, the trial court signed a final judgment in favor
of Haskell. In six issues, Tsakiris LP appeals. We will reverse and render. Background
A. Haskell’s Purchase of the Property
Haskell testified that around 2015, he purchased fifty-two acres of real
property from Harris without the involvement of a real estate agent, attorney,
or title company. Haskell explained that in the past, he had purchased
property primarily with the assistance of a real estate agent but that he had
also previously purchased one or two properties that were for sale by owner
without the involvement of a real estate agent or attorney and had never had
any problem.
Haskell testified that the property at issue in this case was listed for sale
by owner. Additionally, after talking to Harris, Haskell thought that Harris
was very straightforward, that Harris had experience in this area, and that
the transaction would be simple. Haskell therefore felt comfortable proceeding
with the transaction without the involvement of anyone else.
Haskell testified that on December 19, 2014, he received an email from
Harris regarding the property, which stated: “We will do the note and deed of
trust if you agree with the following terms.” Haskell testified that the
provisions that were then listed in the email described the material terms of
the agreement under which he purchased the property from Harris. The
record, however, does not include Haskell’s response confirming his agreement
Louis A. Tsakiris Fam. P’ship, Ltd. v. Haskell Page 2 to the terms listed in the email, nor does the record include a purchase and
sale agreement regarding the purchase of the property by Haskell from Harris.
In Harris’s email, the property is described only as “52 acres which will
be on a aerial track # 1 and accept [sic] for 20 acres and the 2 metal buildings
they are on.” Haskell testified that Harris’s tract of land included a total of
73.69 acres but that the tract had two buildings on it that Harris did not want
to sell. Haskell explained that he had therefore negotiated with Harris to buy
the land to the north and to the south of the land with the buildings on it,
which ended up totaling fifty-two acres.
On December 31, 2014, Harris then emailed Haskell a deed of trust and
promissory note for Haskell to sign. On January 6, 2015, Haskell executed the
deed of trust in Harris’s favor. The deed of trust provided the following “[l]egal
description” of the property: “See Exhibit ‘A’. ‘Save and except for 20 acres
and two metal buildings (ten acres on each side of the buildings).’” Harris
explained in his December 31 email: “We will add the legal description as a
separate sheet Exhibit ‘A’ when we get it from the title company.”
Harris further confirmed in his December 31 email that he had called a
surveyor to request a survey of the property. Haskell testified that Harris had
the survey conducted to determine the property lines of the middle portion of
the property on which the buildings that Harris wanted to keep were located
Louis A. Tsakiris Fam. P’ship, Ltd. v. Haskell Page 3 and to determine the property lines of the two tracts of land that Haskell was
purchasing. Harris delivered the survey to Haskell once it was completed.
The field notes from the survey contain the metes and bounds description
of fifteen acres of land identified as “TRACT 1,” the metes and bounds
description of thirty-seven acres of land identified as “TRACT 2,” and the metes
and bounds description of 21.67 acres of land identified as the “REMAINDER
TRACT.” At trial, Haskell identified Tracts 1 and 2 as the property that he
purchased from Harris and the remainder tract as the land that was not being
conveyed to him.
On January 29, 2015, Harris then sent Haskell another email that
stated: “Please sign the note and sign the deed of trust and send me a copy of
these two documents. At your convenience go and record it in Hill County.
Once you have it recorded[,] please send us a copy of those as well.” On
February 20, 2015, Harris then emailed Haskell with an attached title search
on the fifty-two acres. Harris’s email further stated: “Please send me a signed
note as soon as possible.”
An unsigned version of the promissory note was admitted as evidence at
trial. Haskell confirmed in his testimony that Harris had sent him the
promissory note, dated January 1, 2015, outlining the loan for the property.
Haskell testified that he had signed the promissory note and had returned it
to Harris. The promissory note stated: “The securing property is: See Exhibit
Louis A. Tsakiris Fam. P’ship, Ltd. v. Haskell Page 4 ‘A’.” However, no Exhibit “A” was attached to the note. Haskell nevertheless
testified that he sent Harris a check dated January 22, 2015, for $5,000 as a
down payment on the property and that he had thereafter made payments on
the property.
Haskell testified that he did not move onto the property after he
purchased it. Haskell explained that when he purchased the property, it was
vacant land that was being farmed by a lessee and that, at that time, he wanted
the lessee to continue farming the land. Haskell therefore made a verbal
agreement with the lessee to farm the land, and at the end of every year, the
lessee would mail Haskell a check.
Haskell confirmed that the use of the property did not change between
the time that Harris owned the property and the time that he owned it.
Haskell stated that he did not build any fences, buildings, or structures of any
kind on the property. When asked if he did anything to the property after he
purchased it, Haskell replied: “I cut the for sale sign down on it.”
Haskell testified that, on March 10, 2016, Harris’s wife Carolyn 1 then
sent Haskell a letter regarding the fifty-two acres. Haskell explained that
Carolyn had not participated in the transaction between Harris and him
regarding the property but that, at times, she had communicated for Harris
1 Because Harris and his wife have the same last name, we will refer to Harris’s wife by her
first name.
Louis A. Tsakiris Fam. P’ship, Ltd. v. Haskell Page 5 regarding the transaction. Haskell testified that Carolyn’s letter was about
paying his share of the property taxes on the property. Carolyn’s letter stated
that the Harrises had paid the total amount of property taxes for the entire
tract of land, including the fifty-two acres that Haskell had purchased, and
that Haskell therefore owed them the amount of the property taxes for the
fifty-two acres that he had purchased from them. Additionally, the letter
stated: “Please take your paper work provided you when you bought the
property and file it with Hill County. That way they will send you a tax
statement for your 52 acres.”
Haskell testified that he responded to Carolyn’s letter by sending a check
to Harris for payment of his share of the property taxes. Additionally, on
August 31, 2016, Haskell filed with the Hill County Clerk the deed of trust that
he had previously executed in Harris’s favor. Regarding the legal description
of the property, the deed of trust provided: “See Exhibit ‘A’. ‘Save and except
for 20 acres and two metal buildings (ten acres on each side of the buildings).’”
But no Exhibit “A” was attached to the deed of trust. Haskell asserted that he
discovered years later when he called the county clerk’s office that the last two
pages that he had tried to file—the pages that included the plat of the property
that he had purchased from Harris—had not been recorded in the real property
records.
Louis A. Tsakiris Fam. P’ship, Ltd. v. Haskell Page 6 Haskell testified that on September 1, 2016, he then paid off the
remaining balance on the fifty-two acres with the proceeds from the sale of
another property. Haskell asserted that, at that time, he owed Harris no other
performance on their agreement. Additionally, that same day, upon receiving
Haskell’s payment, Harris and Carolyn sent a confirmation to Haskell that
read: “Thank you for your check . . . , received today to pay off completely your
note . . . on the 52 acres Hill County, Texas.”
Despite this, Haskell acknowledged at trial that not all the documents
related to the sale of the property had been completed, and Haskell admitted
during his testimony that, in retrospect, he “made a huge, huge mistake.” As
stated above, the record does not include a purchase and sale agreement
regarding Haskell’s purchase of the property from Harris. Furthermore, the
record does not include a deed conveying the fifty-two acres from Harris to
Haskell.
Haskell testified that it was always his and Harris’s contemplation that
all the documents related to the sale of the property would be completed. When
asked why they were not completed, Haskell replied that he thought that they
had been. Haskell stated that, at that time, he thought that he had done the
right thing and that the sale had been recorded in the Hill County real property
records. Haskell acknowledged, however, that that evidently had not
happened.
Louis A. Tsakiris Fam. P’ship, Ltd. v. Haskell Page 7 B. Tsakiris LP’s Purchase of the Property
Louis Tsakiris testified that he is the owner of Tsakiris LP and had been
purchasing property in Hill County when he saw that Harris had a large
amount of property that was adjacent to other properties that he had
purchased. Tsakiris testified that he therefore met with Harris and, in
December 2018, made an offer to purchase Harris’s property. Harris, however,
declined Tsakiris’s offer at that time. Tsakiris nevertheless decided to
approach Harris again in 2019.
Ron Stevens, who had been a broker on multiple deals in Hill County for
Tsakiris, testified that Tsakiris told him to reach out to Harris again to see if
Harris was interested in selling his property. Stevens thus called Harris, and
Harris said that he was interested. Stevens then asked Harris if he could visit
Harris’s home, and Harris consented to the meeting. Stevens therefore went
to Harris’s home. Michael Magness, who has been involved in real estate with
Tsakiris for many years, testified that he also went to the meeting at Harris’s
home. Magness had power of attorney from Tsakiris to execute a contract with
Harris at the meeting.
Harris testified that during the meeting at his home, he clearly explained
that he had already sold the specific fifty-two acres of land at issue in this case
to Haskell and that those fifty-two acres therefore had to be excluded from any
contract. Stevens and Magness testified, however, that Harris never said that
Louis A. Tsakiris Fam. P’ship, Ltd. v. Haskell Page 8 he had already sold the property, and, on April 18, 2019, a written contract
was entered into between Harris and Tsakiris “and/or Assigns” for the sale and
purchase, respectively, of approximately 435 acres of land, including the fifty-
two acres of land at issue in this case.
Tsakiris testified that Stevens thereafter informed him that Harris had
called and told him that he may have sold a portion of the tract that included
the fifty-two acres. Tsakiris responded by telling Stevens to alert the title
company.
The business records of Hill County Title Co. (Hill County Title) indicate
that Stevens called on May 2, 2019, to report that Harris thought that he
remembered selling a part of the land “described in survey label #3” but that
Harris could not remember definitively. That same day, Stevens followed up
with an email to Hill County Title that stated:
[W]ould you please have your Abstract/Examiner teams look up the parcel on Survey #3 … recorded in Volume 1430 Page 135 of the Official Public Records of Hill County … determine if Mr. Harris has sold any of the 71 acres, and if so how may [sic] acres and to whom? Mr. Harris believes he sold sections to the north and south of the two metal building[s.]
Jennifer Nowlin, the officer manager and an escrow officer for Hill
County Title, testified that after a thorough search, Hill County Title found
nothing in the real property records indicating that Harris had conveyed any
portion of the tract in question. Furthermore, the “Attorney’s Report on Title
Louis A. Tsakiris Fam. P’ship, Ltd. v. Haskell Page 9 to Hill County Title Co.,” dated May 28, 2019, indicated that title to the tract
in question was vested in Harris. Nowlin stated that Hill County Title
thereafter used the attorney’s report to prepare a title commitment. Nowlin
further confirmed that after receiving the attorney’s report, she no longer had
any lingering concerns about whether Harris owned all of the tract in question.
On July 12, 2019, Harris and Carolyn then executed a general warranty
deed, conveying eight separate tracts of land, including the fifty-two acres of
land at issue in this case, to Tsakiris LP.
C. The Lawsuit
Haskell testified that, at some point, he realized that he had not received
a tax bill for the property in question. Haskell therefore checked the Hill
County tax records and discovered that Harris’s name was still on the property
at that time. Haskell stated that he immediately called Harris and Hill County
and found out that Tsakiris LP had purchased the property and was filing a
deed for the property.
Haskell subsequently sued Harris, Carolyn, and Tsakiris LP, requesting
that the attempted conveyance of the property to Tsakiris LP be set aside and
that “legal title to such property be quieted” in him. In the alternative, Haskell
requested that he recover damages from Harris and Carolyn.
In response, Tsakiris LP generally denied Haskell’s allegations. Tsakiris
LP also asserted the affirmative defense of the statute of frauds, among others.
Louis A. Tsakiris Fam. P’ship, Ltd. v. Haskell Page 10 Harris thereafter filed for bankruptcy. Accordingly, Haskell and
Tsakiris LP filed a joint motion to sever Haskell’s claims against Tsakiris LP
into a separate cause number. The trial court granted the joint motion and
severed all claims between Haskell and Tsakiris LP into the cause number
underlying this appeal.
The case proceeded to a jury trial. After both sides closed, Tsakiris LP
moved for a directed verdict based, in part, on the statute of frauds. The trial
court denied the motion for directed verdict, and the jury returned findings in
favor of Haskell.
Tsakiris LP thereafter moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
(JNOV), again based, in part, on the statute of frauds. The trial court denied
the motion for JNOV and signed a final judgment in favor of Haskell.
Issue One
In its first issue, Tsakiris LP contends that the trial court erred in failing
to grant its motion for JNOV based on the statute of frauds.
A. Standard of Review
The standard of review for a trial court’s denial of a motion for JNOV is
“to determine whether the evidence conclusively proves a fact that establishes
a party’s right to a judgment as a matter of law.” Roberts v. Staples, 644
S.W.3d 738, 742 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2022, no pet.) (quoting Great N.
Energy, Inc. v. Circle Ridge Prod., Inc., 528 S.W.3d 644, 675 (Tex. App.—
Louis A. Tsakiris Fam. P’ship, Ltd. v. Haskell Page 11 Texarkana 2017, pet. denied)). If so, then the trial court erred in denying the
motion for JNOV. Id.
B. Standing
In determining this issue, we must begin by addressing Haskell’s
argument that the statute of frauds was not available to Tsakiris LP as a basis
to challenge the real estate transaction between Harris and him. Haskell
specifically contends that: (1) a real estate transaction that violates the statute
of frauds is voidable, not void; and (2) Tsakiris LP had no standing to assert
the affirmative defense of the statute of frauds to challenge the transaction
between Harris and him because Tsakiris LP was not a party to such
transaction.
In “Moore” Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934 (Tex.
1972), the Texas Supreme Court stated:
Although it is the general rule that a stranger to a contract cannot invoke the statute of frauds, Murphy v. Johnson, 439 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston 1st 1969, no writ), the plaintiff in this case seeks to enforce its contract against [the defendant] Phillips, and [the defendant] Phillips’ position is similar to that of a purchaser of land whose grantor has previously made a contract to sell to another. In a suit by that other, the courts uniformly hold that the purchaser may assert the defenses which his grantor had. Masterson v. Little, 75 Tex. 682, 13 S.W. 154 (1890); Sanborn v. Murphy, 86 Tex. 437, 25 S.W. 610 (1894); Franzetti v. Franzetti, 124 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1939, writ ref’d); 49 Am. Jur. 889, Statute of Frauds § 592.
Louis A. Tsakiris Fam. P’ship, Ltd. v. Haskell Page 12 “Moore” Burger, Inc., 492 S.W.2d at 938–39; accord Richardson v. Iley, 299
S.W.2d 187, 188–89 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“A grantee
may set up the statute [of frauds] as against one who claims title under an oral
contract with the grantor.”).
Here, the evidence indicates that Tsakiris LP purchased the property in
question from Harris but that Harris had previously agreed to sell such
property to Haskell. In this suit by Haskell, Tsakiris LP, as a grantee of the
property from Harris, therefore had standing to assert any defense to the
alleged prior contract that Harris would have had standing to assert. See
“Moore” Burger, Inc., 492 S.W.2d at 938–39; Richardson, 299 S.W.2d at 188–
89. Accordingly, while we agree with Haskell that a contract that violates the
statute of frauds is voidable, not void, see Troxel v. Bishop, 201 S.W.3d 290,
300 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.); Eland Energy, Inc. v. Rowden Oil & Gas,
Inc., 914 S.W.2d 179, 186 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied), we
conclude that Tsakiris LP, as a grantee of the property from Harris, had
standing to assert the affirmative defense of the statute of frauds to challenge
the prior real estate transaction between Haskell and Harris. See “Moore”
Burger, Inc., 492 S.W.2d at 938–39; Richardson, 299 S.W.2d at 188–89.
C. Statute of Frauds
Having concluded that the statute of frauds was available to Tsakiris LP
as a basis to challenge the transaction between Haskell and Harris, we next
Louis A. Tsakiris Fam. P’ship, Ltd. v. Haskell Page 13 address Tsakiris LP’s contention that the real estate transaction between
Haskell and Harris did, in fact, violate the statute of frauds.
The party pleading the statute of frauds bears the initial burden of
establishing its applicability. Dynegy, Inc. v. Yates, 422 S.W.3d 638, 641 (Tex.
2013) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 94). Here, Tsakiris LP pleaded the statute of
frauds as an affirmative defense and thus had the initial burden to establish
its applicability. See id. Whether a contract comes within the statute of frauds
is a question of law, which we review de novo. Id. at 642.
A contract for the sale of real estate is subject to the statute of frauds.
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(a), (b)(4). A contract for the sale of real
estate is therefore not enforceable unless it is (1) in writing and (2) signed by
the person to be charged with the contract or by someone lawfully authorized
to sign for him. Id. Moreover, to satisfy the statute of frauds,
a conveyance of real property must contain a sufficient description of the property to be conveyed. A property description is sufficient if the writing furnishes within itself, or by reference to some other existing writing, the means or data by which the particular lands to be conveyed may be identified with reasonable certainty.
AIC Mgmt. v. Crews, 246 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tex. 2008); Reeder v. Curry, 426
S.W.3d 352, 359 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.) (quoting AIC Mgmt., 246
S.W.3d at 645); accord Fears v. Tex. Bank, 247 S.W.3d 729, 735–36 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2008, pet. denied). Even when “[t]he record leaves little doubt that
the parties knew and understood what property was intended to be conveyed,
Louis A. Tsakiris Fam. P’ship, Ltd. v. Haskell Page 14 . . . the knowledge and intent of the parties will not give validity to the contract,
and neither will a plat made from extrinsic evidence.” Morrow v. Shotwell, 477
S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex. 1972) (citations omitted); Reiland v. Patrick Thomas
Props., Inc., 213 S.W.3d 431, 437 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet.
denied) (quoting Morrow, 477 S.W.2d at 540).
Tsakiris LP argues that the agreement between Haskell and Harris was
not in writing as required by the statute of frauds. We agree. Haskell testified
that he and Harris made an agreement for the purchase of the property in
question, but the evidence showed that neither a purchase and sale agreement
regarding the purchase of the property nor a deed conveying the property was
ever executed. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence conclusively proved
that the real estate agreement between Haskell and Harris violated the statute
of frauds and was consequently unenforceable as a matter of law unless an
exception to the statute of frauds applied. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §
26.01(a), (b)(4); AIC Mgmt., 246 S.W.3d at 645; Roberts, 644 S.W.3d at 742.
D. Exception
Having concluded that the real estate agreement between Haskell and
Harris violated the statute of frauds, we finally turn to Tsakiris LP’s
contentions that: (1) Haskell waived the applicable exception to the statute of
frauds because he failed to obtain a jury finding on it; and (2) even if the
applicable exception was not waived, the undisputed evidence conclusively
Louis A. Tsakiris Fam. P’ship, Ltd. v. Haskell Page 15 disproved the exception. Haskell counters that the exception would fully apply
to his purchase of the real property because he fulfilled all three elements of
the exception, i.e., he paid the consideration in full for the property; he took
possession of the property; and he made valuable use of the property without
any objection from Harris. Assuming without deciding that Haskell did not
waive the applicable exception to the statute of frauds by failing to obtain a
jury finding on it, we agree with Tsakiris LP that the evidence conclusively
disproved the applicability of the exception.
Once the party pleading the statute of frauds meets its initial burden of
establishing its applicability, the burden shifts to the opposing party to
establish an exception that would take the verbal contract out of the statute of
frauds. Dynegy, Inc., 422 S.W.3d at 641. Because Tsakiris LP conclusively
proved that the real estate agreement between Haskell and Harris violated the
statute of frauds, Haskell had the burden to establish an exception that would
take the agreement between Harris and him out of the statute of frauds. See
id.
An oral contract for the purchase of real property is enforceable, despite
the statute of frauds, if the purchaser: (1) pays the consideration; (2) takes
possession of the property; and (3) makes permanent and valuable
improvements on the property with the consent of the seller, or without such
improvements, other facts are shown that would make the transaction a fraud
Louis A. Tsakiris Fam. P’ship, Ltd. v. Haskell Page 16 on the purchaser if the oral contract was not enforced. Boyert v. Tauber, 834
S.W.2d 60, 63 (Tex. 1992); Hooks v. Bridgewater, 111 Tex. 122, 126–27, 229
S.W. 1114, 1116 (1921). “Each of these three elements is indispensable, and
they must all exist.” Hooks, 111 Tex. at 127, 229 S.W. at 1116.
Tsakiris LP argues here, in part, that the evidence conclusively
disproved the third element because the evidence conclusively established that
Haskell made no improvements to the property in question. We agree.
Here, Haskell confirmed in his testimony that the use of the property did
not change between the time that Harris owned it and the time that he owned
it. Haskell testified that when he purchased the property, it was vacant land
that was being farmed by a lessee and that, after he purchased the property,
it continued to be farmed by the same lessee. Haskell confirmed that he did
not move onto the property or build any fences, buildings, or structures of any
kind on the property. When asked if he did anything to the property after he
purchased it, Haskell simply replied, “I cut the for sale sign down on it.”
Haskell nevertheless argues that the evidence showed that he made
valuable use of the property, without any objection from Harris, by allowing
the land to be farmed under lease. But allowing the land to continue being
farmed under lease, exactly as it was before Haskell purchased the property,
is not evidence of “permanent and valuable improvements on the property.”
See Boyert, 834 S.W.2d at 63 (citing Hooks, 111 Tex. at 126–27, 229 S.W. at
Louis A. Tsakiris Fam. P’ship, Ltd. v. Haskell Page 17 1116); cf. Burrus v. Reyes, 516 S.W.3d 170, 183–85 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017,
pet. denied) (evidence was factually sufficient to support jury’s finding that
plaintiff made valuable and permanent improvements to property when
evidence showed plaintiff installed fence around lot, built shed, added rooms
and fixtures, poured concrete slab, and planted trees). Furthermore, the Texas
Supreme Court has explained:
There is no fraud in refusing to enforce the contract where only the consideration is paid. The value of the consideration may in law action be recovered. Nor where only possession of the premises is given. In such case there is no performance by the purchaser of any obligation. Nor even where there is both payment of the consideration and possession; without valuable and permanent improvements made on the faith of contract, or their equivalent. Merely the transfer of the possession by the vendor could create no estoppel against him. A transfer of the possession of the soil affords no presumption of a sale of the fee. As said by Judge Moore in Ann Berta Lodge v. Leverton, 42 Tex. 18, to permit a person who can show no other act done beyond the transfer of the possession of the soil from the owner to himself, to enforce an oral agreement for the sale of the fee, would practically repeal the statute of frauds and let in all the mischiefs it was intended to guard against.
Hooks, 111 Tex. at 128, 229 S.W. at 1117.
Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence conclusively disproved the
third element of the exception. See id., 111 Tex. at 127, 229 S.W. at 1116.
During oral argument, Haskell additionally raised the contention that
the statute of frauds could not apply in this case because the jury found that
Tsakiris LP purchased the property in question with actual notice of Haskell’s
prior purchase of the property. But Tsakiris LP’s notice is irrelevant to the
Louis A. Tsakiris Fam. P’ship, Ltd. v. Haskell Page 18 issue of whether the agreement between Haskell and Harris satisfied the
statute of frauds. In fact, as indicated above in the discussion regarding
standing, one must generally be a party to a contract or conveyance to
challenge such contract or conveyance under the statute of frauds. See “Moore”
Burger, Inc., 492 S.W.2d at 938–39; MEI Camp Springs, LLC v. Clear Fork,
Inc., 623 S.W.3d 83, 92 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, no pet.).
Having determined that (1) Tsakiris LP had standing to assert the
statute of frauds; (2) the evidence conclusively proved that the real estate
agreement between Haskell and Harris violated the statute of frauds; and (3)
the evidence conclusively disproved the applicability of the exception to the
statute of frauds, we conclude that the agreement between Haskell and Harris
was unenforceable as a matter of law. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §
26.01(a), (b)(4); AIC Mgmt., 246 S.W.3d at 645; Roberts, 644 S.W.3d at 742.
Accordingly, we further conclude that the trial court erred in failing to grant
Tsakiris LP’s motion for JNOV based on the statute of frauds. See Roberts,
644 S.W.3d at 742. Tsakiris LP’s first issue is sustained.
Issues Two, Three, Four, Five, and Six
Having sustained Tsakiris LP’s first issue, we need not reach its second,
third, fourth, fifth, and sixth issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
Louis A. Tsakiris Fam. P’ship, Ltd. v. Haskell Page 19 Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and render
judgment that Haskell take nothing on his claims against Tsakiris LP.
MATT JOHNSON Chief Justice
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: May 28, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Senior Justice Davis 2 Reversed and rendered CV06
2 The Honorable Rex Davis, Senior Justice (Retired) of the Tenth Court of Appeals, sitting by
assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas.
Louis A. Tsakiris Fam. P’ship, Ltd. v. Haskell Page 20