Louie L. Raven, Individually and in His Capacity as Independent of the Estate of Josephine B. Leissner, Robert Clayton Raven, Joyce Raven, and Linda Gayle Raven Neinast v. Karen L. Beall

Court of Appeals of Texas

Louie L. Raven, Individually and in His Capacity as Independent of the Estate of Josephine B. Leissner, Robert Clayton Raven, Joyce Raven, and Linda Gayle Raven Neinast v. Karen L. Beall

DecidedAugust 14, 1997

Docket03-97-00234-CV

StatusPublished

This text of Louie L. Raven, Individually and in His Capacity as Independent of the Estate of Josephine B. Leissner, Robert Clayton Raven, Joyce Raven, and Linda Gayle Raven Neinast v. Karen L. Beall (Louie L. Raven, Individually and in His Capacity as Independent of the Estate of Josephine B. Leissner, Robert Clayton Raven, Joyce Raven, and Linda Gayle Raven Neinast v. Karen L. Beall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Louie L. Raven, Individually and in His Capacity as Independent of the Estate of Josephine B. Leissner, Robert Clayton Raven, Joyce Raven, and Linda Gayle Raven Neinast v. Karen L. Beall, (Tex. Ct. App. 1997).

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Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-97-00234-CV

Louie L. Raven, Individually and in his capacity as Independent Executor of the

Estate of Josephine B. Leissner, Deceased, Robert Clayton Raven; Joyce Raven,

and Linda Gayle Raven Neinast, Appellants

v.

Karen L. Beall, Appellee

FROM THE PROBATE COURT NO. 1 OF TRAVIS COUNTY

NO. 60,365-A, HONORABLE GUY HERMAN, JUDGE PRESIDING

PER CURIAM

The parties announce that they have settled their dispute and jointly move for dismissal and remand of the cause of action to the trial court to implement the settlement agreement. We cannot both dismiss and remand. See Panterra Corp. v. American Dairy Queen, 908 S.W.2d 300, 301 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1995, no writ). We do not view our powers as narrowly as the majority in Panterra, however. See id. (holding that appellate courts must vacate judgments in settled cases when parties request inconsistent relief).

The rules allow us to dispose of an appeal in accordance with an agreement signed by the parties and filed with the clerk. Tex. R. App. P. 59(a)(1)(A). The rules also allow us to reverse the trial court judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. Tex. R. App. P. 80(b)(4). Because the parties' settlement agreement requires replacement of the judgment of the trial court with an agreed judgment formulated by the parties, reversal of the judgment is in accord with the settlement agreement. Indeed, the Panterra court presented this procedure as an option to the litigants before it determined that it was compelled to vacate the judgment in a settled case. See Panterra, 908 S.W.2d at 301 (majority and Duncan, J., dissenting).

We therefore deny the joint motion to the extent that it requests dismissal of the appeal. We grant the motion in all other respects. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for proceedings necessary to implement the settlement agreement.

Before Chief Justice Carroll, Justices Aboussie and B. A. Smith

Reversed and Remanded on Joint Motion

Filed: August 14, 1997

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TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-97-00234-CV

Louie L. Raven, Individually and in his capacity as Independent Executor of the

Estate of Josephine B. Leissner, Deceased, Robert Clayton Raven; Joyce Raven,

and Linda Gayle Raven Neinast, Appellants

v.

Karen L. Beall, Appellee

FROM THE PROBATE COURT NO. 1 OF TRAVIS COUNTY

NO. 60,365-A, HONORABLE GUY HERMAN, JUDGE PRESIDING

PER CURIAM

The parties announce that they have settled their dispute and jointly move for dismissal and remand of the cause of action to the trial court to implement the settlement agreement. We cannot both dismiss and remand. See Panterra Corp. v. American Dairy Queen, 908 S.W.2d 300, 301 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1995, no writ). We do not view our powers as narrowly as the majority in Panterra, however. See id. (holding that appellate courts must vacate judgments in settled cases when parties request inconsistent relief).

The rules allow us to dispose of an appeal in accordance with an agreement signed by the parties and filed with the clerk. Tex. R. App. P. 59(a)(1)(A). The rules also allow us to reverse the trial court judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. Tex. R. App. P. 80(b)(4). Because the parties' settlement agreement requires replacement of the judgment of the trial court with an agreed judgment formulated by the parties, reversal of the judgment is in accord with the settlement agreement. Indeed, the Panterra court presented this procedure as an option to the litigants before it determined that it was compelled to vacate the judgment in a settled case. See Panterra, 908 S.W.2d at 301 (majority and Duncan, J., dissenting).

We therefore deny the joint motion to the extent that it requests dismissal of the appeal. We grant the motion in all other respects. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for proceedings necessary to implement the settlement agreement.

Before Chief Justice Carroll, Justices Aboussie and B. A. Smith

Reversed and Remanded on Joint Motion

Filed: August 14, 1997

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