STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
13-712
LOUIE GANDY, ET UX.
VERSUS
KEY REALTY, L.L.C.
**********
APPEAL FROM THE ALEXANDRIA CITY COURT PARISH OF RAPIDES, DOCKET NO. 123,511 HONORABLE RICHARD E. STARLING, JR., CITY COURT JUDGE
JAMES T. GENOVESE JUDGE
Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Jimmie C. Peters, and James T. Genovese, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
Thomas D. Davenport, Jr. The Davenport Firm, APLC 602 Murray Street Alexandria, Louisiana 71301 (318) 445-9696 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS: Louie Gandy and Marion Gandy Randall B. Keiser D. Heath Trahan Keiser Law Firm, P.L.C. Post Office Box 12358 Alexandria, Louisiana 71315 (318) 443-6168 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: Key Realty, LLC
Ricky L. Sooter Jeremy C. Cedars Provosty, Sadler, deLaunay, Fiorenza & Sobel 934 Third Street, Suite 800 Post Office Drawer 1791 Alexandria, Louisiana 71309-1791 (318) 445-3631 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES: Liz Merryman, Inc. and Liz Merryman GENOVESE, Judge.
Plaintiffs, Louie and Marion Gandy, appeal the city court‟s grant of the
exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction filed on behalf of Defendant, Key
Realty, L.L.C., and Defendants, Liz Merryman, Inc. and Liz Merryman. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Louie and Marion Gandy (collectively referred to as Mr. Gandy) are the
owners of a house and lot located in Pineville, Louisiana, upon which two trees
were located near its boundary line. When the trees were cut and removed without
his consent, Mr. Gandy instituted this litigation in Alexandria City Court (City
Court) naming as Defendants, Key Realty, L.L.C. (Key Realty), and Liz
Merryman, Inc. and Liz Merryman (Merryman), asserting that the Defendants
lacked the “legal authority to have these trees killed, destroyed and/or removed.”
Although Mr. Gandy asserted that the trees were located upon his property,
Key Realty and Merryman contended that the trees were located upon the
boundary line of Mr. Gandy‟s property and that of the adjacent landowner; thus,
they were in fact owned in common pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 687.1 In claiming
that the trees were deemed immovable property, Key Realty and Merryman each
excepted to Mr. Gandy‟s petition on the grounds that City Court, a court of limited
jurisdiction, lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this suit “involving title to
1 Louisiana Civil Code Article 687 provides as follows:
Trees, bushes, and plants on the boundary are presumed to be common unless there be proof to the contrary.
An adjoining owner has the right to demand the removal of trees, bushes, or plants on the boundary that interfere with the enjoyment of his estate, but he must bear the expense of removal. immovable property” pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 4847.2 Following a hearing,
the City Court issued written reasons granting the exceptions and signed a
judgment in accordance therewith. Mr. Gandy appeals.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
On appeal, Mr. Gandy asserts that the City Court erred in granting the
exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction filed on behalf of Key Realty and
Merryman.
LAW AND DICUSSION
Mr. Gandy asserts that the City Court erred in granting the exceptions of
lack of subject matter jurisdiction since this “case does not present a question of
ownership or title to immovable property stemming from a party trespassing upon
the other parties‟ land, where a theft of timber occurred[.]” We disagree.
An issue of subject matter jurisdiction raises a question of law which is
reviewed de novo to determine whether the lower court was legally correct.
Chavers v. Bright Truck Leasing, 06-1011 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/12/06), 945 So.2d
838, writ denied, 07-304 (La. 4/5/07), 954 So.2d 141. Therefore, in this case, we
must decide whether the City Court‟s determination that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over Mr. Gandy‟s claims was legally correct.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 2 defines subject matter
jurisdiction as “the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine a
particular class of actions or proceedings, based upon the object of the demand, the
amount in dispute, or the value of the right asserted.” The subject matter
jurisdiction of a city court is limited, and its jurisdiction to adjudicate matters
2 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 4847(A)(1) provides for the limited civil jurisdiction of parish and city courts and excludes from said jurisdiction “[a] case involving title to immovable property.”
2 “involving title to immovable property” is expressly prohibited by La.Code Civ.P.
art. 4847(A)(1).
Pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 462, “Tracts of land, with their component
parts, are immovables.” Additionally, La.Civ.Code art. 463 provides: “Buildings,
other constructions permanently attached to the ground, standing timber, and
unharvested crops or ungathered fruits of trees, are component parts of a tract of
land when they belong to the owner of the ground.”
In this case, when considering the exceptions of lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the City Court reasoned as follows:
The defendants in this litigation have filed this exception on the basis that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to LSA- C.C.P. Article 4847 (A) (1) that provides that city courts do not have jurisdiction over cases involving title to immovable property. This case involves a claim by the plaintiff to recover damages for removal of trees owned by the plaintiff.
At first blush[,] it appears that Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 4847(A) (1) is an attempt to divest city and parish courts of the authority to determine title to real estate between parties when that is the issue before the court. However, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals determined in a similar situation that a small claims court had no jurisdiction to determine ownership or title to a tree since a tree was a component part of immovable property. [King v. Young Properties, 04-680 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/27/04), 893 So.2d 895, writ denied, 05-662 (La. 4/29/05), 901 So.2d 1076]. The court must determine if the plaintiffs are owners of the trees in question to decide this case. Accordingly, the [King] case mandates that the court grant this [e]xception.
King, 893 So.2d 895, involved a dispute over the responsibility for a tree
located on the boundary of property owned by the plaintiff and the defendant, an
adjacent landowner. Mr. King brought suit in Crowley City Court, Small Claims
Division, alleging that the tree belonged to the defendant and that its branches
caused damage to his garage. However, the defendant responded, asserting that the
tree was actually located on the property line. Following a trial in Crowley City
Court, the court determined that the tree was located on the boundary line between
3 the parties; thus, La.Civ.Code art. 687 applied. This court, in considering an
exception of res judicata raised in subsequent proceedings, first had to determine
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STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
13-712
LOUIE GANDY, ET UX.
VERSUS
KEY REALTY, L.L.C.
**********
APPEAL FROM THE ALEXANDRIA CITY COURT PARISH OF RAPIDES, DOCKET NO. 123,511 HONORABLE RICHARD E. STARLING, JR., CITY COURT JUDGE
JAMES T. GENOVESE JUDGE
Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Jimmie C. Peters, and James T. Genovese, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
Thomas D. Davenport, Jr. The Davenport Firm, APLC 602 Murray Street Alexandria, Louisiana 71301 (318) 445-9696 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS: Louie Gandy and Marion Gandy Randall B. Keiser D. Heath Trahan Keiser Law Firm, P.L.C. Post Office Box 12358 Alexandria, Louisiana 71315 (318) 443-6168 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: Key Realty, LLC
Ricky L. Sooter Jeremy C. Cedars Provosty, Sadler, deLaunay, Fiorenza & Sobel 934 Third Street, Suite 800 Post Office Drawer 1791 Alexandria, Louisiana 71309-1791 (318) 445-3631 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES: Liz Merryman, Inc. and Liz Merryman GENOVESE, Judge.
Plaintiffs, Louie and Marion Gandy, appeal the city court‟s grant of the
exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction filed on behalf of Defendant, Key
Realty, L.L.C., and Defendants, Liz Merryman, Inc. and Liz Merryman. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Louie and Marion Gandy (collectively referred to as Mr. Gandy) are the
owners of a house and lot located in Pineville, Louisiana, upon which two trees
were located near its boundary line. When the trees were cut and removed without
his consent, Mr. Gandy instituted this litigation in Alexandria City Court (City
Court) naming as Defendants, Key Realty, L.L.C. (Key Realty), and Liz
Merryman, Inc. and Liz Merryman (Merryman), asserting that the Defendants
lacked the “legal authority to have these trees killed, destroyed and/or removed.”
Although Mr. Gandy asserted that the trees were located upon his property,
Key Realty and Merryman contended that the trees were located upon the
boundary line of Mr. Gandy‟s property and that of the adjacent landowner; thus,
they were in fact owned in common pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 687.1 In claiming
that the trees were deemed immovable property, Key Realty and Merryman each
excepted to Mr. Gandy‟s petition on the grounds that City Court, a court of limited
jurisdiction, lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this suit “involving title to
1 Louisiana Civil Code Article 687 provides as follows:
Trees, bushes, and plants on the boundary are presumed to be common unless there be proof to the contrary.
An adjoining owner has the right to demand the removal of trees, bushes, or plants on the boundary that interfere with the enjoyment of his estate, but he must bear the expense of removal. immovable property” pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 4847.2 Following a hearing,
the City Court issued written reasons granting the exceptions and signed a
judgment in accordance therewith. Mr. Gandy appeals.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
On appeal, Mr. Gandy asserts that the City Court erred in granting the
exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction filed on behalf of Key Realty and
Merryman.
LAW AND DICUSSION
Mr. Gandy asserts that the City Court erred in granting the exceptions of
lack of subject matter jurisdiction since this “case does not present a question of
ownership or title to immovable property stemming from a party trespassing upon
the other parties‟ land, where a theft of timber occurred[.]” We disagree.
An issue of subject matter jurisdiction raises a question of law which is
reviewed de novo to determine whether the lower court was legally correct.
Chavers v. Bright Truck Leasing, 06-1011 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/12/06), 945 So.2d
838, writ denied, 07-304 (La. 4/5/07), 954 So.2d 141. Therefore, in this case, we
must decide whether the City Court‟s determination that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over Mr. Gandy‟s claims was legally correct.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 2 defines subject matter
jurisdiction as “the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine a
particular class of actions or proceedings, based upon the object of the demand, the
amount in dispute, or the value of the right asserted.” The subject matter
jurisdiction of a city court is limited, and its jurisdiction to adjudicate matters
2 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 4847(A)(1) provides for the limited civil jurisdiction of parish and city courts and excludes from said jurisdiction “[a] case involving title to immovable property.”
2 “involving title to immovable property” is expressly prohibited by La.Code Civ.P.
art. 4847(A)(1).
Pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 462, “Tracts of land, with their component
parts, are immovables.” Additionally, La.Civ.Code art. 463 provides: “Buildings,
other constructions permanently attached to the ground, standing timber, and
unharvested crops or ungathered fruits of trees, are component parts of a tract of
land when they belong to the owner of the ground.”
In this case, when considering the exceptions of lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the City Court reasoned as follows:
The defendants in this litigation have filed this exception on the basis that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to LSA- C.C.P. Article 4847 (A) (1) that provides that city courts do not have jurisdiction over cases involving title to immovable property. This case involves a claim by the plaintiff to recover damages for removal of trees owned by the plaintiff.
At first blush[,] it appears that Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 4847(A) (1) is an attempt to divest city and parish courts of the authority to determine title to real estate between parties when that is the issue before the court. However, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals determined in a similar situation that a small claims court had no jurisdiction to determine ownership or title to a tree since a tree was a component part of immovable property. [King v. Young Properties, 04-680 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/27/04), 893 So.2d 895, writ denied, 05-662 (La. 4/29/05), 901 So.2d 1076]. The court must determine if the plaintiffs are owners of the trees in question to decide this case. Accordingly, the [King] case mandates that the court grant this [e]xception.
King, 893 So.2d 895, involved a dispute over the responsibility for a tree
located on the boundary of property owned by the plaintiff and the defendant, an
adjacent landowner. Mr. King brought suit in Crowley City Court, Small Claims
Division, alleging that the tree belonged to the defendant and that its branches
caused damage to his garage. However, the defendant responded, asserting that the
tree was actually located on the property line. Following a trial in Crowley City
Court, the court determined that the tree was located on the boundary line between
3 the parties; thus, La.Civ.Code art. 687 applied. This court, in considering an
exception of res judicata raised in subsequent proceedings, first had to determine
whether Crowley City Court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the initial
claim.
On appeal, after quoting the provisions of La.Civ.Code arts. 462 and 463, we
stated in King: “Under these provisions[,] the tree is a component part of the land
and is, therefore, considered an immovable. The primary issue in this case is who
owns the tree, an immovable, and the rights and obligations of the landowners.”
Id. at 899. Accordingly, this court held that the Crowley City Court “had no
jurisdiction to determine the legal responsibility of parties in a dispute involving
ownership (title) to immovable property. The judgment of the Small Claims Court
is invalid and cannot be used as a basis to assert an exception of res judicata.” Id.
In the case at bar, Mr. Gandy argues that the City Court erred in reaching its
conclusion and attempts to distinguish King on the grounds that the present
litigation is not between landowners. He argues that “[i]n this case, the [c]ourt is
not called upon to determine who owns the tree and/or the rights and obligations of
landowners.” Because neither Key Realty nor Merryman claim ownership of the
trees, Mr. Gandy concludes that the City Court would not be required to rule upon
“the legal responsibility of the parties involving ownership (title) to the immovable
property.” We disagree.
We agree with the City Court that an essential element of Mr. Gandy‟s claim
is establishing his ownership of the trees at issue which, by definition, are a
component part of immovable property. Therefore, a determination of the
ownership of the trees necessarily requires a determination of who owns the
property upon which the trees are located; hence, an adjudication as to title of
immovable property is required.
4 The fact that Key Realty and Merryman are not landowners and/or not
asserting claims of ownership of the trees does not negate the requirements of the
law. The fact that the adjacent landowner was not made a party to these
proceedings, likewise, does not negate the requirements of the law. Additionally,
the fact that a determination of the ownership of the immovable property was not
the impetus of the litigation does not negate the requirements of the law. As
argued by Key Realty, “[a] case „involves‟ title to immovable property even if the
city court is not asked to confer title to one of the parties.” Regardless of the
foregoing, this litigation would require a judicial determination of whether
Mr. Gandy owns the land upon which the trees are located. The City Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over “case[s] involving title to immovable property.”
La.Code Civ.P. art. 4847(A)(1). Therefore, we find that the City Court‟s
determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Gandy‟s claims
was legally correct.
DECREE
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the Alexandria
City Court granting the exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction on behalf
of Defendant, Key Realty, L.L.C., and Defendants, Liz Merryman, Inc. and Liz
Merryman, and dismissing the claims of Louie and Marion Gandy, with prejudice.
The costs of this appeal are assessed to Louie and Marion Gandy.