Loudner v. United States

200 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8077, 2002 WL 741664
CourtDistrict Court, D. South Dakota
DecidedApril 24, 2002
DocketCiv 94-4294
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 200 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (Loudner v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Dakota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Loudner v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8077, 2002 WL 741664 (D.S.D. 2002).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

PIERSOL, Chief Judge.

The defendants filed a Motion to Modify Injunction, Doc. 226, requesting that the preliminary injunction in this action be modified to allow a partial distribution of the Judgment Fund to the group of lineal descendants found eligible prior to 1994 to share in the Judgment Fund. The plaintiffs filed a Response to the motion stating they have no objection to dissolution of the injunction as to the 1,988 LeBeau plaintiff group and retaining the preliminary injunction as to the-remainder of the Judgment Fund. The motion will be granted.

The Court originally issued a preliminary injunction in this case on January 6, 1995, enjoining defendants from distributing the Judgment Fund 1 at issue in this lawsuit owed lineal descendants of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux pursuant to the decision in Sisseton-Wahpeton Bands or Tribes v. United States, 18 Ind.Cl.Comm. 526-1. (Doc. 12.) The preliminary injunction was dissolved on October 13, 1995, following the Court’s dismissal of this action as time-barred. (Doc. 28.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal and rem- *1148 stated this action in Loudner v. United States, 108 F.3d 896 (8th Cir.1997). On April 28, 1998, the Court reinstated the preliminary injunction and enjoined defendants from distributing the Judgment Fund. (See Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, Doc. 66.)

Defendants request that the preliminary injunction be modified to allow them to make a partial payment of the Judgment Fund to lineal descendants who were notified they were eligible to share in the Judgment Fund prior to the initiation of the present lawsuit in 1994. When the present lawsuit was filed, there were 1,988 lineal descendants who had been notified they were eligible to share in the Judgment Fund. This group of 1,988 lineal descendants is often referred to by the parties as the “LeBeau” plaintiffs or group because two of the lineal descendants (Casimir LeBeau and Vernon Ashley) in that group filed a lawsuit on May 27, 1999 alleging a breach of trust for delay in distributing the Judgment Fund and challenging a 1998 Act that reapportioned approximately 28 per cent of the Judgment Fund from the lineal descendants to the three Tribes 2 also entitled to share in the Judgment Fund pursuant to the 1972 Distribution Act, Pub.L. No. 92-555, 86 Stat. 1168. See LeBeau v. United States, CIV 99-4106 (D.S.D.); 25 U.S.C. § 1300d-26(c) (2001).

The two plaintiffs in the LeBeau action submitted their applications in 1973 prior to the expiration of the first deadline and were notified in 1979 that they were eligible to share in the Judgment Fund. They have been waiting almost 30 years from the time they submitted their applications and approximately 23 years from the time they were officially notified they were eligible to share in the Judgment Fund. Defendants state that if the preliminary injunction is modified expeditiously as requested, partial payment could be made to the LeBeau group by mid-July 2002. The reasons for requesting that the injunction be modified to allow payment to the LeBeau group and not to the Loudner group are: 1) the list of the LeBeau group has already been compiled and only needs updating, but no list has been compiled for the Loudner group; 2) the LeBeau group was notified of eligibility and has been waiting for payment since 1979, but, with a few exceptions, the Loudner group did not know of the existence of the Judgment Fund until the application process was reopened and none of them have been notified of their eligibility; 3) the LeBeau group has a finite eligibility determinátion date compared to the Loudner group that would require an .arbitrary cutoff date for partial payment eligibility because not all applications have been processed; and 4) if the Loudner group was included in the partial distribution, the projected date for partial payment would be much later than July 2002 because defendants would need to notify lineal descendants of their eligibility, create a list of payees and calculate a cutoff date.

The Eighth Circuit explained that, “[i]n modifying a preliminary injunction, a district court is not bound by a strict standard of changed circumstances but is authorized to make any changes in the injunction that are equitable in light of subsequent changes in the facts or the law, or for any other good reason.” Movie Systems, Inc. v. MAD Minneapolis Audio Distributors, 717 F.2d 427, 430 (8th Cir.1983).

Defendants represent to the Court that the calculation of the partial payment to the LeBeau group will reserve sufficient funds to pay the Tribes pursuant to the *1149 1998 Act and to pay the Loudner group when all of the applications have been processed and the list of eligible lineal descendants is finalized. There were 12,386 applications submitted during the reopening of the application deadline and defendants’. calculation will reserve sufficient funds to pay 100 per cent of those lineal descendants, even though a significant portion of those applications have already been determined to be ineligible. Thus, the Court finds that there is no longer a threat of irreparable harm from a partial payment to the LeBeau group and the preliminary injunction will be vacated to that extent. In reaching this decision, the Court considered both the standard for modification of a preliminary injunction and the four-part test for initially granting a preliminary injunction established in Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. CL Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir.1981) (en banc) and concluded that on balance the factors weigh toward vacating the preliminary injunction as to the LeBeau group.

In considering whether to initially grant a preliminary injunction, the Court is to consider “(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties litigant; (3) the probability that movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest.” Id. at 113. As mentioned above a partial payment to the LeBeau group will not result in irreparable harm. The Court recognizes that there is a potential for harm to the Tribes and the Loudner group from the requested modification, because the money that is paid to the LeBeau group will no longer be accruing interest from the time of the partial payment to the date of final distribution of the Judgment Fund. Thus, the Tribes’ and the Loudner

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
200 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8077, 2002 WL 741664, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/loudner-v-united-states-sdd-2002.