Loud v. Philadelphia & Reading R.

15 F. Cas. 701, 8 Ben. 333
District Court, S.D. New York·Decided January 15, 1876·Published

Opinion

BLATCHFORD, District Judge.

These are cross-libels, growing out of a collision which took place in the Atlantic ocean, off the coast of New Jersey, on the 2d of February, 1875, in the evening, between the steamer Achilles, belonging to the. Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, and the schooner Lizzie Major, whereby both vessels were injured. The steamer was bound from New York to Wilmington, North Carolina, and the schooner was bound up the coast to New York.

The libel in the first case, that against the schooner, was filed on the 26th of February, 1875. It alleges, that, after passing Sandy Hook, the wind at the time blowing a strong breeze from the southwest, the steamer heading at the time south by east, those on board of her discovered a vessel, which proved to be the schooner, showing her red light, about three-fourths of a mile distant and about two points on the port bow of the steamer; that the steamer’s wheel was immediately ported, and her course changed to south by west, the schooner still approaching, showing her red light; that, when the schooner was about four points on the port bow of the steamer, her helm was put hard-a-starboard, and the steamer’s helm was then hove hard-a-port; that the schooner, by this manoeuvre, changed her course, so as to head for the steamer’s fore rigging, and showing her green light; that the schooner then saw that a collision [702]*702was imminent and put her helm a-port, but too late to avoid a collision, she striking the steamer on the port side; and that the schooner was guilty of negligence, in improperly changing her course from the course she was on when she was first seen by the steamer, which would have carried her far to the eastward of the steamer, and in not keeping a proper lookout, and in not sooner seeing the steamer, and in otherwise not properly navigating; and that the collision was the result of the careless, unskillful and improper conduct and management of those on board of and navigating the schooner.

The answer to that libel was sworn to on the 9th of March, 1875, and filed seven days thereafter. It alleges, that the wind was blowing a moderate breeze from the south south west, and the weather was clear; that the schooner had her regulation lights set, as required by law, and they were burning brightly, at the time of the collision; that, when the schooner arrived at a point opposite Sandy Hook beach, and close along the Sandy Hook shore, she had the Sandy Hook light one or two points on her port bow, her booms being swung over the starboard rail, about four points off; that she was steering north northwest; that the steamer was discovered showing her two lights, about two or three miles distant, and on the starboard bow of the schooner; that the schooner held her course without any change whatever, but, when the vessels were a few lengths apart, the steamer suddenly ran across the schooner’s bow, and some one on board of the steamer hailed the schooner to put her helm hard up, which was done, and the main sheet eased off, but the steamer struck, with her port quarter, the bowsprit of the schooner; and that the steamer was guilty ■of negligence in changing her course and running across the bows of the schooner, which manoeuvre was the cause of the collision.

The libel in the second case is, in all its material allegations, like the answer in the first case. It was sworn to on the 9th of March, 1875. and filed the next day.

The answer in the second case was sworn to and filed on the 15th of April, 1875. It differs, in its allegations, from the libel in the first case, in two particulars. One of them is, that the answer alleges, that, when the steamer’s wheel was hove hard-a-port, after the schooner starboarded, the course of the steamer was changed thereby some four or five points more to the starboard hand. This allegation is not found in the libel in the first case. The other particular, and it is a very material one, is, that the libel in the first case alleges, that the schooner, when she put her helm hard-a-starboard, changed her course so as to head for the steamer’s fore rigging and showed her green light, whereas, the answer in the second case, instead of alleging that the schooner changed so as to head for the steamer’s fore rigging, avers merely that she changed her course toward the steamer, and the answer omits entirely the averment that the schooner then showed her green light. This is a very material point and a very material discrepancy. The story of the libel in the first ease is, in substance, that those on board of the steamer saw at first the red light of the schooner, and saw no other light on the schooner from that time until the schooner starboarded, and then saw the schooner’s green light, the schooner heading for the steamer’s fore rigging. The implication in such libel, from the allegation therein that the schooner, before she starboarded, had got to be four points on the port bow of the steamer, is, that the schooner, by star-boarding, shut in her red light to the view of those on the steamer and showed to them instead her green light. The answer in the second case tells a very different story in this particular, — and is to the effect, that the schooner, by starboarding, did not come around so as to head for the steamer’s fore rigging and shut in her red light and show instead her green light, but only changed her course so as to head more towards the steamer, and continued to show her red light, and only her red light, and did not come around so far as to hide her red light and show instead her green light.

Nelson, the look-out on the steamer, who was on duty forward, about 10 feet from the steamer’s head, testifies, that he first saw the light of the schooner when it was from three-quarters of a mile to a mile off; that he saw it on his port bow; that it was a red light; that he reported it; that the steamer then ported; that he continued seeing the red light until the schooner was close up; and that he did not see the green light of the schooner- until the schooner’s boom ran over the deck of the steamer. There is nothing in this testimony to show any change of course by the schooner. It shows that he thought the light he first saw was the red light; that he continued to see a light on the schooner all the time; that he thought the light he saw all the time down to the time the schooner’s boom came across the deck of the steamer was the same light he first saw, and was the red light; and that, when the schooner’s boom was coming across the steamer’s deck, he thought the light he saw was the green light. The light he then saw must have been the green light, as the schooner’s jib boom came over the port side of the steamer. He does not say that he saw one light disappear by being shut in and another light come afterwards into view. There is nothing in his testimony that is inconsistent with the fact, -that the light he saw all the time on the schooner was the green light, and that he mistook it for the red light until it was close at hand. Adopting the conclusion that the light was all the time the red light until close at hand, and that then no red light was visible, but only [703]*703a green light, it was easy to jump at and swear to the inference, that the schooner starboarded and changed her course so as to shut in her red light and show her green light, this inference being strengthened by the fact that the steamer was porting all the time. But, if the schooner was really all the time showing her green light to the steamer, over the port bow of the steamer, and was holding her course, she was on a course that was drawing on to the course •of the steamer, and the steamer, by porting, was crossing the bows of the schooner.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Loud v. Philadelphia & Reading R., 15 F. Cas. 701, 8 Ben. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1876).

15 F. Cas. 701 (Loud v. Philadelphia & Reading R.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.