Lotti v. Unemployment Appeals Commission

699 So. 2d 863, 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 11131, 1997 WL 609171
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedOctober 3, 1997
DocketNo. 96-1538
StatusPublished

This text of 699 So. 2d 863 (Lotti v. Unemployment Appeals Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lotti v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 699 So. 2d 863, 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 11131, 1997 WL 609171 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Staci Lotti, appeals a determination by the Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission (“UAC”) that the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security (“DOL”) was entitled to money owed to her by the state. This money is a refund due Lotti because of the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So.2d 717 (Fla.1994), cert. denied, sub nom., Adams v. Dickinson, 516 U.S. 1158, 115 S.Ct. 2608, 132 L.Ed.2d 853 (1995), declaring the motor vehicle impact fee unconstitutional. DOL claimed that Lotti received an overpayment of unemployment benefits in 1993-1994. Lotti argues that the refund qualifies for exemption as personal property pursuant to the homestead exemption provision of Article X, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution and its implementing statute, section 222.061, Florida Statutes (1995). Lotti, in compliance with that statute, filed an inventory and affidavit of exemption in the administrative forum below.

The state argues that Lotti is not entitled to assert her homestead exemption in regard to the refund money because that money was not “seized by the state” via levy but merely offset against a pre-existing and greater obligation owed by Lotti to the state. We find this argument unpersuasive. Cf. Schlosser v. State, 602 So.2d 628 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

We do not believe that the State of Florida is in any different position than a private creditor in respect to the applicability of the Florida Constitution homestead exemption provisions. See Florida Industrial Commission v. Coleman, 154 Fla. 744, 18 So.2d 905 (1944). Most of the courts that have addressed the issue have determined that a debtor’s exemptions, including a homestead exemption, can defeat a creditor’s right of setoff. See Annotation, Availability of Debtor’s Exemption to Defeat Counterclaim or Setoff, 106 A.L.R. 1070 (1937).

REVERSED.

COBB, HARRIS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Department of Revenue v. Kuhnlein
646 So. 2d 717 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1994)
Florida Industrial Commission v. Coleman
18 So. 2d 905 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1944)
Schlosser v. State
602 So. 2d 628 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1992)
Adams v. Dickinson
515 U.S. 1158 (Supreme Court, 1995)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
699 So. 2d 863, 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 11131, 1997 WL 609171, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lotti-v-unemployment-appeals-commission-fladistctapp-1997.