Lorraine Chambers v. Department of Housing and Urban Development

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided July 17, 2024·No. DA-1221-20-0094-W-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

LORRAINE D. CHAMBERS, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DA-1221-20-0094-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND DATE: July 17, 2024 URBAN DEVELOPMENT, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Lorraine D. Chambers , Fort Worth, Texas, pro se.

Marcus R. Patton , Anju V. Mathew , Esquire, Sakeenda M. Adams , and Mary C. Merchant , Fort Worth, Texas, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member*

*Member Kerner recused himself and did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which denied her request for corrective action in connection with her individual right of

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

action (IRA) appeal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND The appellant, an Equal Opportunity Specialist, filed an IRA appeal in which she alleged that the agency took several personnel actions against her in retaliation for her numerous protected disclosures. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1. After consideration of the parties’ written submissions, the administrative judge found that the appellant had established the Board’s jurisdiction over her appeal. 2 IAF, Tab 19. Following the requested hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision in which he found that the appellant made two protected disclosures, specifically, that she reasonably believed that: she disclosed a

2 The administrative judge did not make a specific finding that the appellant had exhausted her remedy before the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), but rather found Board jurisdiction over the appeal. IAF, Tab 53, Initial Decision at 1. We find that the matters deemed at issue by the administrative judge fully comport with those described in the appellant’s OSC complaint and OSC’s closure letter, thereby establishing exhaustion. To the extent the administrative judge erred by not specifically addressing exhaustion, his error did not prejudice either party’s substantive rights. Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984).

violation of the Privacy Act when she confronted her first- and second-line supervisors regarding a conversation they had in which she overheard them discussing her prior EEO complaint and her medical issues, and she disclosed a conflict of interest when she reported that a city of Fort Worth employee with whom she worked had taken action related to the needs of her disabled brother that impacted her objectivity in the performance of her official duties. IAF, Tab 53, Initial Decision (ID) at 13-15. The administrative judge next found that the appellant showed that her two protected disclosures were contributing factors in four of her claimed personnel actions. ID at 15-26. Those four actions were assigning her as a Government Technical Monitor, subsequently removing her from that assignment, failing to timely promote her to GS-12, and rating her as fully successful for fiscal year 2018. Finally, the administrative judge found that the agency showed by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken those same personnel actions in the absence of the appellant’s protected disclosures. ID at 26-32. Accordingly, the administrative judge denied the appellant’s request for corrective action. ID at 2, 32.

The appellant has filed a petition for review, Petition for Review (PFR)

File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 3.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Lorraine Chambers v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, (Miss. 2024).

Lorraine Chambers v. Department of Housing and Urban Development (Lorraine Chambers v. Department of Housing and Urban Development) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Theodore Yanopoulos v. Department of the Navy
796 F.2d 468 (Federal Circuit, 1986)
Mohammed Yunus v. Department of Veterans Affairs
242 F.3d 1367 (Federal Circuit, 2001)
Todd R. Haebe v. Department of Justice
288 F.3d 1288 (Federal Circuit, 2002)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)