USCA4 Appeal: 24-1518 Doc: 51 Filed: 03/03/2026 Pg: 1 of 17
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-1510
KELLY M. HOFFMAN,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
INOVA HEALTH CARE SERVICES; NORTH AMERICAN PARTNERS IN ANESTHESIA (VIRGINIA) LLC,
Defendants – Appellees.
No. 24-1518
LORRAINE BIONDI AUSTIN,
INOVA HEALTH CARE SERVICES,
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Michael Stefan Nachmanoff, District Judge. (1:23-cv-01696-MSN-IDD; 1:23-cv-01698-MSN-JFA)
Argued: September 12, 2025 Decided: March 3, 2026 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1518 Doc: 51 Filed: 03/03/2026 Pg: 2 of 17
Before KING, RUSHING, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Benjamin joined.
ARGUED: Timothy Bosson, BOSSON LEGAL GROUP, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellants. Nancy North Delogu, LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C., Washington, D.C.; Scott Andrew Siegner, OGLETREE DEAKINS, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Isaiah R. Kalinowski, Arie M. Jones, BOSSON LEGAL GROUP, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellants. W. Ryan Waddell, OGLETREE DEAKINS, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee North American Partners in Anesthesia (Virginia), LLC. Alexander P. Berg, Lauren M. Bridenbaugh, LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C., Tysons Corner, Virginia, for Appellee Inova Health Care Services.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1518 Doc: 51 Filed: 03/03/2026 Pg: 3 of 17
RUSHING, Circuit Judge:
Inova Health Care Services suspended clinical privileges at its medical facilities for
Plaintiffs Kelly Hoffman and Lorraine Austin after they refused Covid-19 vaccinations.
North American Partners in Anesthesiology (NAPA) subsequently terminated Plaintiffs’
employment. In separate complaints, Hoffman and Austin both sued Inova for
discrimination, and Hoffman also sued NAPA. The district court dismissed both
complaints for failure to state a claim, finding that neither Plaintiff plausibly alleged Inova
was her employer and that Hoffman did not exhaust the administrative process before suing
NAPA. Considering these two cases together, we affirm in full.
I.
Plaintiffs Hoffman and Austin are Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists
(CRNAs) who were employed by American Anesthesiology of Virginia, a subsidiary of
NAPA. American Anesthesiology contracted exclusively with Inova facilities, while
NAPA maintained contractual arrangements with other medical facilities beyond Inova.
By contract, American Anesthesiology had the sole and exclusive right to provide
anesthesia services at Inova Loudoun Hospital and Inova Loudoun Ambulatory Surgery
Center. Consistent with that arrangement, American Anesthesiology supplied the
physicians and CRNAs to perform anesthesia services at both facilities. During their
employment with American Anesthesiology, Hoffman and Austin worked exclusively at
these Inova facilities—Hoffman for five years and Austin for twenty.
In 2022, Inova denied Plaintiffs’ requests for exemptions from its Covid-19
vaccination policy. After Plaintiffs refused to be vaccinated, Inova suspended their clinical
3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1518 Doc: 51 Filed: 03/03/2026 Pg: 4 of 17
privileges effective August 1. Approximately two months later, NAPA terminated their
employment.
Austin sued Inova, alleging it violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Virginia Human Rights Act (VHRA), Va. Code § 2.2-3900
et seq. Separately, Hoffman sued Inova and NAPA, asserting claims under Title VII, the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the VHRA. Both
Plaintiffs alleged that Inova was their joint employer with NAPA. Both NAPA and Inova
moved to dismiss the complaints.
After a hearing, the district court granted the motions to dismiss. The court
dismissed Hoffman’s claims against NAPA because her charge of discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) did not name NAPA but only Inova.
As a result, the court concluded, Hoffman had failed to exhaust the administrative process
with respect to her claims against NAPA. As for Inova, the court found Plaintiffs’
allegations insufficient to allege it was their employer, as was necessary for liability under
each statutory scheme on which Plaintiffs relied. But the court granted Plaintiffs’ requests
for the opportunity to amend their complaints regarding Inova. After Plaintiffs filed
amended complaints, Inova again moved to dismiss and the district court dismissed both
complaints with prejudice. Applying the factors from this Court’s decision in Butler v.
Drive Automotive Industries of America, Inc., 793 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 2015), the district
court concluded that Plaintiffs again had not plausibly alleged that Inova was their
employer for purposes of Title VII, the ADA, or the VHRA.
Plaintiffs each appealed, and we consolidated their cases for oral argument.
4 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1518 Doc: 51 Filed: 03/03/2026 Pg: 5 of 17
II.
We review de novo a decision to grant a motion to dismiss. Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC,
959 F.3d 605, 615–616 (4th Cir. 2020). “When doing so, we ‘accept the factual allegations
of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.’” Corder v. Antero Res. Corp., 57 F.4th 384, 401 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Rockville
Cars, LLC v. City of Rockville, 891 F.3d 141, 145 (4th Cir. 2018)). “To survive a motion
to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient facts to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Mere
“labels and conclusions . . . will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
III.
We begin with whether Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that Inova was their employer.
Title VII, the ADA, and the VHRA prohibit covered employers from engaging in certain
types of discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 12111(2), 12112(a); Va. Code § 2.2-
3905(B)(1). It is undisputed that NAPA, not Inova, formally employed Plaintiffs. But
“multiple entities may simultaneously be considered” an individual’s employer for
purposes of Title VII under the “joint employment doctrine” adopted by this Court. Butler,
793 F.3d at 410. That doctrine focuses on “the substance of the employment relationship”
to “prevent[] those who effectively employ a worker from evading liability by hiding
behind another entity, such as a staffing agency.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
5 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1518 Doc: 51 Filed: 03/03/2026 Pg: 6 of 17
This Court uses a nine-factor test to determine “which entities actually exercise
control over an employee” such that they can rightly be considered an employer under Title
VII. Id. at 409. Those factors are:
(1) authority to hire and fire the individual;
(2) day-to-day supervision of the individual, including employee discipline;
(3) whether the putative employer furnishes the equipment used and the place of work;
(4) possession of and responsibility over the individual’s employment records, including payroll, insurance, and taxes;
(5) the length of time during which the individual has worked for the putative employer;
(6) whether the putative employer provides the individual with formal or informal training;
(7) whether the individual’s duties are akin to a regular employee’s duties;
(8) whether the individual is assigned solely to the putative employer; and
(9) whether the individual and putative employer intended to enter into an employment relationship.
Id. at 414. The first three factors “are the most important.” Id. However, “‘no one factor
is determinative,’” and “courts can modify the factors to the specific industry context.” Id.
at 414–415 (quoting Cilecek v. Inova Health Sys. Servs., 115 F.3d 256, 260 (4th Cir. 1997)).
6 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1518 Doc: 51 Filed: 03/03/2026 Pg: 7 of 17
Our “principal guidepost” in the joint employer analysis is “the common-law element of
control.” 1 Id. at 414 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Considering these factors, we agree with the district court that Plaintiffs have not
plausibly alleged that Inova was their employer.
First and significantly, Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Inova had the
“authority to hire and fire” them. Id. Hoffman alleges she “was hired by American
Anesthesiology,” which “has since been purchased by NAPA.” Hoffman J.A. 202. Austin
likewise alleges she was hired “by Loudoun Anesthesia Associates, which was acquired
by American Anesthesiology,” which was then acquired by NAPA. Austin J.A. 145–146.
Neither alleges that Inova had the power to hire them or was involved in their hiring. As
for the authority to fire, Hoffman alleges that her employment contract with American
Anesthesiology “provided that she would be terminated for cause if Inova demanded that
she be removed from providing services at its facility.” Hoffman J.A. 202. The contract
actually states that such a demand by a facility provides “[c]ause” for termination, as
determined by American Anesthesiology “in its sole discretion.” 2 Hoffman J.A. 60. In
1 The ADA and the VHRA use definitions of “employer” analogous to that in Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 12111(5); Va. Code § 2.2-3905(A). The parties do not contest the district court’s decision to apply the same joint employment doctrine from Title VII to those statutes as well. Cf. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 448 (2003) (calling “the common-law element of control” the “principal guidepost” for determining whether certain individuals were “employees” under the ADA); Smith v. CSRA, 12 F.4th 396, 414 (4th Cir. 2021) (applying the Butler factors to an ADA claim). 2 We can consider the contract at this early stage of the proceedings because it is integral to Hoffman’s complaint and its authenticity is undisputed. See Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2016). 7 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1518 Doc: 51 Filed: 03/03/2026 Pg: 8 of 17
other words, Inova’s decision denying Hoffman access to its facilities gave NAPA a
contractual basis to fire her if NAPA, in its discretion, chose to do so. The authority lay
with NAPA, not Inova. Austin, for her part, does not allege that Inova influenced NAPA’s
decision to fire her or that it had any authority to do so.
Plaintiffs attempt to analogize their allegations to the facts of Butler, but the
comparison is inapt. In Butler, the putative employer “direct[ed]” the staffing agency to
replace the plaintiff, and the staffing agency then fired her. 793 F.3d at 415. A manager
for the staffing agency testified that he could not recall an instance when the staffing agency
failed to terminate an employee upon a request from the putative employer. Id. Here, by
contrast, Plaintiffs do not allege that Inova directed NAPA to fire them or had the authority
to do so. Rather, as Hoffman alleges, she lost her clinical privileges at Inova and months
later NAPA terminated her employment. Plaintiffs suggest that their employment was
contingent on access to Inova’s facilities because American Anesthesiology contracts
exclusively with Inova. But in their complaints Plaintiffs admit they were NAPA
employees, and they do not allege that NAPA contracted exclusively with Inova facilities. 3
Second, regarding day-to-day supervision, Plaintiffs say little. Each Plaintiff alleges
that Inova “exercised oversight over” her work and “exercised control over [her] delivery
of her professional services.” Hoffman J.A. 203; Austin J.A. 146. Their complaints,
however, leave these “naked assertions” largely without “further factual enhancement.”
3 In their briefs on appeal, Plaintiffs indicate that, after Inova suspended their privileges, NAPA “presumably considered other jobs” for them before ultimately terminating their employment. Hoffman Reply Br. 8; Austin Reply Br. 7. 8 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1518 Doc: 51 Filed: 03/03/2026 Pg: 9 of 17
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Plaintiffs’
complaints do not identify any individual who supervised their work, either by name or
title, even though Virginia law requires CRNAs to practice under the supervision of a
licensed doctor. See Va. Code § 54.1-2957(C). Plaintiffs do not identify any individual in
their chain of command. We note, however, that the right to perform anesthesia services
at these Inova facilities belonged solely and exclusively to physicians and CRNAs
employed by American Anesthesiology. 4
The only example Plaintiffs offer regarding Inova’s purported control over their
work is that “Inova maintained control over whether [a] medication could be approved for
[a] patient; Inova could deny use of a particular medication, or could set a policy for the
conditions under which the medication could or could not be used.” Hoffman J.A. 203;
Austin J.A. 146. We have recognized, however, that a measure of control over “medical
services rendered at hospitals” is not “a reliable indicator” of an employer-employee
relationship, because a “hospital must assert a degree of . . . control over every [medical
provider’s] work—whether an employee, an independent contractor, or a [provider] merely
with privileges—to discharge its own professional responsibility to patients.” Cilecek, 115
F.3d at 260, 262. For that reason, Inova’s general authority over which medications
CRNAs may dispense to patients in Inova facilities does not advance the plausibility of an
employment relationship between Plaintiffs and Inova.
4 Plaintiffs object to the Court considering the contract between Inova and American Anesthesiology because the version Inova produced in the district court is heavily redacted. Like the district court, we conclude we can consider the contract because it is integral to the complaints and its authenticity is undisputed. See Goines, 822 F.3d at 166. 9 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1518 Doc: 51 Filed: 03/03/2026 Pg: 10 of 17
Plaintiffs also offer one example of Inova allegedly exercising authority over their
work schedule. By contract, the responsibility for scheduling physicians and CRNAs to
provide anesthesia services at the Inova facilities lay with American Anesthesiology, and
it was obligated to notify Inova of any changes to the schedule. In their complaints,
Hoffman and Austin make identical allegations about an incident “when something
troubling happened” while they were on duty in 2022 and “certain Inova staff offered” that
Hoffman and Austin could “take the remainder of the day off” but “other Inova staff later
disciplined” them for doing so. Hoffman J.A. 203; see Austin J.A. 146–147. Accepting
the truth of this allegation, one instance of an Inova employee, apparently erroneously,
telling Hoffman and Austin they could leave work early does not raise a reasonable
inference that Inova exercised daily supervision over them, especially in view of the dearth
of factual allegations pertinent to “day-to-day, practical control of the employee[s].”
Butler, 793 F.3d at 414; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (describing facial plausibility).
Third, “whether the putative employer furnishes the equipment used and the place
of work” is not probative of an employer-employee relationship in this context. Butler,
793 F.3d at 414; see Cilecek, 115 F.3d at 262 (“Similarly, that Cilecek used instruments of
the hospital emergency room that were supplied by the hospital is also inherent in the
provision of emergency medical services and likewise is not a reliable indicator of
employee status.”). As CRNAs providing anesthesia services to patients at an Inova
hospital or surgery center, Plaintiffs worked at Inova facilities and used Inova equipment.
But in the healthcare context, the use of hospital equipment and facilities is standard
practice “in almost every case,” whether the healthcare provider is an employee of the
10 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1518 Doc: 51 Filed: 03/03/2026 Pg: 11 of 17
hospital or not. Cilecek, 115 F.3d at 262. Such use is therefore not a reliable indicator of
joint employment. 5 See id.; Butler, 793 F.3d at 415 (emphasizing that “the consideration
of factors must relate to the particular relationship under consideration” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Fourth, neither Plaintiff alleges that Inova had “possession of and responsibility
over [their] employment records, including payroll, insurance, and taxes.” Butler, 793 F.3d
at 414. They allege that Inova possessed records about their licensure, credentialing, and
vaccination status, but that information is relevant to ensuring appropriate patient care and
is not indicative of an employment relationship.
Fifth, Hoffman and Austin allege they worked at Inova facilities—and, pertinent to
the eighth factor, solely at Inova facilities—for five years and twenty years, respectively.
While relevant, these allegations communicate little, if anything, about whether Inova
“actually exercise[d]” “significant control” over Plaintiffs while they were NAPA
employees. Butler, 793 F.3d at 409, 410 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Sixth, regarding “formal or informal training,” id. at 414, Plaintiffs allege that Inova
provided training about its charting system and equipment, workplace harassment, and
patient privacy law and also debriefed staff after negative patient outcomes. As the district
5 Plaintiffs rely on Crump v. TCoombs & Assocs., LLC, No. 2:13-CV-707, 2015 WL 5601885 (E.D. Va. Sept. 22, 2015). In that case, the district court found that the Navy jointly employed a physician assistant where the Navy reviewed her application, interviewed her, exercised day-to-day supervision over her in the same manner as government personnel, assigned her the same duties as government personnel, and possessed unilateral authority to transfer her to any Navy medical facility within a fifty- mile radius. Id. at *19, *20, *23. Plaintiffs have not alleged similar facts here, making Crump inapposite. 11 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1518 Doc: 51 Filed: 03/03/2026 Pg: 12 of 17
court observed, and Plaintiffs do not address on appeal, “these trainings largely encompass
those Inova is obligated to provide under federal law or to ensure an appropriate standard
of patient care” vis-à-vis all personnel treating patients at their facilities, regardless of
employment status. Austin v. Inova Health Care Servs., No. 1:23-CV-1698 (MSN/JFA),
2024 WL 2871395, at *4 (E.D. Va. May 7, 2024). Neither Plaintiff alleges that Inova
trained them in providing anesthesia services, which was their unique responsibility as
CRNAs, distinct from Inova’s employees.
Seventh, Hoffman and Austin have not plausibly alleged that their duties as CRNAs
were “akin to a regular employee’s duties.” Butler, 793 F.3d at 414. Each Plaintiff alleges
that “much of her work was focused on tasks that were specific to providing anesthesia,” a
job that regular Inova employees did not perform and that was reserved exclusively for
American Anesthesiology employees. Hoffman J.A. 204; Austin J.A. 148. Plaintiffs
allege they also performed “generalized patient care tasks that were commonly performed
by Inova staff nurses,” such as “placing an IV line” or “repositioning a patient for their
comfort.” Hoffman J.A. 204; Austin J.A. 148. But nothing suggests that Plaintiffs
performed these patient care tasks outside their specialized role as CRNAs.
Lastly, Plaintiffs do not allege that they subjectively “intended to enter into an
employment relationship” with Inova. Butler, 793 F.3d at 414 & n.12. Rather, their
complaints acknowledge that, “at all relevant times,” they were NAPA employees who
were credentialed to work in Inova facilities. Hoffman J.A. 202; Austin J.A. 146.
12 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1518 Doc: 51 Filed: 03/03/2026 Pg: 13 of 17
Considering all nine Butler factors together, we agree with the district court that
Hoffman and Austin have not plausibly alleged Inova was their employer. 6 Even accepting
the complaints’ factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in
Plaintiffs’ favor, Inova did not have authority to hire and fire Plaintiffs, did not exercise
day-to-day supervision over them, and was not responsible for their employment records.
As CRNAs, Plaintiffs’ duties were not akin to those of regular Inova employees. While
Inova furnished equipment, facilities, and some necessary training, those facts do not
distinguish employees from non-employees in the setting of a hospital or surgical center.
And although Plaintiffs worked for years exclusively at Inova facilities, they did not
subjectively intend to enter an employment relationship with Inova but instead knew that
NAPA was their employer. Despite an opportunity to replead after guidance from the
district court, Plaintiffs have not nudged their claims of joint employment “across the line
from conceivable to plausible.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (internal quotation marks omitted).
IV.
We turn next to Hoffman’s claims against NAPA, which the district court dismissed
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Before pursuing a lawsuit under Title VII
or the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a charge with
the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), (f), 12117(a); see Walton v. Harker, 33 F.4th 165,
172 (4th Cir. 2022); Sydnor v. Fairfax Cnty., 681 F.3d 591, 593 (4th Cir. 2012).
6 At oral argument, Plaintiffs for the first time relied on Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973). That reliance is misplaced. Sibley presented materially different factual circumstances, and the court did not undertake the nine-factor joint employment analysis applicable in this Circuit. See Butler, 793 F.3d at 414. 13 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1518 Doc: 51 Filed: 03/03/2026 Pg: 14 of 17
“[R]equiring a party to file a charge with the EEOC ensures that the employer is put on
notice of the alleged violations” and gives the EEOC “the first crack” at resolving
employment discrimination disputes. Sydnor, 681 F.3d at 593 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Accordingly, “[a] plaintiff’s EEOC charge defines the scope of her subsequent
right to institute a civil suit,” and “[t]he allegations contained in the administrative charge
of discrimination generally limit the scope of any subsequent judicial complaint.” Walton,
33 F.4th at 172 (internal quotation marks omitted). The VHRA imposes its own exhaustion
requirements that similarly involve first filing a charge and ultimately receiving notice
from the state agency of one’s right to file a civil suit. See Va. Code §§ 2.2-3907(A), (B),
2.2-3908(A).
In her original complaint, Hoffman alleged that she had exhausted the relevant
administrative procedures because (1) she filed a discrimination claim with the EEOC on
July 13, 2022, which was cross-filed with the Virginia Office of Civil Rights (OCR), and
(2) on November 21, 2023, the EEOC and the OCR issued right-to-sue notices to her.
Hoffman’s July 13 EEOC charge identifies Inova as the only employer who allegedly
discriminated against her. It does not mention NAPA. Likewise, both right-to-sue notices
were sent to Inova but not to NAPA.
After NAPA moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to exhaust, Hoffman
asserted that she had submitted a letter to the EEOC on March 30, 2023, attempting to add
a claim that NAPA also discriminated against her. In her letter, which Hoffman styled as
an “Update and Amendment” to her original charge, Hoffman claimed that “NAPA
engaged in discrimination against me along with the Inova Health System.” Hoffman J.A.
14 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1518 Doc: 51 Filed: 03/03/2026 Pg: 15 of 17
154. Hoffman appended NAPA’s contact information to her letter and uploaded the letter
to the EEOC’s online portal. But Hoffman’s formal charge of discrimination was never
amended, and NAPA did not receive notice of any charges against it before Hoffman filed
suit.
The district court correctly ruled that Hoffman failed to administratively exhaust her
claims again NAPA. Hoffman’s EEOC charge of discrimination, which limits the scope
of her federal claims, did not name NAPA. See Walton, 33 F.4th at 172. The letter
Hoffman sent to the EEOC eight months after her initial charge did not result in an amended
charge or notice to NAPA. As we reasoned in a similar case, “it would be objectively
illogical to view a private letter from a complaining party to the EEOC as constructively
amending a formal charge, given that one of the purposes of requiring a party to file charges
with the EEOC is to put the charged party on notice of the claims raised against it.” Sloop
v. Memorial Mission Hosp., Inc., 198 F.3d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Cowgill v.
First Data Techs., Inc., 41 F.4th 370, 385 (4th Cir. 2022) (relying on Sloop to reject
plaintiff’s claim that her discussion with an EEOC investigator expanded her EEOC
charge).
Hoffman emphasizes that her letter to the EEOC was a conspicuous effort to amend
her charge to add a discrimination claim against NAPA and that she used an appropriate
channel for communicating with the agency. 7 Even so, we cannot read Hoffman’s private
Hoffman relies on Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 300 F.3d 400, 404 (4th Cir. 7
2002), where we held that the EEOC’s delay in assigning a number to a plaintiff’s charge and forwarding it to the employer and the state agency did not prevent it from qualifying
15 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1518 Doc: 51 Filed: 03/03/2026 Pg: 16 of 17
letter to the EEOC “as part of her formal discrimination charge without contravening [Title
VII’s] purposes” to put employers “on notice [and] encourag[e] conciliation.” Balas v.
Huntington Ingalls Indus., Inc., 711 F.3d 401, 408 (4th Cir. 2013); see id. (“In determining
what claims a plaintiff properly alleged before the EEOC, we may look only to the charge
filed with that agency.”).
Regarding her VHRA claim, Hoffman relies on the same letter to the EEOC, which
she says would have been cross-filed with the OCR. That argument fails for the reasons
we have explained. In a footnote in her reply brief, Hoffman also states that she “filed an
updated Complaint Questionnaire form with OCR on October 31, 2022,” citing to an
unsigned and undated document. Hoffman Reply Br. 14 n.3. She offers nothing further
about the import of this filing, thereby waiving any potential argument about this document
multiple times over. See Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 615 (4th Cir. 2023) (“‘A party
waives an argument by failing to present it in its opening brief or by failing to develop its
argument—even if its brief takes a passing shot at the issue.’” (quoting Grayson O Co. v.
Agadir Int’l LLC, 856 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017)); see also Wahi v. Charleston Area
Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding that claims asserted in a single
sentence in a footnote were waived on appeal).
as a valid charge to which the subsequent formal charge could relate back for timeliness purposes. Edelman is of limited relevance here, as it did not involve amending a formal charge or lack of notice to an employer. 16 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1518 Doc: 51 Filed: 03/03/2026 Pg: 17 of 17
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Hoffman’s and
Austin’s complaints in full.
AFFIRMED