Loro Popaj v. Kristi Noem
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Opinion
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 5:26-cv-01360-MWC-AYP Date: April 10, 2026 Title: Loro Popaj v. Kristi Noem
Present: The Honorable Michelle Williams Court, United States District Judge
T. Jackson Not Reported Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants: N/A N/A
Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER DISCHARGING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, DISCHARGING ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, AND GRANTING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (DKTS. 2, 11, 15) Before the Court are filings in connection with the Court’s March 30, 2026, Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) mandating Respondent1 to release Petitioner immediately under the same conditions applicable to him prior to his November 19, 2025, detention, enjoining Respondent from re-detaining Petitioner without providing notice and a pre-deprivation hearing, and enjoining Respondent from transferring Petitioner outside of the Central District of California pending final resolution of his case. See Dkt. # 11 (“TRO”). The Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS a preliminary injunction mandating the same relief. I. Background The Court incorporates the underlying facts articulated in its TRO. See TRO.
When issuing the TRO on March 30, 2026, the Court ordered Respondent to show cause, in writing, no later than 7 days after the TRO as to why a preliminary injunction should not issue, and allowed Petitioner to respond 7 days after Respondent’s filing. See id. at 7. On April 6, 2026, Respondent filed a response, arguing that Petitioner’s release moots the case and asking the Court for dismissal. See Dkt. # 16 (“Response”).
1 The Court adopts the naming conventions used in its TRO. CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 5:26-cv-01360-MWC-AYP Date: April 10, 2026 Title: Loro Popaj v. Kristi Noem
II. Legal Standard As with a temporary restraining order, to obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must show: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). When the government is a party to a case, the balance of the equities and public interest factors merge. See Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)).
The Ninth Circuit uses a sliding scale approach to preliminary injunctions, such that “a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2012). “This circuit has adopted and applied a version of the sliding scale approach under which a preliminary injunction could issue where the likelihood of success is such that ‘serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in [Petitioner’s] favor.’” All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131 (quoting Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. City of L.A., 340 F.3d 810, 813 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotation modified)).
III. Discussion “A case becomes moot—and therefore no longer a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ for purposes of Article III—when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Rosebrock v. Mathis, 745 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 90 (2013)). “A defendant’s voluntary cessation of allegedly unlawful conduct ordinarily does not suffice to moot a case.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 174 (2000). “Thus, the standard for determining whether a case has been mooted by the defendant’s voluntary conduct is stringent: A case might become moot if subsequent events make it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Id. (citing United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)). This standard requires the “defendant [to] demonstrate that ‘there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated’”—a heavy burden. United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953) (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 448 (2d Cir. 1945)). CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 5:26-cv-01360-MWC-AYP Date: April 10, 2026 Title: Loro Popaj v. Kristi Noem Respondent has not met his heavy burden to demonstrate that the requested relief is moot since he offers no assurance that his previous wrongs would not recur. See id.; see generally Response. And the Supreme Court has rejected the idea that temporary relief, like the Court’s issuance of the TRO, would moot a habeas petition. See Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 403 (2019) (holding that class case was not moot even though some named plaintiffs obtained relief sought). Petitioner continues to face the threat of re-arrest and detention. For the same reasons that Petitioner was entitled to a TRO based on the threat of those harms, see generally TRO, he is entitled to a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the potential for unlawful re-detention remains, and the Court’s TRO did not moot the Petition.
IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS a preliminary injunction. For the duration of this action, Respondent is ENJOINED from re-detaining Petitioner without providing notice and a pre-deprivation hearing and complying with all other governing law, and must apply the conditions applicable to Petitioner prior to his November 19, 2025, detention. Respondent is also ENJOINED from transferring Petitioner outside of the Central District of California pending final resolution of his case. To the extent that Respondent has not returned to Petitioner all property confiscated from him during his arrest and processing into detention, Respondent must do so immediately.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
: Initials of Preparer TJ
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