Lorio v. Kaizer

259 So. 2d 95, 1972 La. App. LEXIS 5722
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 7, 1972
DocketNo. 4814
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 259 So. 2d 95 (Lorio v. Kaizer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lorio v. Kaizer, 259 So. 2d 95, 1972 La. App. LEXIS 5722 (La. Ct. App. 1972).

Opinion

STOULIG, Judge.

This is an action in quanti minoris brought by plaintiffs, who allege that the home they purchased from defendants contained substantial hidden termite damage which was discovered only after sale. Defendants made termite exterminators Melvin Billiot and Paul Billiot, doing business as Billiot Bros., and Billiot Bros., Inc., third party defendants, alleging reliance upon their certification that the termite damage to the house was less than $100 and prayed for indemnification should they be cast in judgment. Additionally, Billiot Bros., Inc., third partied Melvin Billiot. After trial of the matter judgment was rendered in favor of defendants, dismissing plaintiffs’ suit at their cost and further dismissing the third party demands. From the judgment on the principal demand plaintiffs have lodged this appeal. No appeal was taken from that portion of the judgment dismissing all third party demands and therefore the issues presented therein are not before us.

On February 22, 1967, John C. Fraser accepted William J. Ameling’s offer to sell his residence at 2217 Wirth Place in the City of New Orleans for a stated price of $26,000. The following stipulation was included in the purchase agreement:

“If roof & termite1 damage in excess of $100.00 is ascertained on an inspection [97]*97which must be made within (3) working days of acceptance, this agreement will be null and void without expense to either party except that vendor shall reserve the right, at his option to pay any roof damage in excess of said $100.00, in which event the agreement of sale will be binding. Seller is to pay for inspection fee.”

According to the testimony of Bernard Freedman, defendants’ real estate agent, Billiot Bros, was contacted within two days of the agreement and, after making an inspection, reported to him that there was a minimum amount of termite damage and that it was considerably less than $100. Plaintiffs’ agent was also apprised of this fact. Although no “termite certificate” had been presented despite numerous requests by him for it, Mr. Fraser nevertheless went through with the act of sale on March 17, 1967, with the assurance that the certificate would be forthcoming. Subsequently, he received a certificate signed by Paul Billiot, indicating that visible subterranean termite damage “should not exceed $100.”

Shortly after moving into the home Fraser became aware of some old termite damage and active infestation and contracted with Billiot Bros, to eradicate the pests. On April 24, 1967, plaintiffs sent a letter through their attorney Charles Bar-bera to Ameling demanding reimbursement of $250 for the expense of eradication, together with an amount necessary to repair the termite damage, which was provisionally estimated to exceed that sum by several hundred dollars. No reply was ever received. Plaintiffs began to discover more termite damage “in a small way,” but it was not until the following October or November that he became fully aware of the substantial damage to the home, which has since been repaired at a cost of $4,200.

It is well settled in our jurisprudence that latent termite damage may be the basis of an action in quanti minoris. Thompson v. Klein, 188 So.2d 180 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1966); Foreman v. Jordan, 131 So.2d 796 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1961); Ruehmkorf v. McCartney, 121 So.2d 757 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1960).

However, where the termite damage is partially observable by a simple inspection of the premises, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held in the leading case of Pursell v. Kelly, 244 La. 323, 152 So.2d 36 (1963), that the purchaser who nevertheless buys without further investigation waives his right to sue in quanti minoris. In that case the court found that some of the termite damage to the premises which plaintiffs purchased could have been discovered by a simple inspection and, accordingly, charged plaintiffs with this knowledge and the corresponding duty to make a further examination. However, since the purchasers failed to detect the damage on the pre-sale inspection of the house and no further exploration was made, the court was not faced with the problem of determining what actions by the prospective purchaser would satisfy this obligation and did not find it necessary to set down any specific guidelines.

The obvious reason for the court’s imposition of this duty is that visible defects should alert the prospective purchaser to the possibility of further damage and he should be required to make a more comprehensive examination with a view toward determining the true condition of the house. However, a practical application of this rule raises problems which will be more fully discussed at a later point.

In the case of Bonhagen v. Hooper, 195 So.2d 447 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1967) (writ refused, 250 La. 634, 197 So.2d 652 (1967)), this court was faced with interpreting the duty imposed by Pursell on the buyer to make a further investigation once he is charged with knowledge that some damage is present. There, the plaintiff Bonhagen entered into an agreement to purchase defendant’s residence, conditioned upon the purchaser’s ability to termite proof the home and make essential struc[98]*98tural repairs due to any termite damage at a cost not in excess of $300. In accordance with this stipulation plaintiff had four pest control organizations inspect the premises, and accepted a bid of $165 to termite proof the dwelling, which was found to have active termites. He was advised by the exterminator that the inspection revealed no structural damage from the old or current infestation which warranted repair. The sale was completed, subsequent to which plaintiff discovered, by removing two cracked weather boards, extensive hidden termite damage which was repaired at a cost of over $1,000.

The Bonhagen court cited Pursell, supra, and denied recovery. Although it did not indicate whether any damage had been observed by plaintiff Bonhagen prior to his hiring of the exterminator, it considered the information which he obtained from that source prior to the sale sufficient to have imposed upon him the duty of making further inspection. The court stated:

“ * * * [W]e must conclude that plaintiff did not act with reasonable prudence under the circumstances. Having notice of some old damage and current infestation, he was under duty to make further inspection. * * *
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“ * * * True, the extent of damage was not discovered, and it could not have been found by any inspection short of defacing the house, but our appreciation of Pursell is that this became necessary once the simple inspection revealed the possibility of more extensive damage.
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“ * * * [The inspection by the exterminator] gave Mr. Bonhagen information from which he was under duty to make such further inspection or have it made by persons qualified in building construction and repair. He cannot be relieved of this duty merely because the exterminator, who is not a builder or repairman, thought there was no damage beyond that which his inspection had revealed.” 195 So.2d at 450-451.

The district judge in the instant suit found the Bonhagen case to be controlling and, accordingly, denied plaintiff recovery. Careful reflection upon the matter by this court convinces us that the plaintiff was properly denied recovery, but that it was not necessary to adopt the far-reaching rationale of the Bonhagen court.

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Related

Lier v. Hight
357 So. 2d 73 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1978)
Lorio v. Kaizer
277 So. 2d 633 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1973)
Conley v. Cupit
274 So. 2d 713 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1973)

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Bluebook (online)
259 So. 2d 95, 1972 La. App. LEXIS 5722, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lorio-v-kaizer-lactapp-1972.