Loria v. Loria

952 S.W.2d 836, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 175, 1997 WL 107170
CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedMarch 12, 1997
Docket01A01-9609-CH-00441
StatusPublished
Cited by59 cases

This text of 952 S.W.2d 836 (Loria v. Loria) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Loria v. Loria, 952 S.W.2d 836, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 175, 1997 WL 107170 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

Opinion

*837 OPINION

TODD, Presiding Judge, Middle Section.

In this appeal by the husband from a divorce decree, the only issue is the award of alimony in futuro rather than rehabilitative alimony. Subordinate issues are the ability of the wife to work, her needs, and the ability of the husband to supply her needs.

At the time of the divorce, each of the parties was 56 years old; they had been married for 35 years and separated for 2-1/2 years; and their children were adults. The husband received a monthly retirement of $2,442.10 and earned $2,499.40 per month from his present employment. The wife was a homemaker during the marriage and worked only at brief intervals. She claims disability for work. The parties owned two residences, four vehicles, and other personalty which were divided to their satisfaction.

As pertinent to this appeal, the divorce decree provided:

1. The parties were declared to be divorced pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-129. (No fault determined.)
2. Husband was ordered to pay alimony in futuro of $3,000.00 per month until wife’s death, remarriage or modification or termination by the Court.
3. Wife was awarded one-half of husband’s pension.
4. Wife was awarded one-half of husband’s interest in the stock in his company-

On appeal, the husband insists that the award of periodic alimony was inconsistent with T.C.A. § 36—5—101(d)(1) which states:

It is the intent of the general assembly that a spouse who is economically disadvantaged, relative to the other spouse, be rehabilitated whenever possible by the granting of an order for payment of rehabilitative, temporary support and maintenance. Where there is such relative economic disadvantage and rehabilitation is not feasible in consideration of all relevant factors, including those set out in this subsection, then the court may grant an order for payment of support and maintenance on a long-term basis or until the death or remarriage of the recipient except as otherwise provided in subdivision (a)(3). Rehabilitative support and maintenance is a separate class of spousal support as distinguished from alimony in solido and periodic alimony. In determining whether the granting of an order for payment of support and maintenance to a party is appropriate, and in determining the nature, amount, length of term, and manner of payment, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including:
(A) The relative earning capacity, obligations, needs, and financial resources of each party, including income from pension, profit sharing or retirement plans and all other sources;
(B) The relative education and training of each party, the ability and opportunity of each party to secure such education and training, and the necessity of a party to secure further education and training to improve such party’s earning capacity to a reasonable level;
(C) The duration of the marriage;
(D) The age and mental condition of each party;
(E) The physical condition of each party, including, but not limited to, physical disability or incapacity due to a chronic debilitating disease.
(F) The extent to which it would be undesirable for a party to seek employment outside the home because such party will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage.
(G) The separate assets of each party, both real and personal, tangible and intangible;
(H) The provisions made with regard to the marital property as defined in See. 36-4-121;
(I) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage.
(J) The extent to which each party has made such tangible and intangible contributions to the marriage as monetary and homemaker contributions, and tangible and intangible contributions by a party to the education, training or *838 increased earning power of the other party;
(K) The relative fault of the parties in eases where the court, in its discretion, deems it appropriate to do so; and
(L) Such other factors, including the tax consequences to each party, as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties.
(2) An award of rehabilitative, temporary support and maintenance shall remain in the court’s control for the duration of such award, and may be increased, decreased, terminated, extended, or otherwise modified, upon a showing of substantial and material change in circumstances. Rehabilitative support and maintenance shall terminate upon the death of the recipient. Such support and maintenance shall also terminate upon the death of the payor unless otherwise specifically stated. The recipient of the support and maintenance shall have the burden of proving that all reasonable efforts at rehabilitation have been made and have been unsuccessful.

Alimony in futuro is a designation of alimony paid periodically, as distinguished from alimony in solido which is paid in a single lump sum of cash or property. Alimony in futuro, or periodic alimony is subject to the continuing control of the Trial Court, whereas alimony in solido or lump sum alimony is generally considered a final judgment, ordinarily unchangeable by the court after expiration of the time for appeal.

Alimony in futuro may be made subject to limitations or conditions, but it nevertheless remains subject to the control of the court. In this respect, rehabilitative alimony may be considered a species of alimony in futuro. It is paid periodically and remains subject to the control of the court. It distinguishing characteristic is the purpose for which it is awarded, which is to provide a temporary income during a period of adjustment and effort of the dependent spouse to become partially or totally self sufficient. During this period, the Court retains the authority to make appropriate adjustments in keeping with changing circumstances and developments.

If a dependent spouse does not satisfactorily strive for self sufficiency, the Court may withdraw part or all of the support allocated to finance rehabilitation. If the dependent spouse demonstrates complete inability to achieve even partial self sufficiency, the Court may grant alimony in futuro to provide for the needs of the dependent spouse.

If the dependent spouse achieves partial self sufficiency but demonstrates inability to achieve total self sufficiency, the Court may grant sufficient alimony in futuro to supplement the earning capacity of the dependent spouse.

Of course, all of the foregoing must be administered within the capability of the supporting spouse to provide the needed support.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
952 S.W.2d 836, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 175, 1997 WL 107170, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/loria-v-loria-tennctapp-1997.