Loria v. Cerniglia

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Loria v. Cerniglia

69 A.D.3d 583, 891 N.Y.2d 286

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 5, 2010

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 69 A.D.3d 583 (Loria v. Cerniglia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Loria v. Cerniglia, 69 A.D.3d 583, 891 N.Y.2d 286 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2010).

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Opinion

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the first cause of action, alleging legal malpractice, as time-barred. The action was commenced on August 14, 2008, and the three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]) began to run on August 12, 2005, when the plaintiff signed a consent to change attorney form, relieving the defendant as counsel in the underlying action (see Frost Line Refrig., Inc. v Gastwirth, Mirsky & Stein, LLP, 25 AD3d 532, 532-533 [2006]; Sommers v Cohen, 14 AD3d 691, 692 [2005]; Marro v Handwerker, Marchelos & Gayner, 1 AD3d 488 [2003]; Daniels v Lebit, 299 AD2d 310 [2002]).

However, the second cause of action, alleging that the defendant charged an excessive fee, was not duplicative of the first cause of action, and should not have been dismissed (see Boglia v Greenberg, 63 AD3d 973, 976 [2009]).

[584]*584The plaintiff’s remaining contentions are without merit. Rivera, J.E, Miller, Leventhal and Chambers, JJ., concur.

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The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the first cause of action, alleging legal malpractice, as time-barred. The action was commenced on August 14, 2008, and the three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]) began to run on August 12, 2005, when the plaintiff signed a consent to change attorney form, relieving the defendant as counsel in the underlying action (see Frost Line Refrig., Inc. v Gastwirth, Mirsky & Stein, LLP, 25 AD3d 532, 532-533 [2006]; Sommers v Cohen, 14 AD3d 691, 692 [2005]; Marro v Handwerker, Marchelos & Gayner, 1 AD3d 488 [2003]; Daniels v Lebit, 299 AD2d 310 [2002]).

However, the second cause of action, alleging that the defendant charged an excessive fee, was not duplicative of the first cause of action, and should not have been dismissed (see Boglia v Greenberg, 63 AD3d 973, 976 [2009]).

[584]*584The plaintiff’s remaining contentions are without merit. Rivera, J.E, Miller, Leventhal and Chambers, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

69 A.D.3d 583, 891 N.Y.2d 286, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/loria-v-cerniglia-nyappdiv-2010.

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