Loretta Coy v. Southwest Airlines Co., et al.

Opinion

LORETTA COY, Case No. 26-cv-02399-NW

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO v. DISMISS COUNTS I AND II

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO., et al., Re: ECF No. 15 Defendants.

Before the Court is Defendant Southwest Airlines Co.’s (“Southwest”) partial motion to dismiss Plaintiff Loretta Coy’s first amended complaint (“FAC”). Mot., ECF No. 15. For the reasons set forth below, Southwest’s motion is GRANTED and Counts I and II of the FAC are The facts of this action are straightforward.1 Plaintiff requires mobility assistance when travelling. While booking a trip with Southwest for November 30, 2023, Plaintiff requested disability accommodations “including, but not limited to loading, unloading and transferring with wheelchair [sic] assitance, regarding transferring between her arrival gate at the Norman Y. Mineta San Jose International Airport [(“SJC”)]and her departing gate.” FAC ¶ 14, ECF No. 14. In all communications between Plaintiff and Southwest prior to November 30, 2023, Southwest repeatedly assured her that it had arranged the necessary accommodations. Id. ¶ 15. But when Plaintiff arrived at SJC, she alleges that Southwest and the other Defendants “refused to provide mobility and/or disabled assistance.” Id. ¶ 16. As a result, Plaintiff was not afforded “the legally requested and required pre-boarding assistance, and transfer assistance between her arrival and departure gates.” Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiff attempted to take herself to her departure gate but allegedly fell and suffered injury. On November 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed suit against Southwest and dozens of Doe Defendants in Santa Clara County Superior Court. Plaintiff served Southwest on February 17, 2026, and Southwest timely removed the action to federal court. ECF No. 1. On April 22, 2026, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint that added G2 Secure Staff, L.L.C. as an additional Defendant. ECF No. 14. As of the date of this Order, G2 Secure Staff has not been served. Plaintiff’s FAC alleges four causes of action arising from the same conduct, including two causes of action under California antidiscrimination statutes: the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Count I) and the California Disabled Person Act (“CDPA”) (Count II). Southwest moves to dismiss those causes of action. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is designed to “test[ ] the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim can be based on either (1) the lack of a cognizable legal theory, or (2) insufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). When analyzing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the well-pled factual allegations are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009). Similarly, conclusory legal allegations are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In re Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff advances two reasons why the Court should deny Southwest’s motion: first, because the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the case (and should therefore remand the action to state court); and second, because Count II is not preempted by federal law. Neither are persuasive. A. Jurisdiction2 Plaintiff argues that this case should be remanded because the Court does not have jurisdiction over this suit. Both parties agree that Plaintiff’s claims arise under California law, and Southwest removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. At the time of removal,3 Southwest was the only named Defendant. For diversity purposes, Plaintiff is a citizen of California and Southwest is a citizen of Texas, see FAC, so there is complete diversity between the parties. Plaintiff claims that the Doe Defendants defeat diversity jurisdiction where, as here, she has alleged specific Doe’s to be California residents. Plaintiff is incorrect. The Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]he citizenship of fictitious defendants is disregarded for removal purposes and becomes relevant only if and when the plaintiff seeks leave to substitute a named defendant.” Soliman v. Philip Morris Inc., 311 F.3d 966, 971 (9th Cir. 2002). Likewise, the statute itself is clear: “In determining whether a civil action is removable on the basis of jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of [title 28], the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1).4 In sum, the Court is satisfied that diversity jurisdiction exists.

2 Although Plaintiff did not file a motion to remand and only raised the issue in its opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the question of remand for lack of diversity jurisdiction is properly before the Court. See Karambelas v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 992 F.2d 971, 973 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[R]aising the issue [of remand] in opposition to a motion to dismiss will suffice.”).

3 “[W]hether remand is proper must be ascertained on the basis of the pleadings at the time of removal.” Broadway Grill, Inc. v. Visa Inc., 856 F.3d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Williams v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 471 F.3d 975, 976 (9th Cir.2006) (holding that “post- removal amendments to the pleadings cannot affect whether a case is removable, because the propriety of removal is determined solely on the basis of the pleadings filed in state court”).

4 The Court acknowledges that other courts have found that the question of whether Doe defendants may destroy diversity to be a “convoluted and unsettled” one. Robinson v. Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC, No. 1:15-cv-1321-LJO-SMS, 2015 WL 13236883, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2015). At least one court has concluded that this question requires an assessment of whether Plaintiff’s “description of Doe [D]efendants or their activities is specific enough as to suggest their identity, citizenship, or relationship to the action.” Gardiner Family, LLC v. Crimson Res. Mgmt. Corp., No. 1:15-cv-751-LJO-JLT, 2015 WL 5646648, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2015). In this Court’s view, however, the clear language of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1) governs, and the Court B. Preemption Plaintiff concedes that, should this case remain in federal court, her first cause of action alleging a violation under the Unruh Civil Rights Act cannot stand. Opp. at 6, ECF No. 20. She maintains, however, that her CDPA claim survives. But neither claim can stand because antidiscrimination claims against an airline are generally field preempted by the Air Carrier Access Act (“ACAA”), 49 U.S.C. § 41705, which is an amendment to the Federal Aviation Act (“FAA”).5 “Federal law impliedly preempts state law when the state law ‘regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Government to occupy exclusively.’” Azocar v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 3d 788, 792 (C.D. Cal. 2021) (citation omitted). “Such an intent may be inferred from a scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.” English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (internal quotations omitted). In the field of aviation, courts should “more readily” infer preemption because aviation “is an area of law where the federal interest is dominant.” Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. United Airlines, Inc., 813 F.3d 718, 724 (9th Cir. 2016) (“National Federation”) (internal quotations omitted). In National Federation, the Ninth Circuit addressed the specific question currently before the Court, namely whether claims under the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the CDPA are preempted by the ACAA. There, plaintiffs alleged that the airline’s policy of using kiosks inaccessible to the blind violated these California antidiscrimination statutes. 813 F.3d at 723. The Ninth Circuit explicitly found that the ACAA “was intended to ensure nondiscriminatory treatment of airline passengers, whether on an airplane, in an airport, at a kiosk, or otherwise.” National Federation, 813 F.3d at 739 (internal citation and quotations omitted). In other words, because the ACAA and its implementing regulations pervasively and comprehensively regulate discrimination in the context of air travel, the Ninth Circuit found that plaintiff’s Unruh and CDPA claims were 5 Plaintiff does not explain why she only “agree[d] to abandon her” Unruh Act claim “[i]n the event the Court proceeds” to consider Southwest’s motion to dismiss. Whatever the reason, there impliedly field preempted under the ACAA. Two California district courts have applied National Federation on facts nearly identical to the instant action and both have found that field preemption applies. See Lagomarsino v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. CV193131DMGGJSX, 2020 WL 1955314 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2020) and Azocar v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 3d 788 (C.D. Cal. 2021). In both Lagomarsino and Azocar, a plaintiff sued their airline after each was denied wheelchair assistance when moving through an airport terminal. See Lagomarsino, 2020 WL 1955314, at *1. In Lagosmarsino, the court found plaintiff’s claims to be analogous to those asserted in National Federation and dismissed them as impliedly preempted by the ACAA. Id. at *3. Azocar, decided the following year, explicitly endorsed Lagosmarsino’s interpretation of National Federation. As the Azocar court stated, “[t]he ACAA comprehensively addresses discrimination with respect to assisting disabled passengers move through airports.” Azocar, 562 F. Supp. 3d at 794. The court continued: “As Congress has indicated its intent to occupy this field to the exclusion of state regulation, federal law impliedly field preempts Azocar’s claims under Unruh and CDPA.” Id. Tellingly, though while Southwest cites both cases liberally, Plaintiff’s opposition fails not only to reference or distinguish either case, but also fails to cite the Ninth Circuit controlling authority of National Federation. What’s more, Plaintiff’s preferred cases, Barnett and Burgess, are inapposite to the Court’s analysis. Barnett v. Cass, 522 F. Supp. 3d 780 (D. Haw. 2021) and Burgess v. Novictor Aviation LLC, No. CV 21-00242 JMS-WRP, 2021 WL 3510679 (D. Haw. Aug. 10, 2021). Neither case involved allegations of discrimination, and likewise did not include claims under state antidiscrimination statutes. The plaintiffs in Barnett and Burgess were victims of helicopter accidents and asserted only claims based in tort. The applicable Ninth Circuit case in tort cases is Gilstrap v. United Air Lines, Inc., 709 F.3d 995, 1006 (9th Cir. 2013), which “evaluated California tort claims, not the prescriptive statutory claims at issue here.” Azocar, 562 F. Supp. at 794. As the Azocar court explained:

Gilstrap found the ACAA preempted the state tort standard of care, elements of her claims—breach, causation, damages, and 1 remedies.”). In contrast, in National Federation, the Ninth Circuit evaluated ACAA preemption of Unruh and CDPA claims, like 2 Azocar asserts here, and concluded the claims were preempted. See Nat'l Fed’n, 813 F.3d at 723, 740 (finding the plaintiff's Unruh and 3 CDPA claims “impliedly field preempted under the ACAA”). 4 Id. Like the court in Azocar, the Court here is guided not by Gilstrap, but “by National 5 Federation’s evaluation of the same statutory claims.” /d. And like the Ninth Circuit in National 6 Federation, and the district courts in Lagomarsino and Azocar, the Court finds Plaintiffs 7 antidiscrimination claims preempted by the ACAA. 8 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Southwest’s motion to dismiss Counts I and II of 9 Plaintiffs FAC. And as no amendment can alter the deficiency regarding preemption, the Court 10 } DISMISSES those claims WITH PREJUDICE. 1] IV. CONCLUSION a 12 The Court DISMISSES Counts I and I of Plaintiff's FAC. Southwest shall file an Answer

13 to Counts II and IV of the FAC within 21 days of this Order. Plaintiff shall serve the remaining

Y 14 || named Defendant G2 Secure Services, and file proof of service accordingly, within the timeframe

15 set forth by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), i.e., no later than July 21, 2026. Qa 16 IT IS SO ORDERED.

17 Dated: July 2, 2026

Z 18 19 Noél Wise United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28