Lorenzo Ramirez v. the State of Texas

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00251-CR

LORENZO RAMIREZ, APPELLANT V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 154th District Court Lamb County, Texas

Trial Court No. DCR-5972-20, Honorable Felix Klein, Presiding

August 31, 2026

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.

Texas Rule of Evidence 614, commonly known as “The Rule,” provides that “[a]t a party’s request, the court must order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear other witnesses’ testimony.” Its purpose is to prevent the testimony of one witness from

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influencing another’s.1 With articles 36.03(a)2 and 56A.051(b)3 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, however, the Legislature made exceptions for crime victims, their guardians, and others, subject to the court’s approval. Here, the mother of a seventeen- year-old sexual assault complainant testified, and the trial court then permitted her to remain in the courtroom and hear her daughter’s testimony. We hold that the court acted within its discretion to do so.

Appellant, Lorenzo Ramirez, appeals from a judgment of conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a young child.4 A jury found him guilty and assessed punishment at confinement for life. Appellant raises two issues. He first argues that permitting the complainant’s mother to remain in the courtroom after she testified violated Rule of Evidence 614. He next argues that Code of Criminal Procedure article 56A.051(b) is unconstitutional, facially and as applied, a challenge he concedes was never presented to the trial court. We affirm.

1 Webb v. State, 766 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).

2 Article 36.03(a) provides: “(a) Notwithstanding Rule 614, Texas Rules of Evidence, a court at the

request of a party may order the exclusion of a witness who for the purposes of the prosecution is a victim, close relative of a deceased victim, or guardian of a victim only if the witness is to testify and the court determines that the testimony of the witness would be materially affected if the witness hears other testimony at the trial.” (emphasis added).

3 Article 56A.051(b) provides: “A victim, guardian of a victim, or close relative of a deceased victim

is entitled to the right to be present at all public court proceedings related to the offense, subject to the approval of the judge in the case.”

4See TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02.

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BACKGROUND

In September 2019, A.G. received a Snapchat message that her eleven-year-old daughter, R.M., had sent her by mistake.5 What she saw prompted her to look through the phone, where she found a message suggesting that R.M. was being sexually abused by her uncle, Appellant. A.G. took her daughter to the police department that day; a forensic interview and a sexual-assault nurse examination followed. During the forensic interview, R.M. described several acts of sexual abuse committed by Appellant, beginning when she was six. The sexual assault examination documented that R.M. had a torn and scarred hymen, a finding the nurse characterized as a definitive penetrating injury.

Appellant was indicted for continuous sexual abuse of a young child. He pleaded not guilty. When trial began in 2025, R.M. was seventeen years old and living with her mother. Appellant invoked Rule 614 at the outset of the evidentiary portion of trial.

A.G. testified about the Snapchat message that prompted the investigation and about her relationship with Appellant. She also confirmed that Appellant lived in the family home during the period of the alleged abuse. She explained that R.M. never made an outcry to her, that she did not press her daughter for details, and that she left that work to the police. She also testified that she had trusted Appellant and did not want to believe the allegations. Both sides examined her at length.

When her testimony concluded, the State asked that A.G. be permitted to remain in the courtroom as the guardian of the victim. Appellant objected. He argued that A.G.

5 We use initials to protect the child victim from identification.

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remained subject to recall, that no purpose was served by her hearing further evidence, and that the State could furnish her a transcript after the verdict. The State responded that both parties had already extensively questioned A.G. about what she knew, and that the only question was whether her testimony would be materially affected by what she heard. The trial court observed that A.G.’s testimony was “pretty well locked in to her story” and that it did not know how her testimony could materially change. The court allowed A.G. to stay.

The forensic interviewer testified next. Before R.M. took the stand the next day, Appellant re-urged his objection that A.G. had by then heard from the interviewer what happened to her daughter and had no further reason to remain. The trial court overruled the objection. A.G. was never recalled.

R.M. testified in detail to multiple acts of abuse by Appellant. The investigating officer, the detective, the examining nurse, and a psychologist who had treated R.M. for several years also testified. The defense called a CPS investigator, who testified about an investigation of physical abuse by R.M.’s stepfather. During that investigation, R.M. denied any sexual touching. She later identified a teenage neighbor as someone who had poked her buttocks over her clothing. Appellant’s brother and mother testified they had seen nothing concerning and that R.M. had never reported sexual abuse to them. Appellant testified and denied the allegations.

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ANALYSIS

Constitutionality of Article 56A.051(b)

We begin with Appellant’s second issue as it has the potential to dispose of the first. Here, Appellant complains that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure art. 56A.051(b) is unconstitutional, facially and as applied.6 He concedes, however, that neither challenge was lodged in the trial court. Our review confirms that nothing was preserved.

Nearly every appellate complaint requires a timely and specific objection as a prerequisite. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. In criminal cases, whether an objection is required depends on the nature of the right asserted. The Court of Criminal Appeals has sorted those rights into three categories. The first consists of absolute, systemic requirements, which cannot be waived or forfeited. The second consists of rights that must be implemented unless expressly waived. The third consists of rights that are implemented only upon request, and that are forfeited by inaction. Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 279–80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); see Proenza v. State, 541 S.W.3d 786, 792 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).

Rule of Evidence 614 belongs to the third category. The court must order witnesses excluded “[a]t a party’s request” or on the court’s own motion. TEX. R. EVID. 614. By its terms, then, exclusion of a trial witness from the courtroom is neither a systemic rule nor a requirement a defendant must expressly relinquish. Ladd v. State illustrates the point. 3 S.W.3d 547, 566 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). There, the victim’s parents heard the testimony of other witnesses before taking the stand. Id. The Court of

6 Appellant does not challenge the constitutionality of article 36.03.

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Criminal Appeals reviewed the complaint as ordinary non-constitutional error and required a showing of harm. It declined to reach Appellant’s due process challenge to the exemption because the argument had not been raised in the trial court. Id. (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1).

As in Ladd, Appellant’s constitutional challenges were never presented to the trial court. His objection there was that A.G. should not remain in the courtroom because The Rule had been invoked and she was subject to recall. He did not argue that article 56A.051(b) was unconstitutional. Nor did he argue that A.G.’s presence denied him due process, the right of confrontation, or the effective assistance of counsel.

Nor may Appellant avoid these principles by casting his complaint as a facial challenge. When the statute at issue governs the procedure for taking testimony at trial, a facial challenge must also be raised in the trial court. Wyatt v. State, 268 S.W.3d 270, 273 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, no pet.).7 Article 56A.051(b) is such a statute.

We hold that Appellant preserved an evidentiary objection under Rule 614, and nothing more. We overrule his second issue.

Rule of Evidence 614

Whether a guardian may remain in the courtroom is a matter the Legislature has expressly left to the trial court. Article 36.03 conditions exclusion on the court’s determination that the witness’s testimony would be materially affected. Article 56A.051(b) makes the guardian’s presence subject to the approval of the judge in the

7 See also Runningwolf v. State, 317 S.W.3d 829, 839 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010), aff’d, 360 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (as-applied challenge must be raised in the trial court to be preserved).

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case. We therefore review the ruling for an abuse of discretion. Cf. Batiste v. State, No. AP-76,600, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 657, at *29 (Tex. Crim. App. June 5, 2013); Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35, 50 (Tex. Crim. App.1996) (en banc). A court abuses its discretion only when its ruling falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. State v. Heath, 696 S.W.3d 677, 688–89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). We do not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s. Id.

Article 36.03(a) displaces Rule 614 for a guardian of a victim, allowing their presence in the courtroom unless the witness is to testify and the court determines that the testimony would be materially affected by hearing other testimony at trial. The threshold question is whether A.G. was R.M.’s guardian within its meaning.

Per statute, a child is a person under eighteen years of age who is not and has not been married and whose disabilities of minority have not been removed. TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.003(a). Parents of a minor child hold the rights and duties of care, control, protection, and decision-making unless a court has terminated or limited those rights. Id. § 151.001. R.M. was seventeen at the time of trial and lived with her mother. Nothing suggests that A.G.’s parental rights had been terminated or limited. A.G. was R.M.’s legal guardian.8

Moreover, the conditions for excluding a guardian under article 36.03(a) were never met. Exclusion is permitted only when two things are true: the witness must be one who “is to testify,” and the court must determine that her testimony would be materially

8 Although he never made the argument at trial, Appellant now argues that because R.M. was

seventeen, she should have been treated as an adult. He provides no support for this statement. As noted, majority is attained at eighteen. TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.003(a).

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affected by hearing other testimony at trial. Here, A.G. had already testified when the State asked that she be allowed to remain. Even though A.G. was subject to recall, the trial court weighed that possibility and found she was “pretty well locked in to her story,” adding that it did not know how her testimony could materially change. Events bore out the trial court’s assessment. A.G. never returned to the stand.

The trial court applied the statute the Legislature wrote. Permitting A.G. to remain in the courtroom after her testimony fell within the zone of reasonable disagreement. We find no error and overrule Appellant’s first issue.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled Appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Lawrence M. Doss

Justice

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