Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 552 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CR-23-791
Opinion Delivered November 6, 2024
LORENZO LAMONT ALLEN APPEAL FROM THE CRITTENDEN APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 18CR-23-108] V. HONORABLE RANDY F. PHILHOURS, JUDGE STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE AFFIRMED; REMANDED TO CORRECT SENTENCING ORDER
KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge
Appellant Lorenzo Lamont Allen appeals after he was convicted by a Crittenden
County Circuit Court jury of first-degree murder with a firearm employed during the
commission of the offense, terroristic act, and six counts of aggravated assault. He was
sentenced to serve an aggregate of 780 months’ incarceration. On appeal, appellant
contends that (1) the circuit court erred when it denied his motion for directed verdict; and
(2) the circuit court erred in allowing testimony in violation of Arkansas Rules of Evidence
404(b) and 403. We affirm appellant’s convictions but remand for the limited purpose of
correcting the sentencing order.
I. Relevant Facts
Late in the evening on October 29, 2022, appellant went to Donna Christley’s home
to insist that he be allowed to speak with Donna’s daughter, Tiara Christley. Appellant shot and killed Donna underneath the carport of her home and fired a second shot into Donna’s
home with Donna’s two adult daughters and four minor grandchildren inside. Appellant
was arrested and charged by amended criminal information with first-degree murder in
violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-10-102 (Supp. 2023), a Class Y felony;
terroristic act in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-13-310 (Repl. 2013), a Class
B felony; and six counts of aggravated assault in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated
section 5-13-204 (Supp. 2023), a Class D felony. The State alleged that appellant’s sentence
should be enhanced pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-120 (Supp. 2023)
for having employed a firearm as a means of committing the felony offense and pursuant to
Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-702 (Supp. 2023) for having committed a felony
involving homicide in the presence of a child.
Prior to trial, on July 24, 2023, the State filed a motion in limine to admit evidence
of appellant’s prior bad acts against Tiara Christley that occurred on August 2, 2022, and
September 27, 2022. The State argued that the evidence showed that appellant had “a
history of carrying a firearm and firing at the victim’s family” and was therefore “relevant to
the issue of [appellant’s] mental state at the time of the shooting and also [to] indicate plan,
motive, opportunity and absence of mistake or accident” under Arkansas Rule of Evidence
404(b). Appellant opposed the State’s motion, arguing that evidence of the events that
occurred on August 2, 2022, and September 27, 2022, were not independently relevant
because the prior incidents “involve[ed] a third party and not the actual victim in this
matter,” and even if the evidence were relevant, its probative value was substantially
2 outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. After a pretrial conference, the circuit court
ruled that it would take the matter under advisement and rule on it when the issue arose
during trial.
A jury trial was held on August 22–23, 2023, and the following evidence was
presented. Tiara testified that she and appellant met on a dating website in May 2022. They
dated until she broke up with him two or three months later. On October 29, 2022,
following her older sister’s funeral, and after working for Door Dash, Tiara went to her
mother’s home, where her twelve-year-old child was staying. Also at the home that evening
was Donna Christley, Tiara’s mother; Kiara Christley, Tiara’s twin sister; and Kiara’s three
minor children, ages ten, seven, and four.
Tiara testified that appellant started “calling and calling” late that evening. She
answered to tell him that she was unavailable and would call him back. At that time, Tiara
was in the living room with the children preparing them for bed, and Donna and Kiara were
in the bedrooms. Appellant called a few more times, and Tiara eventually answered, but she
refused appellant’s repeated demands that she “come outside.” Tiara testified that at that
point, the carport door “swung open” as she and the children were attempting to sleep in
the living room of the house. Appellant walked into the house, took hold of Tiara’s arms,
and pulled her toward the door. Tiara testified that he “was tugging pretty hard,” causing
her to fall into a table. The noise from the struggle between appellant and Tiara ultimately
caused Kiara and Donna to come out of their bedrooms, and the four of them walked into
the kitchen, where appellant was “steadily telling [Donna] that he wants to talk to [Tiara].”
3 Donna responded that Tiara did not want to talk to him, and then she took appellant outside
to talk.
Tiara and Kiara later followed them outside. Tiara said that she had planned to “get
in [her] car and leave” because “[appellant] came there for [her] and [her] mom was trying . .
. [to] talk him down and tell him that he was to go, and he [was] still there.” Appellant,
however, prevented Tiara from driving away by holding her car door open. After Tiara and
Kiara went back into the house, they watched and listened to the conversation between
appellant and Donna on a monitor showing live views from the surveillance cameras “set up
around the house,” including the carport. According to Tiara, the monitor was located next
to the door leading to the carport, and they could see and hear “everything . . . going on.”
Tiara described the conversation between Donna and appellant as initially “calm,”
but frustrations became high when Donna stood in front of the carport door and told
appellant he could not go back into the house. According to Tiara, her mother “was getting
frustrated,” and appellant “was already frustrated trying to get a point across, and [her] mom
kept telling him to leave[.]” Then, as Donna continued to stand at the carport door with
appellant, Tiara saw appellant pull a “black handgun with [an] extended clip” from the
waistband of his pants and fire two shots “right behind one another.” The first shot was
fired in Donna’s direction, causing her to fall. The second shot went in “the window under
the carport [to the living room] where the kids sleep.”
Tiara testified that she and her sister then braced themselves against the carport door
as appellant attempted to kick his way inside. When he failed to gain entry through the
4 carport door, appellant went to the back deck door and started trying to kick that in. Tiara
stated that she, her sister, and their children ran to the back of the house and hid in
bedrooms until the police arrived.
State’s exhibit 32, video-surveillance footage from the house next door, was played for
the jury as Tiara testified. The neighbor’s camera was directed toward Donna’s carport.
Although it did not clearly show appellant shoot Donna since they had moved further
underneath the carport by that point, it depicted several of the other events that Tiara
described in her testimony, including appellant holding Tiara’s car door open and
preventing her from leaving. Tiara identified appellant as the man in the video that was
played for the jury, and she told the jury that she could identify appellant “because [she]
dated him” and knew “exactly what he looked like.”
Over appellant’s objection, Tiara further testified about the two previous incidents
involving appellant that occurred on August 2, 2022, and September 27, 2022. Appellant
and the State repeated their same arguments about the issue as they did at the pretrial
conference, and the circuit court overruled appellant’s objection. Tiara testified that on
August 2, 2022, after she broke up with appellant, appellant unexpectedly appeared at her
house. She said that she immediately “called the [police] and told them that [her] ex-
boyfriend was trying to break into [her] house, and that he had a gun.” Tiara testified that
appellant appeared again at her house on September 27, 2022. This time, he broke her back
window and entered her house. Tiara testified that appellant was armed with a black gun
“with an extended clip” and refused her numerous requests to leave. Tiara testified that she
5 was able to finally leave when she took her children to school. When she was driving back
and stopped at a stop sign, she saw appellant pull out his gun and shoot at her. She “pulled
off,” and none of appellant’s shots ended up hitting her or her vehicle.
Detective Chad Davis, the lead detective from the West Memphis Police Department,
testified that when he first arrived, he saw Donna on her back underneath the carport. There
was blood on her head and on the ground next to her head. Detective Davis explained that
he found two 9mm shell casings next to Donna’s body. He also found bullet fragments
located behind the couch inside the house. Detective Davis was subsequently able to review
and download the surveillance video from the residence next door that had been played for
the jury.
Detective Nicholas Anderson, also a detective with the West Memphis Police
Department, testified that he interviewed Tiara and Kiara. He confirmed that Tiara and
Kiara both identified appellant as the individual who had shot Donna after the photographic
lineups.
Dr. Jennifer Forsyth, a forensic pathologist and the medical examiner who examined
Donna’s body, confirmed that she was killed by a single gunshot wound to her head and that
the manner of death was homicide. She opined that Donna was shot from within one to
three feet away.
Steve Hargis, employed as an expert in firearms and toolmarks by the Arkansas State
Crime Laboratory, testified that he examined a copper jacket from a bullet, a lead core from
a bullet, a damaged copper jacket fragment from a bullet, a damaged lead core fragment, and
6 two expended cartridge cases. Hargis testified that the lead core and the lead core fragment
were of no value for microscopic comparison examination. However, he determined that
the damaged jacket from the victim, the damaged copper jacket fragment, and the two
expended cartridge cases were all fired from the same firearm.
After the State rested, appellant moved for a directed verdict on all counts. Relevant
to the issues on appeal, appellant argued that the State failed to prove that appellant’s actions
were purposeful as required to commit the offenses of first-degree murder, terroristic act,
and aggravated assault. The circuit court denied the motion, and appellant then rested
without introducing any further evidence. Appellant renewed his motion for directed
verdict, which the circuit court also denied.
The jury found appellant guilty of first-degree murder, terroristic act, and six counts
of aggravated assault; the jury also found that appellant had employed a firearm during the
commission of the offense. He was sentenced to serve an aggregate of 780 months’
incarceration. This appeal followed.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
We treat a motion for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence. Armstrong v. State, 2020 Ark. 309, 607 S.W.3d 491. In reviewing a sufficiency
challenge, we assess the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and consider only
the evidence that supports the verdict. Id. We will affirm a judgment of conviction if
substantial evidence exists to support it. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence that is of
sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one
7 way or the other without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id. Circumstantial evidence
may provide a basis to support a conviction, but it must be consistent with the defendant’s
guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Collins v. State, 2021 Ark. 35,
617 S.W.3d 701. Whether the evidence excludes every other hypothesis is left to the jury to
decide. Id. Further, the credibility of witnesses is an issue for the jury, not the court; the
trier of fact is free to believe all or part of any witness’s testimony and may resolve questions
of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence. Armstrong, supra.
This court has noted that a criminal defendant’s intent or state of mind is seldom
apparent. Benton v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 223, 599 S.W.3d 353. One’s intent or purpose,
being a state of mind, can seldom be positively known to others, so it ordinarily cannot be
shown by direct evidence but may be inferred from the facts and circumstances. Id. Because
intent cannot be proved by direct evidence, the fact-finder is allowed to draw on common
knowledge and experience to infer it from the circumstances. Id. Because of the difficulty
in ascertaining a defendant’s intent or state of mind, a presumption exists that a person
intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her acts. Id.
In relevant part, a person commits the crime of first-degree murder if “[w]ith a purpose
of causing the death of another person, the person causes the death of another person[.]”
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-103(a)(2) (Repl. 2013). “A person commits a terroristic act if, while
not in the commission of a lawful act, the person . . . [s]hoots at an occupiable structure with
the purpose to cause injury to a person or damage to property.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-
310(a). “A person acts purposely with respect to his or her conduct or a result of his or her
8 conduct when it is the person’s conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to
cause the result[.]” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202(1) (Repl. 2013).
On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
convictions for first-degree murder and terroristic act. He argues as he did below that he
lacked the purposeful intent to harm anyone and states that Tiara even testified at trial that
he said that he was on the property because he wanted to talk to her. However, appellant’s
argument ignores the other testimony presented from which the jury could infer his intent.
Tiara testified that she watched appellant on the monitor pull a black handgun from his
waistband and fire the first shot at her mother and the second shot into the window under
the carport into the living room where the children were sleeping. Appellant knew that
Tiara, Kiara, and children were in the house when he fired the second shot into the house.
Further, the medical examiner opined that Donna had been shot from within one to three
feet away. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold that
substantial evidence supports the verdict and affirm.
III. Prior Bad Acts
Next, appellant argues that the circuit court erred in allowing Tiara to testify regarding
the August 2, 2022, and September 27, 2022, incidents in violation of Arkansas Rules of
Evidence 404(b) and 403. He more specifically argues that the prior bad acts were not
independently relevant to the main issue but were introduced to merely prove that he was a
criminal. Appellant explains that the prior incidents related to Tiara and therefore were not
relevant to prove his intent to shoot Donna. Moreover, he argues that the incidents were
9 “more confusing and prejudicial than probative.” Appellant finally argues that any error
could not be held harmless because the evidence was prejudicial and confused the jury
regarding who the victim was in this case and because the evidence against him was not
overwhelming. We disagree.
The admission or rejection of testimony is a matter within the circuit court’s sound
discretion and will not be reversed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of that discretion and
a showing of prejudice to the defendant. Gonzales v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 600, 589 S.W.3d
505. An abuse of discretion is a high threshold that does not simply require error in the
circuit court’s decision but requires that the circuit court acted improvidently, thoughtlessly,
or without due consideration. Id.
Arkansas Rules of Evidence 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.” Therefore, evidence is not admissible under Rule 404(b) simply to show a prior
bad act. Vance v. State, 2011 Ark. 243, 383 S.W.3d 325. Rather, the test for admissibility
under Rule 404(b) is whether the evidence is independently relevant, which means it must
have a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Id. Any
circumstance that links a defendant to the crime or raises a possible motive for the crime is
independently relevant and admissible under Rule 404(b). Id.
10 The analysis of whether evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) is not resolved in a
vacuum. Gonzales, supra. While evidence of other crimes or bad acts may be independently
relevant and therefore admissible under Rule 404(b), that evidence must also be probative
and satisfy Rule 403. This court gives considerable leeway to the circuit court to determine
whether the circumstances of the prior crimes and the crimes at hand are sufficiently similar
to warrant admission under Rule 404(b). See Vance, supra; Sasser v. State, 321 Ark. 438, 902
S.W.2d 773 (1995). When offered as Rule 404(b) evidence, the prior bad act need not have
the degree of similarity that is required for evidence of modus operandi. Fells v. State, 362
Ark. 77, 207 S.W.3d 498 (2005).
Arkansas Rule of Evidence 403 provides that “evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Our supreme court has noted that evidence
offered by the State in a criminal trial is likely to be prejudicial to the defendant to some
degree, otherwise it would not be offered. Vance, supra; Rounsaville v. State, 2009 Ark. 479,
346 S.W.3d 289. Nevertheless, the evidence should not be excluded under Rule 403 unless
the defendant can show that the evidence lacks probative value in view of the risk of unfair
prejudice. Vance, supra. This court reviews a circuit court’s ruling under Rule 403 for an
abuse of discretion. Id. While the Rule 404(b) evidence here may have been prejudicial, as
most 404(b) evidence is, the question under Rule 403 is whether its probative value was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
11 We agree with the State that the evidence here was independently relevant under
Rule 404(b) and that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. Contrary to his argument, appellant’s previous conduct toward Tiara was
directly related to his conduct on October 29, 2022. Appellant was charged with and
convicted of first-degree murder, terroristic act, and six counts of aggravated assault against
Tiara, Kiara, and the four children inside the house. In other words, Donna was not the
only victim as appellant attempts to allege. The evidence of appellant’s previous two attempts
to force contact with Tiara and his attempt to shoot at Tiara’s vehicle when he failed to
succeed were independently relevant to prove his motive and intent in Donna’s murder as
well as his lack of mistake or accident in the commission of the terroristic act and aggravated
assaults. On October 29, 2022, just like before, appellant insisted on talking to Tiara.
However, after Donna stood in his way and repeatedly told him to leave, appellant shot her
and then shot into the house when he knew Tiara, Kiara, and the children were inside.
Accordingly, we cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting this
evidence.
Moreover, we agree with the State that any error was harmless. We have held that
even if a circuit court errs in admitting evidence, when the evidence of guilt is overwhelming
and the error is slight, we can declare that the error was harmless and affirm the conviction.
Williams v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 507, 505 S.W.3d 234. Here, overwhelming evidence
supported appellant’s convictions. Tiara positively identified appellant as the man whom
she saw shoot her mother and fire a second shot into the living room of the house. The jury
12 also saw the surveillance video from the neighbor’s house that corroborated Tiara’s
testimony. As such, even if there was any error in admitting the evidence about the incidents
that occurred on August 2, 2022, and September 27, 2022, the error was harmless, and we
affirm.
IV. Sentencing Order
Finally, we note that appellant’s sentencing order contains a clerical error that must
be corrected. Although it is undisputed that appellant was sentenced to serve an aggregate
of 780 months’ imprisonment and the sentencing order accurately reflects his sentences for
each conviction, the sentencing order erroneously calculates that appellant was sentenced to
serve an aggregate of 1212 months’ imprisonment. We therefore remand for the circuit
court to correct the amended sentencing order. See Palmer v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 178, 663
S.W.3d 436 (remanding the case to the circuit court for the limited purpose of entering an
amended sentencing order that corrects a clerical error).
Affirmed; remanded to correct sentencing order.
ABRAMSON and VIRDEN, JJ., agree.
Dusti Standridge, for appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Lauren Elizabeth Heil, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.