Lorenz v. Waldron

31 P. 54, 96 Cal. 243, 1892 Cal. LEXIS 936
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 23, 1892
DocketNo. 14895
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 31 P. 54 (Lorenz v. Waldron) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lorenz v. Waldron, 31 P. 54, 96 Cal. 243, 1892 Cal. LEXIS 936 (Cal. 1892).

Opinion

Vanclief, C.

— Action to enjoin defendant from running a tunnel into the side of a mountain, under plaintiffs’ water-ditch. The judgment was in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding a perpetual injunction; and defendant has appealed from the judgment, and from an order denying his motion for a new trial.

The plaintiffs’ ditch was constructed along the side of a mountain, on the public land of the United States, for mining purposes; and it is not questioned that, [244]*244under acts of Congress, plaintiffs had acquired the right of way for, and were entitled to maintain, their ditch as constructed.

The court found that on the thirtieth day of October, 1886, the defendant located a mining claim on the side of the mountain, extending across and below the plaintiffs’ ditch; that for the purpose of prospecting this mining claim, the defendant had run a tunnel into the mountain, beneath plaintiffs’ ditch, extending about fifty feet beyond a vertical plane drawn on the line of the ditch. The floor of this tunnel is thirty-five to forty feet, vertically, lower than the bottom of the ditch. At the back end of the tunnel the bed-rock inclined downwards, indicating, as defendant believed, the existence of a back pay-channel,” so low that it could not be mined through this tunnel, on account of water. He therefore abandoned it more than two years before the commencement of this action. The plaintiffs made no objection to the running of this tunnel before it was abandoned by defendant. Afterwards, defendant made several open cuts into the side of the mountain, below plaintiffs’ ditch, from ten to twenty feet in length, for the purpose of prospecting his claim, to which no objection was made by plaintiffs while they were being made. How nearly any of these cuts approached the ditch does not appear. Having answered the purpose for which they were made, these open cuts were also abandoned. . Afterwards, defendant commenced another tunnel, about three hundred feet, horizontally, from a vertical plane drawn on the line of the tunnel first above mentioned, and forty-eight feet four inches, vertically, lower than plaintiffs’ ditch. After driving this lower tunnel in, very nearly horizontally, a distance of twenty-nine feet, this action was commenced, and defendant was enjoined from continuing it, pendente lite; and by the final judgment he was “perpetually enjoined and restrained from digging or excavating any tunnel or tunnels under and beneath ” plaintiffs’ ditch.

It was not alleged, nor found by the court, that plain[245]*245tiffs’ ditch had been injured, nor that plaintiffs had sustained any damage from any work done by defendant before the commencement of the action; and, of course, there is no judgment for damages. The sole object of the suit is to obtain a perpetual injunction against threatened future injuries to plaintiffs’ ditch. The only threat or intention of the defendant which the evidence tended to prove was to drive his lower tunnel in the direction in which he had started it, to and beyond a point vertically beneath plaintiffs’ ditch, for the purpose of tapping what he believed to be a “pay-channel” running through his mining claim.

The court found that “ defendant is engaged in running tunnels, starting at a point about fifty feet below said ditch, and that he threatens to continue to run said tunnels beneath the bottom of said ditch; .... that if defendant is permitted to dig and excavate the above-named tunnels, great and irreparable injury will result to plaintiffs, for which pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief; .... that said second tunnel, if not properly constructed, would be dangerous to the safety of said ditch, and would cause the waters of said ditch to percolate through the roof of said tunnel, and thereby endanger its safety; .... that said ditch would be in danger of destruction if said tunnel is permitted to be constructed in the manner now pursued by defendant”; and that defendant is insolvent.

These findings, except the insolvency, are excepted to, on the ground that they are not justified by the evidence, and I think the exceptions are well taken, to the extent hereinafter defined.

1. There is no evidence tending to prove that defendant was “engaged in running tunnels,” or more than one tunnel; nor did the evidence tend to prove that he threatened to “ continue to run said tunnels,” or any tunnel, except his lower tunnel, which, if continued in its course, will pass under plaintiffs’ ditch at a point about forty-six feet vertically below it.

2. The finding that if defendant is permitted to con[246]*246tinue the construction of his second (lower) tunnel,.“said ditch would be in danger of destruction,” construed to mean that there is a reasonable probability of the effect predicted, is not justified by the evidence.

Eight experienced miners, on the part of the defend, ant, testified that, in their opinion, the extension of the lower tunnel beyond a vertical line from the ditch would not injure the ditch, and also, that even the upper tunnel would never injure the ditch. As grounds for their opinion, they testified, among other things, that the earth in which the ditch was dug, and under it, was composed of clay and’broken rocks; that the upper tunnel had stood more than two years without injury to the ditch; that there was still about twenty feet of solid ground between the upper tunnel and the ditch; that the upper tunnel was partly in bed-rock where it passed the ditch; and that the lower tunnel was partly in bed-rock at a distance of twenty-nine feet from its mouth.

Five witnesses, on the part of the plaintiffs, testified on this point, substantially, as follows:—

Mr. Johnson: “Where a ditch is passing over it (tunnel), it would be more apt to cave.....In my opinion, as a miner, the effect of the running of these tunnels under the ditch, I think it would be an injury to the ditch. I think it would be likely to make it cave down, from the nature of the ground it was in.....The effect of water percolating through ground of this character is to loosen it and cause it to cave; it also causes it to slide..... The second tunnel is three hundred feet farther down stream.
“Q. Did that tend to weaken the «bank at all, where the upper tunnel was? A. No, sir.
“ Q,. Did the upper tunnel tend to weaken the bank where the lower tunnel was? A. No, sir.
“Q. There could be no relative connection between the two with reference to the caving or sliding? A. No, sir.
“Q,. Each one would have to occasion its own particu[247]*247lar injury by weakening the bank? A. Yes, sir; I think so.
“ Q. How could it cause a slide? A. By caving down from the roof.
“ Q. That would be a mere possibility? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. It might happen, or it might not? A. It might happen, or it might not.
“Q. Then this is a mere conjecture on your part; that it would happen? A. Certainly; because it has not happened yet. That tunnel was run two years ago and over, and we have had two very excessive seasons since then.”
Mr. Day: “ Q. What is the effect of running a tunnel under the bottom of a ditch? A. It has a bad effect if it has water in it.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
31 P. 54, 96 Cal. 243, 1892 Cal. LEXIS 936, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lorenz-v-waldron-cal-1892.