1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Richard Allen Lorencz, Jr., No. CV-19-05630-PHX-DWL
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14
15 16 At issue is the denial of Plaintiff Richard Allen Lorencz, Jr.’s application for 17 disability insurance benefits by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) under the 18 Social Security Act. Plaintiff filed a complaint (Doc. 1) with this Court seeking judicial 19 review of that denial, and the Court now addresses Plaintiff’s Opening Brief (Doc. 12, “Pl. 20 Br.”) Defendant SSA Commissioner’s Response Brief (Doc. 13, “Def. Br.”), and Plaintiff’s 21 Reply Brief (Doc. 16, “Reply”). The Court has reviewed the briefs and Administrative 22 Record (Doc. 11, “R.”) and now affirms the Administrative Law Judge’s decision (R. at 23 18–30) as upheld by the Appeals Council (Id. at 1–3). 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits on November 3, 2015, 26 for a period of disability beginning on May 30, 2013. (R. at 18.) His claim was denied 27 initially on March 10, 2016, and upon reconsideration on October 11, 2016. (Id.) Plaintiff 28 appeared before the ALJ for a hearing regarding his claim on June 20, 2018. (Id.) 1 On December 6, 2018, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s claim. (Id. at 2 30.) The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s disability based on the following severe impairments: 3 lumbar radiculopathy, lumbar degenerative disc disease, and lumbar post laminectomy 4 syndrome. (Id. at 20.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff “did not have an impairment or 5 combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed 6 impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (Id. at 22.) Next, the ALJ 7 calculated Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) as follows: “[Plaintiff] had the 8 [RFC] to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except: [Plaintiff] could 9 not be exposed to dangerous machinery and unprotected heights. [Plaintiff] could 10 occasionally climb ramps and stairs, kneel, crouch, and crawl. [Plaintiff] could never climb 11 ladders, ropes, and scaffolds.” (Id. at 23.) Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was 12 not disabled from May 2013 (the alleged disability onset date) through December 31, 2017 13 (the date last insured) because he could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in 14 the national economy, including housekeeper, office helper, and fast food worker. (Id. at 15 28-29.) 16 On September 18, 2019, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review 17 and adopted the ALJ’s decision as the agency’s final decision. (Id. at 1–3.) 18 II. LEGAL STANDARD 19 In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court reviews only 20 those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 21 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination 22 only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 23 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a 24 reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion considering the record 25 as a whole. Id. To determine whether substantial evidence supports a decision, the Court 26 must consider the record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific 27 quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. Generally, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to 28 more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s 1 conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) 2 (citations omitted). 3 To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ 4 follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of 5 proof on the first four steps but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett 6 v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether 7 the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. 8 § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe” 9 medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). At 10 step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 11 impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P 12 of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically 13 found to be disabled. Id. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC and determines 14 whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. 15 § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where she 16 determines whether the claimant can perform any other work in the national economy 17 based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. 18 § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If not, the claimant is disabled. Id. 19 III. ANAYSIS 20 In Part A of the “Legal Argument” section of his opening brief, entitled 21 “Introduction,” Plaintiff seems to suggest that he is raising four assignments of error on 22 appeal. (Pl. Br. at 4 [“The ALJ erred by: 1) rejecting the medical opinion of Dr. Briggs, 23 examining physician, of disabling limitations; 2) rejecting Lorencz’s self-reports; 3) failing 24 to explain why the objective data was believed to be inconsistent with medical opinion and 25 reported symptoms; and 4) failing to address statutory factors when weighing evidence.”].) 26 However, the “Legal Argument” section of the brief only contains two additional 27 headings—Part B pertains to the first assignment of error, the rejection of Dr. Briggs’s 28 opinion (id. at 4-10), and Part C pertains to the second assignment of error, the rejection of 1 Plaintiff’s symptom testimony (id. at 10-25). Moreover, Part C contains an array of 2 subheadings that identify various errors the ALJ allegedly committed when rejecting 3 Plaintiff’s symptom testimony, and Plaintiff repeatedly argues under those subheadings 4 that the ALJ failed to provide sufficient explanations and/or to address statutory factors. 5 Thus, the Court construes the third and fourth issues identified in the “Introduction” section 6 of Plaintiff’s brief not as standalone assignments of error, but as descriptions of the types 7 of errors that the ALJ allegedly made when rejecting Dr. Briggs’s opinion and Plaintiff’s 8 symptom testimony.1 9 A. The ALJ Did Not Err In Rejecting Dr. Briggs’s Medical Opinion 10 Plaintiff’s first assignment of error is that the ALJ erred when rejecting the medical 11 opinion of Dr. Briggs, his examining physician. (Pl. Br. at 4–10.) 12 Although “[t]he ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence,” there is a 13 hierarchy among the sources of medical opinions. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 14 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). Those who have treated a claimant are treating physicians, those 15 who examined but did not treat the claimant are examining physicians, and those who 16 neither examined nor treated the claimant are nonexamining physicians. Lester v. Chater, 17 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). “As a general rule, more weight should be given to the 18 opinion of a treating source than to the opinion of doctors who did not treat the claimant.” 19 Id. This is so because treating physicians have the advantage of in-person interaction and 20 typically a longer history of treatment than a claimant’s other doctors, and their “subjective 21 22 1 Under one of the subheadings in Part C of his opening brief, Plaintiff seems to 23 suggest that the ALJ erred by failing to include any mental limitations in the RFC. (Pl. Br. at 22-24.) The Commissioner did not construe this as a separate argument. (Def. Br. at 10 24 [“Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have found a severe mental impairment, but he fails to raise this as a separate argument and simply includes it in the context of disputing the 25 ALJ’s symptom evaluation.”].) The Court agrees with the Commissioner’s interpretation and concludes, in any event, that Plaintiff waived any argument on this issue by failing to 26 cite any relevant statutes, regulations, or cases to support such a claim. LRCiv 16.1(a)(4) (“Each contention must be supported by specific reference to the portion of the record 27 relied upon and by citations to statutes, regulations, and cases supporting Plaintiff’s position.”). For similar reasons, the Court does not address Plaintiff’s assertion, raised in 28 a cursory footnote on the last page of his brief, that the ALJ erred when rejecting lay witness reports by Plaintiff’s wife. (Pl. Br. at 25 n.15.) 1 judgments . . . are important, and properly play a part in their medical evaluations.” Embrey 2 v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988). 3 An ALJ “may only reject a treating or examining physician’s uncontradicted 4 medical opinion based on ‘clear and convincing reasons.’” Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. 5 Sec., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830–31). “Where such 6 an opinion is contradicted, however, it may be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons 7 that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Id. An ALJ meets this standard 8 by “setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting medical 9 evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 10 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). 11 On May 23, 2018, Dr. Briggs examined Plaintiff and provided a medical opinion. 12 (R. at 27, 838–64.) Dr. Briggs opined Plaintiff was not able to complete an eight-hour 13 workday or a forty-hour workweek due to his limitations and that Plaintiff is incapable of 14 any meaningful work. (Id. at 27, 863–64.) Dr. Briggs opined that Plaintiff’s disability was 15 expected to last longer than twelve months and that Plaintiff could sit for less than two 16 hours and stand or walk for less than two hours in an eight-hour workday. (Id. at 27, 863.) 17 Dr. Briggs explained that Plaintiff needs to alternate between sitting, standing, and walking 18 every twenty to forty minutes and that Plaintiff needs to rest for ten to fifteen minutes when 19 he changes positions. (Id. at 27, 863.) Dr. Briggs also opined Plaintiff would miss work 20 more than six days per month due to his medical condition and that there were severe side 21 effects from his medication, including addiction. (Id. at 27, 864.) 22 The ALJ assigned “minimal weight” to Dr. Briggs’s opinion and provided the 23 following rationale for this determination: “The opinion was authored after [Plaintiff’s] 24 date last insured. Further, this opinion is inconsistent with [Plaintiff’s] actual ability to 25 function. The medical evidence reveals [Plaintiff] was able to perform yard work, cut pool 26 lining, do foundation work on his pool, perform household chores, and walk his children 27 home from school since the alleged onset date.” (Id. at 27.) 28 1 Plaintiff argues this rationale was faulty. As for the ALJ’s first proffered reason for 2 discrediting Dr. Briggs’s opinion—that it was rendered five months after Plaintiff’s date 3 last insured—Plaintiff contends this is a “red herring” because medical opinions rendered 4 after the period of disability should not be disregarded based solely on timing. (Pl. Br. at 5 5-6; Reply at 2-3.) The problem with this argument is that the ALJ did not reject Dr. 6 Briggs’s opinion based solely on timing. Instead, the ALJ also relied on the fact that Dr. 7 Briggs’s opinion differed drastically from the other “medical evidence” in the record, 8 including medical opinions rendered during the alleged period of disability. 9 For example, treating physician assistant (“PA”) Kareem Anderson opined that 10 Plaintiff was not permanently disabled. (R. at 27, 574.) PA Anderson was the only treating 11 provider during the period of alleged disability to offer an opinion on Plaintiff’s medical 12 condition. The ALJ assigned great weight to PA Anderson’s opinion that Plaintiff would 13 not be considered permanently disabled after his February 2017 surgery. (Id. at 27.) 14 Although PA Anderson was not a treating physician, he was the only treating medical 15 provider Plaintiff saw. Popa v. Berryhill, 872 F.3d 901, 907 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding an 16 ALJ should defer to medical opinions from treating providers who are not acceptable 17 medical sources when they are the only primary care medical provider a claimant has seen 18 on a regular basis). It was permissible for the ALJ to choose to credit the opinion of a 19 treating provider who treated Plaintiff during the period of alleged disability over the 20 contrary opinion of a treating doctor who rendered his opinion months after the alleged 21 period of disability ended.2 22 It is also notable that Dr. Briggs was the only medical provider who found Plaintiff 23 had antalgic gait, reduced strength, reduced sensation, and poor coordination. Plaintiff’s 24 medical records generally showed that he had normal gait, reflexes, and strength. (Id. at 25 328, 335, 357, 361, 374, 378, 382, 456, 487–88, 551–52, 554, 565–66, 572, 580, 585–86, 26 657, 660, 664, 694–95, 699, 704–05, 709, 714, 719, 724–25, 729, 772, 788, 817, 825, 841– 27 2 The ALJ also credited the opinion of medical consultant Melvin Roberts, who 28 opined that Plaintiff could perform light work, which was consistent with the activities in which Plaintiff regularly took. (Id. at 26–27.) 1 43.) Given this backdrop, it was not error for the ALJ to discredit Dr. Briggs’s opinion 2 based on a combination of its timing and its inconsistency with the other “medical 3 evidence.” 4 Plaintiff also contends the ALJ erred in finding that his activities of daily living 5 (“ADLs”) were inconsistent with Dr. Briggs’s opinion because the ALJ failed to explain 6 why the ADLs undermined that opinion. (Pl. Br. at 6–7.) The Court disagrees. The ALJ 7 specifically noted that Plaintiff “was able to perform yard work, cut pool lining, do 8 foundational work on his pool, perform household chores, and walk his children home from 9 school since the alleged onset date.” (R. at 27.) Although the ALJ did not explain why 10 each of these activities was inconsistent with Dr. Briggs’s opinion, the ALJ cited sufficient 11 evidence in the record and statements by Plaintiff to enable this Court to reasonably discern 12 her path and meaningfully determine that her conclusions are indeed supported by 13 substantial evidence. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) 14 (reiterating that ALJs may explain their decisions with unideal clarity so long as their 15 reasoning is reasonably discernible). It is easy to understand how such activities could be 16 viewed as inconsistent with a medical opinion that Plaintiff was incapable of any 17 meaningful work. And although Plaintiff identifies various reasons why a different 18 factfinder could have potentially viewed each of the proffered ADLs as consistent with Dr. 19 Briggs’s opinion, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 20 interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be 21 upheld.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 954. 22 B. The ALJ Did Not Err In Rejecting Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony 23 Plaintiff’s second assignment of error is that the ALJ erred in rejecting his symptom 24 testimony. (Pl. Br. at 10–25.) 25 An ALJ performs a two-step analysis to evaluate a claimant’s testimony regarding 26 pain and symptoms. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014). First, the 27 ALJ evaluates whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an 28 impairment “which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or symptoms 1 alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell 2 v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (internal quotation marks 3 omitted)). If so, and absent evidence of malingering, an ALJ may only discount a 4 claimant’s allegations for reasons that are “specific, clear and convincing” and supported 5 by substantial evidence. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). This is 6 the most demanding standard in Social Security cases. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014–15. 7 “[T]he ALJ must specifically identify the testimony she or he finds not to be credible 8 and must explain what evidence undermines the testimony.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 9 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001). General findings are insufficient. Id. “Although the 10 ALJ’s analysis need not be extensive, the ALJ must provide some reasoning in order for 11 [the Court] to meaningfully determine whether the ALJ’s conclusions were supported by 12 substantial evidence.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th 13 Cir. 2014). “[T]he ALJ may consider inconsistencies either in the claimant’s testimony or 14 between the testimony and the claimant’s conduct.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112. For 15 instance, the ALJ may consider “‘whether the claimant engages in daily activities 16 inconsistent with the alleged symptoms.’” Id. (quoting Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1040). 17 “Even where those activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for 18 discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally 19 debilitating impairment,” id. at 1113, or where they suggest that “later claims about the 20 severity of [the] limitations were exaggerated,” Valentine v. Astrue, 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th 21 Cir. 2009). Additionally, the ALJ may consider “whether the claimant takes medication or 22 undergoes other treatment for the symptoms.” Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1040; see 20 23 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). “Impairments that can be controlled effectively with medication 24 are not disabling.” Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 25 2006). The ALJ may properly consider that the medical record lacks evidence to support 26 certain symptom testimony, but that cannot form the sole basis for discounting the 27 testimony. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005). 28 Here, Plaintiff testified that he is unable to work due to back and leg pain and 1 testified that his pain is exacerbated by sitting, lifting, and standing. (R. at 23.) Plaintiff 2 also testified that his 2017 back surgery was unsuccessful and resulted in increased pain. 3 (Id.) Plaintiff further testified that he can sit, stand, and walk for only thirty minutes at a 4 time. (Id.) And Plaintiff testified that he needs to elevate his leg for six to seven hours a 5 day and that his mental impairments affect his ability to work. (Id.) 6 The ALJ found “that [Plaintiff’s] medically determinable impairments could 7 reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, [Plaintiff’s] statements 8 concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely 9 consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons 10 explained in this decision.” (R. at 23.) More specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s 11 symptom testimony was not consistent with the medical record, which showed that 12 Plaintiff’s limitations were not debilitating. (Id. at 24.) For example, the ALJ noted that 13 although Plaintiff asserted that he had knee pain that permeates throughout his lower 14 extremities, x-rays of his bilateral knees were unremarkable. (Id. at 25, 346–47, 450, 644, 15 647.) The ALJ further noted that, in March 2014, Plaintiff had normal gait and 16 coordination. (Id. at 25, 331.) On May 1, 2014, an examination showed that Plaintiff had 17 right knee tenderness, mild crepitus, right knee tenderness, good range of motion in the 18 right knee, no joint laxity, a normal left-knee, and normal gait and coordination. (Id. at 25, 19 326–28.) In August 2015, Plaintiff had increased pain in his lumbar spine that radiated to 20 his lower extremities but denied any bladder or bowel dysfunction and was able to 21 ambulate without an assistive device and with a normal gait. (Id. at 25, 356–58.) On 22 October 14, 2015, Plaintiff had normal gait and station, normal sensation, full spinal range 23 of motion, normal foot and ankle strength bilaterally, and a negative straight leg raise test. 24 (Id. at 25, 374.) Plaintiff went to the emergency room on October 13, 2017 and reported 25 chest pain, shortness of breath, dizziness, headache, left arm weakness but had no back 26 pain, a nontender back, normal musculoskeletal range of motion, normal strength, and no 27 tenderness or swelling. (Id. at 25, 609, 635–38.) These medical records constituted 28 substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s finding of inconsistency. 1 In a similar vein, although the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff’s low-back pain was 2 consistent with a severe impairment, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination 3 that the medical record did not establish this limitation would prevent Plaintiff from light 4 work. (Id. at 25.) Plaintiff attended physical therapy in 2014, which helped decrease pain. 5 (Id. at 25, 272–73, 275–76, 278–79, 280–81, 284–85, 287–88.) Plaintiff argues this was a 6 mischaracterization because he actually stopped attending physical therapy due to minimal 7 progress in reducing pain. (Pl. Br. at 17; R. at 25, 313, 359.) However, this was before 8 Plaintiff’s surgery in 2017 and discounts all the occasions Plaintiff felt relief from physical 9 therapy. (Id.) The record also indicated that Plaintiff’s progress plateaued, not that he was 10 making no progress at all. (R. at 313.) Additionally, in December 2015, Plaintiff was not 11 using narcotic pain relievers often and was not taking anti-inflammatories. (Id. at 25, 454, 12 692, 697, 702, 707.) The ALJ found this was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s allegations of 13 disabling back and leg pain. (Id. at 25.) This was a permissible inference. Parra v. Astrue, 14 481 F.3d 742, 750–51 (9th Cir. 2007) (a claimant’s pursuit of only conservative treatment 15 is a proper reason to discount his testimony regarding his impairments). 16 The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s treatment was beneficial. (R. at 26.) Plaintiff 17 indicated that medial branch blocks did not provide relief for his low back pain. (Id. at 25, 18 443, 454.) In 2016, Plaintiff had a series of epidural steroid injections. (Id. at 25, 493– 19 99.) On February 22, 2017, Plaintiff had a lumbar spine fusion. (Id. at 26, 558.) Two 20 months after the surgery, Plaintiff reported he was doing well with lower back pain and 21 sensation of the bottom of his left-foot, he ambulated with a normal gait and station, was 22 able to toe and heel walk, exhibited limited flexion and extension of the lumbar spine, no 23 tenderness to palpation, nonpainful facet loading, and normal neurological findings. (Id. 24 at 26, 563, 565, 716, 727.) Plaintiff was inconsistent with physical therapy and doing home 25 exercises after his surgery. (Id. at 26, 588.) On December 20, 2017, Plaintiff reported to 26 his pain management provider that his pain was stable and tolerable, he denied side effects 27 or complications from the medication he was using, and he stated his quality of life had 28 improved and he was able to perform his activities of daily living. (Id. at 26, 563–68, 697– 1 701.) Plaintiff was also not using narcotic pain relievers at this time. (Id. at 26, 699.) 2 Plaintiff argues this does not mean he no longer experienced pain, so the ALJ’s reasoning 3 is flawed. (Pl. Br. at 18.) However, the medical evidence showed Plaintiff’s quality of life 4 improved after the surgery and he was able to do much more than he had before. Although 5 Plaintiff’s pain was not completely eliminated, the ALJ identified evidence to show that 6 Plaintiff is able to engage in some activity, especially after the lumbar fusion surgery. An 7 ALJ may properly discount symptom testimony based on its inconsistency with a 8 claimant’s improvement with treatment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1429(c)(3)(iv); see Tommasetti, 9 533 F.3d at 1040. 10 The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s ADLs were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s 11 symptom testimony. (R. at 26.) Plaintiff reported he was able to do yard work, walk to 12 his children’s school to pick them up, exercise on a treadmill, attend brunch on Sundays, 13 socialize with friends, and take care of his puppy. 3 (Id. at 26, 278, 474, 511, 533, 543, 14 735, 739.) Plaintiff performed household chores, including includes cleaning, laundry, 15 grocery shopping, and dishes. (Id. at 26, 59, 69–70, 533.) Eight months after his back 16 surgery, Plaintiff was able to perform yard work, including cutting bushes and cutting up 17 and disposing the liner of his swimming pool, which Plaintiff indicated was not difficult 18 for him to do. (Id. at 26, 62, 636, 656.) In November 2017, Plaintiff was able to work on 19 the foundation of his swimming pool. (Id. at 26, 62, 636, 656.) The ALJ found that 20 although Plaintiff said he spends his days resting due to his back pain, he told his provider 21 he cooks for his family, watches movies with his family, watches baseball, plays video 22 games, and takes care of his new puppy. (Id. at 26, 69–70, 735, 739.) Plaintiff also testified 23 that he could only be on his feet for about thirty minutes before he would be in pain, yet in 24 July 2017, Plaintiff traveled to Disneyland and had a good experience. (Id. at 26, 781.) 25 Plaintiff argues his ADLs actually show he was constrained by his limitations. (l. 26
27 3 Plaintiff argues that he simply lived with animals (as opposed to caring for them) (Pl. Br. at 20), but the evidence in the record, including Plaintiff’s own testimony during 28 the hearing (R. at 59 [“I get up roughly about 7:30ish, feed the animals, take them outside, maybe get a cup of coffee . . . .”]), supports the ALJ’s characterization. Br. at 21.) For example, Plaintiff testified he would not walk around the block without 2|| using a cane or limping. (Pl. Br. at 21; R. at 551, 600.) Plaintiff also testified that he mostly sits at home and reclines six to seven hours a day. (Pl. Br. at 21; R. at 65, 74, 545.) And Plaintiff testified that he had difficulty dressing and bathing, although he can do it on 5|| his own. (R. at 208, 264, 600.) Despite these limitations, Plaintiff's other activities show 6|| that his ADLs were not overly inhibited. The ALJ found that “[t]he physical and mental || capabilities requisite to performing many of the task described above, as well as the social 8 || interactions belie [Plaintiff's] allegations and instead support the conclusion reached 9|| herein.” (qd. at 26.) The ALJ also noted that, given Plaintiff's claims of disabling 10 || symptoms, there would presumably be an indication in the treatment records of restrictions 11 || placed on Plaintiff by his treating doctors, yet there are no restrictions recommended by his treating doctor. (/d. at 26.) 13 The ALJ provided “specific, clear and convincing” reasons supported by substantial evidence in explaining why the medical evidence and Plaintiff's ADLs contradicted 15 || Plaintiffs symptom testimony. The Court finds no error. 16 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED affirming the December 6, 2018 decision of the 17 || Administrative Law Judge Ud. at 18-30), as upheld by the Appeals Council on September || 18, 2019 Ud. at 1-3). 19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter final judgment 20 || consistent with this Order and close this case. 21 Dated this 1st day of March, 2021. 22 23 fm ee” 24 f : _o—— Dominic W. Lanza 25 United States District Judge 26 27 28
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