Lorena Lopez Valenzuela v. Loretta E. Lynch

673 F. App'x 780
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 19, 2017
Docket13-73527
StatusUnpublished

This text of 673 F. App'x 780 (Lorena Lopez Valenzuela v. Loretta E. Lynch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lorena Lopez Valenzuela v. Loretta E. Lynch, 673 F. App'x 780 (9th Cir. 2017).

Opinion

*781 MEMORANDUM **

Lorena Lopez-Valenzuela petitions for review of the ruling from the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) that the Immigration Judge correctly found that she was removable pursuant to section 237(a) (2) (A) (ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) and deny Lopez-Valenzuela’s petition for review.

1. Lopez-Valenzuela was first admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant in July 1986. In 2007, she was convicted of petty theft. Her status was adjusted to lawful permanent resident on April 9, 2010. Later, in April 2010, Lopez-Valenzuela was again convicted of petty theft.

2. In August 2010, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Lopez-Valenzuela pursuant to section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which provides that an “alien who at any time after admission is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct,” is subject to removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).

3. Lopez-Valenzuela contends that, although she was first admitted in 1986, her April 2010 adjustment of status constituted a second “admission” and she had only one conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude after that admission. The BIA correctly held, however, that Lopez-Valenzuela’s July 1986 date of entry constituted her date of admission for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). See Matter of Alyazji, 25 I&N Dec. 397, 406-07, 407 n.8 (BIA 2011) (adjustment of status following initial admission was not relevant admission for purposes of removability); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (defining admission as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer”).

4.In sum, the BIA did not err in finding that Lopez-Valenzuela is removable.

PETITION DENIED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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Related

ALYAZJI
25 I. & N. Dec. 397 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 2011)

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Bluebook (online)
673 F. App'x 780, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lorena-lopez-valenzuela-v-loretta-e-lynch-ca9-2017.