Lorena Cherpan v. City of Fairfield, et al.

District Court, E.D. California·Decided May 18, 2026·No. 2:23-cv-02100·Unknown

Opinion

LORENA CHERPAN, Case No. 2:23-cv-02100-TLN-CSK Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MODIFIED y STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER (ECF No. 47) CITY OF FAIRFIELD, et al., Defendant. The Court has reviewed the parties’ stipulated protective order below (ECF No. 47), and finds it comports with the relevant authorities and the Court’s Local Rule. See L.R. 141.1. The Court APPROVES the protective order, subject to the following clarification. The Court’s Local Rules indicate that once an action is closed, it “will not retain jurisdiction over enforcement of the terms of any protective order filed in that action.” L.R. 141.1(f); see Bylin Heating Sys., Inc. v. Thermal Techs., Inc., 2012 WL 13237584, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2012) (noting that courts in the district generally do not retain jurisdiction for disputes concerning protective orders after closure of the case). Thus, the Court will not retain jurisdiction over this protective order once the case is closed. Dated: May 18, 2026 C i s CHI S00 KIM 7, cher2100.23sstip UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

K. CHIKE ODIWE, ESQ. (SBN 315109) LAW OFFICES OF KENNETH C. ODIWE, PC 2880 Zanker Road Suite 203 San Jose, CA 95134 Telephone: (669) 315-4431 Facsimile: (669) 315-4431 kenneth@kennethodiwelaw.com Attorney for Plaintiff LORENA CHERPAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 2:23-cv-02100-TLN-CSK Plaintiff, [PROPOSED] STIPULATED v. PROTECTIVE ORDER

CITY OF FAIRFIELD, a municipal corporation; ADAM BRUNIE, in his individual capacity as a law enforcement officer for the CITY OF FAIRFIELD; SELENA DIAZ, in her individual capacity as a law enforcement officer for the CITY OF FAIRFIELD; and DOES 1-25, inclusive, Defendants.

1. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS Disclosure and discovery activity in this action is expected to involve the categories of sensitive information identified in Section 1.3 below, for which specific protection from public disclosure and use outside this litigation is warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. This Order does not confer blanket protection on all discovery material. Only information that falls within the specific categories identified in Section 1.3 and is designated in good faith on a document by document basis shall be entitled to protection. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information under seal; Local Rule 141 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. 1.2 GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT This action is likely to involve information protected by the Peace Officer Bill of Rights (POBRA) and Public Safety Officers Bill of Rights Act as set forth in California Government Code section 3300 et. seq. and Penal Code section 832.7 and 832.8 for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecution of this action is warranted. Defendants may be producing documents that contain personal and confidential information regarding individuals which information is generally unavailable to the public, including peace officer personnel records. The disclosure of this information to the public may violate those individuals’ privacy rights. Defendants contend that peace officers have a federal privilege of privacy in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy therein that is underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective procedure of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 1033-1034, (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14665, *2-3, 12-13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law applies to privilege based discovery disputes involving federal claims,” the “state privilege law which is consistent with its federal equivalent significantly assists in applying [federal] privilege law to discovery disputes”); Cal. Penal Code §§ 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040-1047. The uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel file information can threaten the safety of non-party witnesses, officers, and their families/associates. Defendants further contend that such personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the public entity’s custodian of records pursuant to applicable California law that uncontrolled release is likely to result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; impairment in the collection of third-party witness information and statements and related legitimate law enforcement investigations/interests. Defendants also contend that, since peace officers do not have the same rights as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it is contrary to the fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled release of officers’ compelled statements. See generally Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 822, 828-830 (1985); fc. U.S. Const., amend V. Defendants contend that law enforcement agencies have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official information privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney-client privilege (and/or attorney work product protection) interests in the personnel files of their peace officers – particularly as to those portions of peace officer personnel files that contain critical self-analysis, internal deliberation/decision-making or evaluation/analysis, or communications for the purposes of obtaining or rendering legal advice or analysis – potentially including but not limited to evaluative/analytical portions of Internal Affairs type records or reports, evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records or reports, and/or reports prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-1034; Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1 089, 1092-1095 (9th Cir. 1997); Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668- 671 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Additionally, Defendants may be producing reports obtained from the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS), which reports are generally unavailable to the public and the disclosure of which is subject to state and federal laws and regulations restricting and/or limiting disclosure or dissemination. The disclosure of this information to the public may jeopardize the security of CLETS, the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts that rely on CLETS, and the safety of law enforcement officers using CLETS. Defendants may also be producing documents concerning confidential internal policies, which documents are generally unavailable to the public. The disclosure of this information may jeopardize the security of the State’s operations and jeopardize the safety of peace officers. Finally, Defendants may be producing investigation reports which are generally unavailable to the public, the disclosure of which could violate individuals’ privacy rights and jeopardize the safety of officers. The parties jointly contend that there is typically a particularized need for protection as to any medical or psychotherapeutic records, because of the privacy interests at stake. Because of these sensitive interests, a court order should address these documents rather than a private agreement between the parties. Accordingly, to expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over confidentiality of discovery materials, to adequately protect information the parties are en

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Lorena Cherpan v. City of Fairfield, et al., (E.D. Cal. 2026).

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