Loren J. Larson Jr. v. State of Alaska

Opinion

2026 WL 1819075

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

NOTICE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION

NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law, although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have. See McCoy v. State, 80 P.3d 757, 764 (Alaska App. 2002).

Court of Appeals of Alaska.

LOREN J. LARSON JR., Appellant,

v.

STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.

Court of Appeals No. A-14593

June 24, 2026

Trial Court No. 4FA-96-03495 CR

Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Amy K. Welch, Judge.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Appearances: Loren J. Larson Jr., in propria persona, Kenai, Appellant. Eric A. Ringsmuth, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Stephen J. Cox, Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.

Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Terrell and Beach, Judges.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Judge BEACH.

Star page 1*1 Loren J. Larson Jr. appeals the superior court's denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence by consolidating the motion into his then-pending post-conviction relief case. Larson claims on appeal that the superior court violated his due process rights and contravened principles of party representation by recharacterizing his motion. For the reasons explained here, we conclude that Larson has already received the remedy he requests and, regardless, his underlying claim is meritless.

Factual background and prior proceedings

In 1998, Larson was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of first-degree burglary.¹ Larson was sentenced to two consecutive 99-year terms for each murder conviction and a 10-year concurrent term for his burglary conviction.²

In the years since Larson's sentencing, he has challenged various aspects of his trial, conviction, and sentence.³

As relevant to the instant appeal, Larson challenged his conviction by filing a motion to correct an illegal sentence in his original criminal case, invoking Alaska Criminal Rules 35(a) and 53.⁴ Larson claimed that the superior court wrongfully compelled him to provide an allocution during his sentencing hearing without informing him of his right to remain silent, resulting in structural error. Larson also argued that the sentencing court's reliance on his lack of remorse in sentencing conflicted with his maintenance of innocence and is inextricably linked to the juror misconduct he claimed in his past applications for post-conviction relief.

The superior court denied the motion, finding that Larson's arguments in his motion to correct an illegal sentence were “substantially similar” to those he raised in a then-pending post-conviction relief case.⁵ The court found that “[a]ddressing the issues in one proceeding [would] facilitate judicial economy as well as efficiency and clarity of procedural posture for the parties.”

Larson moved for reconsideration of the denial of his motion. Larson argued that he had intentionally filed his motion under Criminal Rule 35(a) “so that his motion would be litigated in his original criminal case and not on collateral review in a new civil action.” Larson contended the superior court's order consolidating his motion did not point to a procedural defect that would have required recharacterization or dismissal of his motion. Larson also disagreed with the superior court's assessment that his arguments in his motion to correct an illegal sentence mirrored those in his application for post-conviction relief because he included juror statements only to demonstrate the impropriety of the sentencing court's reliance on his lack of remorse when he maintained his innocence. Finally, Larson argued that the superior court's denial of his motion contravened a due process requirement that the court stay his motion instead of dismissing it.

Star page 2*2 The superior court denied Larson's motion for reconsideration. The court reiterated that the claims raised by Larson in his motion to correct an illegal sentence had been repeatedly litigated and were substantially similar to those in his then-pending post-conviction relief case. The court explained that Larson could renew his motion to correct an illegal sentence if there was a remaining basis to do so after the resolution of his post-conviction relief case.

Larson appealed the superior court's decision, seeking reversal of the superior court's denial of his motion and remand for litigation of the issues raised therein. The State filed a responsive brief. The parties proceeded to oral argument in front of this Court on April 21, 2026. During oral argument, Larson informed the Court that, after filing his brief in this case, he was able to renew his motion to correct illegal sentence in the superior court. (The motion has since been denied on the merits by the superior court.)

As to Larson's procedural argument, he has received the remedy he sought and the issue is therefore moot

It appears from the record that Larson's motion to renew his motion to correct illegal sentence was granted by the superior court on January 16, 2026. Because the issue raised in this current appeal was the propriety of the superior court's procedural ruling to decide his illegal sentence claim in his then-pending post-conviction relief case, and because his illegal sentence motion was renewed in his criminal case and ultimately decided, this issue on appeal is moot. In other words, Larson has already received the remedy he sought from this Court in the instant appeal.⁶

Regardless, Larson's underlying illegal sentence claim is meritless

Although Larson's procedural issue is moot, this Court can affirm the superior court's ruling on any ground justified in the record,⁷ and we find no merit to Larson's underlying illegal sentence claim.

Larson argues that his sentence is illegal because the sentencing judge purportedly compelled Larson to testify without informing him of his right to remain silent. Larson states that the “innocuous definition of ‘allocution’ ” given to him by the judge would “cause any defendant to believe their right to remain silent during trial no longer existed during sentencing.” According to Larson, the judge then used his “compelled testimony” to “fashion an illegal 198 consecutive year sentence to be cruelly inflicted upon [him].”

But, in the context of Criminal Rule 35(a), the term “illegal sentence” is construed narrowly.⁸ To constitute an illegal sentence, “the sentence itself must be illegal, not the manner in which it was imposed.”⁹ In other words, Rule 35(a) “applies only to sentences which the judgment of conviction did not authorize”; it does not permit collateral attacks on the original sentencing proceeding but only on the substance of the sentence itself.¹⁰

Star page 3*3 Given this narrow construal, Larson does not raise a claim that his sentence was illegal. Larson's claim that the sentencing court erred by not informing him that he did not need to make a statement is a challenge to the manner in which his sentence was imposed, not the sentence itself. And, as explained, Criminal Rule 35(a) generally does not permit collateral attacks on the original sentencing proceeding.¹¹ As a result, Larson's claim is not a claim that his sentence was illegal and therefore cannot be raised through a motion under Criminal Rule 35(a).

Conclusion

Accordingly, we conclude that Larson has already received the remedy he requests and, regardless, his underlying claim is meritless. We DISMISS this appeal.

Footnotes

1

AS 11.41.100(a) and AS 11.46.300(a), respectively.

2

Larson v. State, 2000 WL 19199, at *2 (Alaska App. Jan. 12, 2000) (unpublished).

3

See, e.g., Larson v. State, 254 P.3d 1073 (Alaska 2011); Larson v. State, 79 P.3d 650 (Alaska App. 2003); Larson v. State, 2013 WL 6169314 (Alaska App. Nov. 20, 2013) (unpublished); Larson v. Schmidt, 2013 WL 6576742 (Alaska App. Dec. 11, 2013) (unpublished); Larson v. State, 2016 WL 191987 (Alaska App. Jan. 13, 2016) (unpublished); Larson v. State, 2022 WL 2092973 (Alaska App. June 8, 2022) (unpublished summary disposition).

4

Criminal Rule 35(a) provides that the “court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.” Criminal Rule 53 explains that the criminal rules “are designed to facilitate business and advance justice. They may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court in any case where it shall be manifest to the court that a strict adherence to them will work injustice.”

5

See Larson v. State, No. 4FA-24-01335 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. May 6, 2025).

6

Jacob v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Off. of Children's Servs., 177 P.3d 1181, 1185-86 (Alaska 2008) (“Issues are moot where the appellant has already received relief.”).

7

Reichel v. State, 101 P.3d 197, 199 n.8 (Alaska App. 2004) (“An appellate court is authorized to affirm a lower court's decision on any legal ground revealed by the record.”).

8

Bishop v. Municipality of Anchorage, 685 P.2d 103, 105 (Alaska App. 1984).

9

Id. at 105 n.3; see also Ranstead v. State, 421 P.3d 15, 24 (Alaska 2018).

10

Id. at 105 (citing United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506 (1954)); see also Stoneking v. State, 2010 WL 2637015, at *1 (Alaska App. June 30, 2010) (unpublished) (finding that excessive-sentence and wrongful finding of worst-offender status did not render sentence “illegal” under Rule 35(a)); Woodard v. State, 2012 WL 1570603, at *2 n.15 (Alaska App. May 2, 2012) (unpublished) (stating that an excessive sentence claim was not an illegal sentence claim under Rule 35(a)).

11

Bishop, 685 P.2d at 105.

End of Document