Lord v. Gallegos

126 P.2d 290, 46 N.M. 221
CourtNew Mexico Supreme Court
DecidedMay 20, 1942
DocketNo. 4650.
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 126 P.2d 290 (Lord v. Gallegos) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Mexico Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lord v. Gallegos, 126 P.2d 290, 46 N.M. 221 (N.M. 1942).

Opinion

BRICE, Chief Justice.

Defendants’ (appellees’) demurrer to plaintiff’s (appellant’s) complaint was sustained by the district court, and the question here is whether the complaint fails to state a cause of action against the defendants for the reasons stated in the demurrer. The alleged facts, material to a decision, are as follows :

The plaintiff resides in California and was engaged in the business of transporting new automobiles in interstate commerce from states in the East to California and other western states, as a “drive away” common carrier under a permit from the Interstate Commerce Commission. He used the roads and highways of New Mexico for the purpose of carrying on his business.

In the operation of his business, the plaintiff after March 11, 1939, transported and convoyed automobiles singly and in tandem from the manufacturers to the owners, which the owners had theretofore purchased, and upon which licenses had been paid in the state where such automobiles were purchased or owned. License plates were attached to each automobile. None of these automobiles were brought through the state of New Mexico for the purpose of selling or offering the same for sale.

The plaintiff’s agents were stopped at the ports of entry of New Mexico by the defendants “and/or their servants, agents and employees,” who required the plaintiff to pay $7.50 for each of such automobiles so transported by plaintiff by use of its own power, and $5 for each automobile towed or drawn by another automobile. These payments were made by plaintiff under protest. Attached to plaintiff’s complaint as an exhibit is a list of the automobiles upon which .license fees were charged, together with a statement of the fees charged and collected, which aggregated $3,487.50, for which plaintiff prays judgment against the defendants.

As we understand plaintiff’s contention, it is that this action is not against the State or the Board of Supervisors of the State Police, but against the individual defendants who, though named as state officers, personally and through their agents and employees collected from him purported license fees not authorized by any law of the State of New Mexico. He states: “ * * * your appellant respectfully points out that (1) he has not sued the State of New Mexico, and indeed (2) that it would be very odd for the Legislature to appropriate monies to pay for the misconduct of its officials. State officials are bonded, or at least most of them, for the proper conduct of their offices and for the faithful performance of their official duties, and your appellant looks to these appellees personally and to their bondsmen if any, for payment of the monies which they have so unlawfully forced from him by means of the abuse of the power of the armed State Police.”

The statute under which defendants assert that plaintiff was liable to the license fees collected is Ch. 139, N.M.L.1933, as amended by Ch. 56 of N.M.L.1935, and Ch. 117, N.M.L.1939, the applicable provisions of which are as follows:

“(e) No person, firm or corporation shall use the highways of the State of New Mexico for the transportation of any motor vehicle on its own wheels' for the purpose of selling or offering the same for sale to or by any agent, dealer, purchaser or prospective purchaser whether such agent, dealer, purchaser or prospective purchaser be located within or without this state, unless such motor vehicle either:
“1. Is licensed by the State of New Mexico; or
“2. Is owned by an automobile dealer, duly licensed by the State of New Mexico and is operated under a dealer’s license duly issued to such dealer; or
“3. A special permit for the use of the highways of this state for the transportation of such vehicle, in the manner in which the same is being transported, has been first obtained and the fee therefor has been paid as hereinafter specified.
“Special permits for the use of said highways in the transportation of such vehicles shall be issued by the Commissioner of Revenue of the State of New Mexico upon application on such form as said Commissioner may prescribe and upon payment of a fee of $7.50 for each such vehicle transported by use of its own power and a fee of $5.00 for each such vehicle towed or drawn by another vehicle and not transported in whole or in part by the use of its own power. * * * ”

We find no provision of this act which authorized the State of New Mexico to levy and collect the license tax in question from appellant, assuming as we must that the allegations of fact stated in plaintiff’s complaint are true.

We are advised from the briefs of both parties that collections of the license tax involved were made by the New Mexico State Police. Ch. 35, L.1937, as amended by Ch. 73, N.M.L.1939, provides for the appointment of a board of supervisors of the New Mexico State Police, consisting of the Governor, the Commissioner of Revenue, the State Highway Engineer, and two other members to be appointed by the Governor for a term of two years. The defendants are the individual members of this board, and are so designated in the complaint.

Section 2 of the act, as amended is as follows: “There is hereby created a separate and distinct division of the New Mexico State Police, to be known as the Division of Field Administration, which said division shall be under the supervision of, and administered by, the Board of Supervisors of the New Mexico State Police. Said board is invested with power to make all needful rules and regulations to secure proper and efficient enforcement of this Act and other laws of the State of New Mexico, not inconsistent with, or in derogation of, the powers, duties and responsibilities placed by existing statutes upon other departments, boards or commissions of the State government. * * * Said Board shall appoint and employ a director of said division of field administration, and such additional agents, deputies and employees as it may deem necessary to carry out fhe provisions of this Act.”

Section 4 thereof provides: “Such agents, deputies and field administrators shall be charged with the enforcement and collection of all excise taxes and licenses or fees of every nature of all departments, commissions and other agencies of the State Government whenever so requested by such department, commission or other agency. * * All departments, boards, commissions and other agencies of the State Government charged by law with the collection of any excise taxes due to the State of New Mexico, shall deputize persons employed in this division to act as their agents in the collection of all such fees and taxes required by law to be collected by such departments, boards, commissions or agencies. All such Departments, boards, commissions and other agencies shall keep and furnish to said board, when requested by it, records of all such excise taxes due to the State. Such persons employed by this division shall, while engaged in the performance of their duties in enforcing this Act and collecting the fees, licenses and taxes required to be collected by the terms of this Act, be considered and held to be the deputies and agents of the departments, boards, commissions and agencies of the State Government, charged with the collection of same.”

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Bluebook (online)
126 P.2d 290, 46 N.M. 221, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lord-v-gallegos-nm-1942.