Lord v. Borough of Pottstown

205 B.R. 48, 1997 WL 43000
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 28, 1997
DocketNo. 96-CV-7181; Bankruptcy No. 95-BK-7181
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 205 B.R. 48 (Lord v. Borough of Pottstown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lord v. Borough of Pottstown, 205 B.R. 48, 1997 WL 43000 (E.D. Pa. 1997).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

CAHN, Chief Judge.

Appellants Thomas and Barbara Lord (“Lords”) appeal the decision of the Bankruptcy Court that the ninety day limitation of liability for water service charges set forth in Pennsylvania’s Municipality Authorities Act, 53 P.S. § 306B(h.l), does not apply to a landlord’s liability for delinquent water charges, when the municipality had no knowledge of the identities of the tenants and had no agreements with the tenants to provide service.

I. Background

Thomas and Barbara Lord own 45 to 50 low-income residential properties in the Borough of Pottstown (“Borough”). These mul-ti-unit and single family dwellings are all tenant-occupied. Mr. Lord is the full-time manager of the properties.

Only about thirty percent of the properties are governed by written leases between the Lords and their tenants, with the remaining units subject to oral agreements. (Tr. 75) Mr. Lord testified that all tenants, regardless of their lease type, are obligated to pay for all utilities, including water.1 (Tr. 52) Since in most cases he has no written lease with his tenants, the utility arrangement is the result of an oral agreement between Mr. Lord and the tenant. Mr. Lord expects tenants to pay the Borough directly. (Tr. 84) The Borough contends, and the Lords do not dispute, that the Borough does not know the identity of the Lords’ tenants, as the tenants have not filed applications for utility or water service with the Borough and Mr. Lord has not notified the Borough of the tenants’ names. Thus, it was Mr. Lord who received the bills from the Borough. Mr. Lord believes that he is not responsible for advising the tenants of their utility charges, and refuses to collect utility charges from the tenants because he is not the Borough’s “collection agent” and he does not “feel it to be [his] bill anyways.” (Tr. at 89, 94).

The fact that Mr. Lord believes the bills are the responsibility of the tenants, combined with the lack of billing agreements between the Borough and the tenants, has resulted in delinquencies of $152,350.51 for unpaid water, sewer, and refuse service.

On August 11, 1995, the Lords filed joint petitions for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. On January 12, 1996, the Borough filed a proof of claim for the unpaid utility bills in the amount of $152,350.51. The Lords objected to the claim, but on June 18, 1996, the Bankruptcy Court ordered that it be allowed in full. The Lords then filed a motion for reconsideration on the issue of the water charges only ($65,122.64), claiming that liabil[50]*50ity for unpaid water bills is limited to charges for the past ninety days under 53 P.S. § 806B(h.l). That motion was denied on September 17, 1996, and the Lords now appeal that denial to this court.

II. Discussion

A Standard of Review

A district court, “in reviewing the decision of a bankruptcy court, must apply a clearly erroneous standard to findings of fact and exercise plenary review over conclusions of law.” Rosen v. Bezner, 996 F.2d 1527, 1530 n. 2 (3d Cir.1993), citing In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 1222 (3d Cir.1989). Mixed questions of law and fact should be broken down into their components and analyzed accordingly. Sharon Steel, 871 F.2d at 1222 (citations omitted).

B. Pennsylvania Municipality Authorities Act

The heart of the Lords’ appeal is their interpretation of 53 P.S. § 306B(h.l). Section 306B(h.l), enacted by the Pennsylvania Legislature on December 19, 1990, provides:

In the case of an Authority which has agreed to provide water service through a separate meter and separate service line to a residential dwelling unit in which the owner does not reside, the owner shall be hable to pay the tenant’s bill for service rendered to the tenant by the Authority only if the Authority notifies the owner and the tenant within thirty days after the bill first becomes overdue. Such notification shall be provided by first class mail to the address of the owner provided to the Authority by the owner and to the billing address of the tenant, respectively. Nothing herein shall be construed to require an Authority to terminate service to a tenant, provided that the owner shall not be liable for any service which the Authority provides to the tenant ninety or more days after the tenant’s bill first becomes due unless the Authority has been prevented by court order from terminating service to that tenant.

The parties have not cited, nor has this court found, any cases or legislative history relating to this statute. Accordingly, this court must predict how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would rule if presented with the issue. See, e.g., Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir.1990).

In the instant case, the Bankruptcy Court found that “the Borough did not agree to supply water service to any of debtors’ tenants (and never entered into an agreement to bill the tenants separately).” Bankruptcy Court Order Denying Reconsideration, September 17, 1996. The Lords do not dispute this finding, and the testimony of Mr. Fieck and Mr. Lord supports it. (TV. 14-15, 21-22, 24r-26, 55-56, 82, 87). Therefore, the finding is not clearly erroneous and it will stand.

Because there was no agreement between the Borough and the tenants to provide water service, I find that § 306B(h.l) does not protect the Lords from liability for the entire amount of the unpaid water bills. The statute only takes effect “[i]n the case of an Authority which has agreed” to provide services. There is nothing in the statute that expresses with whom the Authority must agree. The only logical reading, however, is that the Authority must have some sort of agreement with the tenant to provide water service. Otherwise, the subsequent references to the “tenant’s bill” would be nonsensical. Without an agreement between the Authority and the tenant, the tenant would not receive his or her own bill, and without a “tenant’s bill” the remainder of the statute is meaningless.

Furthermore, it would be unfair for a landlord to receive the benefit of limited liability for unpaid water bills, but to bear none of the burden of ensuring that the tenant and the Borough had an agreement. Mr. Lord, for example, could conceivably orally lease one of his premises to a number of different tenants within a period of time. If he did not inform the Borough as each tenant changed, or he did not arrange for each tenant to tell the Borough, the Borough would have no way to bill each tenant. Under the Lords’ proposed interpretation of § 306B(h.l), however, Mr. Lord would not be liable for the water bills incurred by those tenants.

This interpretation of § 306B(h.l) does not require Mr. Lord and landlords like him to [51]*51become the Borough’s “collection agents.” It merely requires some minimal action on the part of landlords to ensure that the Borough is able to bill the tenant. For example, Mr.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
205 B.R. 48, 1997 WL 43000, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lord-v-borough-of-pottstown-paed-1997.