Loranger v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co.

62 N.W. 137, 104 Mich. 80, 1895 Mich. LEXIS 676
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 12, 1895
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 62 N.W. 137 (Loranger v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Loranger v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co., 62 N.W. 137, 104 Mich. 80, 1895 Mich. LEXIS 676 (Mich. 1895).

Opinion

Grant, J.

The accident which resulted in plaintiff’s injury occurred July 31, 1879, at 5 o’clock p. m. The train crew consisted of five men, — conductor, engineer, fireman, and two brakemen, — plaintiff being the head brakeman. The freight train in charge of the crew had been engaged during the day in distributing steel rails. Just before the accident, the engine and tender were standing upon one track, and the rest of the train upon the main [82]*82■track. , Plaintiff was directed to go over upon wbat was «called the “pier track,” and couple some cars to the engine for the purpose of putting them into their train going ■west. It was necessary to turn a switch in order to get the engine and tender upon the pier track. Plaintiff testified that he was directed by the conductor to proceed in liaste, and throw the switch, there being no switchman at ¡hand to do the work. He hurried along the track; turned the switch; the engine passed over the switch, and backed •■upon the pier track. The engine and tender were backing mp “as fast as a fast walk.” Plaintiff ran past the engine ;and tender “ on a dog trot,” and when within about two car lengths of the cars to be coupled stepped inside the rail in advance of the tender for the purpose of reversing a crooked link, so as to be able to make the coupling when the standing cars were reached. He did not signal to the ¿engineer to slacken speed; and while he was walking sideways, in his attempt to turn the link, he stubbed his toe .against a pile of fresh ashes and cinders lying between the Tails, fell, and was seriously injured. While other grounds •of negligence are alleged in the declaration, none were insisted upon at the trial except the pile of cinders and ashes, and upon this alone the recovery was based. Plaintiff had just passed over the track on his way to the switch, but did not notice it. He says he glanced at it as he fell, .and thought it was five or six inches high, filling the entire .space between the rails. He gave the only evidence on his part as to the manner of the accident.

The contention of the plaintiff is—

1. That he was not furnished a safe place to work in "by reason of this pile of cinders and ashes, and that its ■being there was the negligence of the defendant.
2. That it was good and. safe railroading and customary for brakemen to go in front of the cars for the purpose [83]*83for which he went while they were moving “as fast as a fast walk.”
3. That in so doing he was in the exercise of due care.

The contention of the defendant is—

1. That in so doing he violated its rules, and his written ■contract of service.
2. That the ashes and cinders, if any were there, were ■placed there by some fireman or engineer, and that, if they were there, the duty to remove them belonged to the ¡section crew, and that all these employés were fellow-•servants, for whose acts the defendant is not liable.
3. That the plaintiff was guilty of negligence.

For A full understanding of the case a further statement of facts may be important. Plaintiff was a man of experience in, and thoroughly familiar with, the business in which he was engaged. The movements of the engine were entirely under his control, and the engineer was bound to obey his orders. The engineer was looking out upon ■one side and the fireman on the other of the cab, ready ffo receive orders from him. The rules of the company particularly bearing upon this case — Nos. 28 and 29 — are .as follows:

“28. Every employé is required to exercise the utmost ■caution to avoid injury to himself or to his fellows, and -especially in the switching of cars, and in all movements •of trains; in doing which work each employé must look .after, and be responsible for, his own safety. Jumping on -or off trains or engines in motion, getting between cars in motion to uncouple them, and all similar imprudences, are ■dangerous, and in violation of duty. All employés are warned that if they commit them it will be at their own peril and risk. '
“29. Every employé is hereby warned that before exposing himself in working, or in being on the tracks or grounds -of the company, or in working with or being in any manner on or with its cars, engines, machinery, or tools, he must examine, for his own safety, the condition of all -machinery, tools, tracks, cars, engines, or whatever he may ■undertake to work upon or with, before he makes use of ■or exposes himself on or with the same, so as to ascertain, [84]*84so far as lie reasonably can, tbeir condition and soundness^ * * * The object of this rale is to protect employésfrom suffering personal injury from any cause. While the company will be responsible to each one for the discharge-of all its duties and obligations to him, and for any fault, or neglect of its, own or of its board of directors or general officers which are the proximate cause of injury, yet it will not be responsible to him for the consequences of his own fault or neglect, or of that of any other employés of the-company, whether they, or either of them, are superior to him in authority, as conductor, foreman, or otherwise, or not; it being the right and duty of every employé, under all circumstances, to take sufficient time, before exposing himself, to make such examination as is here, required, and to refuse to obey any order which would expose him to-danger. No person who is careless of others or of himself' should be continued in the service of this company.”

His written contract of service, signed by him, is as. follows:

I, the undersigned, having been employed in the service-of the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Company,, hereby acknowledge the receipt of a copy of the printed orders, rules, and regulations of said company, also of a-copy of this agreement, and do hereby agree with itj in consideration that it will pay me the wages stipulated, that-I will, so long as I remain in its service, faithfully respect, and obey all said. orders, rules, and regulations, and all others which may be adopted, and of which I may have-notice; and I do further agree that I will, for myself, in all cases, before exposing myself in working, or in being on the tracks or grounds of the company, or in working with or being in any manner on or with its cars, engines, machinery, or tools, examine, for my own safety, the con'dition of all machinery, tools, tracks, cars, engines, or whatever I may undertake to work upon or with, before I make use of or' expose myself on or with the same, so as-to ascertain, so far as I reasonably can, their condition and soundness; and that I will promptly report, either to-the superintendent of the company or to its agent who. may be my immediate superior officer, any defect in any track,_ machinery, tools, or property of the company affecting the safety of any one using or operating upon or with, the same. The object of this agreement being:
[85]*85“First. To protect me from suffering personal injury rfrem any cause.
“Second.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Lahti v. Tamarack Mining Co.
152 N.W. 907 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1915)
Rogers v. Tegarden Packing Co.
170 S.W. 675 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1914)
Coke v. Michigan Central Railroad
143 N.W. 1 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1913)
Central R. Co. of New Jersey v. Young
200 F. 359 (Third Circuit, 1912)
Wickham v. Detroit United Railway
125 N.W. 22 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1910)
Marshal v. Dalton Paper Mills
74 A. 108 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1909)
Gillespie v. Grand Trunk Railway Co.
113 N.W. 1116 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1907)
New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad v. Hamlin
83 N.E. 343 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1907)
Henry v. Ann Arbor Railroad
103 N.W. 846 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1905)
De Cair v. Manistee & Grand Rapids Railroad
95 N.W. 726 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1903)
Dawson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.
114 F. 870 (Eighth Circuit, 1902)
Miller v. Michigan Central Railroad
82 N.W. 58 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1900)
Carrier v. Union Pacific Railway Co.
59 P. 1075 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1900)
Frazee v. Stott
79 N.W. 896 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1899)
Gleason v. Detroit, G. H. & M. Ry. Co.
73 F. 647 (Sixth Circuit, 1896)
Anderson v. Michigan Central Railroad
65 N.W. 585 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1895)
Balhoff v. Michigan Central Railroad
65 N.W. 592 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1895)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
62 N.W. 137, 104 Mich. 80, 1895 Mich. LEXIS 676, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/loranger-v-lake-shore-michigan-southern-railway-co-mich-1895.