Lopez Y Lopez De Mazariegos v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 15, 2025
• Docket: 24-7408
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 15 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARTA MARIA LOPEZ Y LOPEZ DE No. 24-7408 MAZARIEGOS; ROBELSI GENARO Agency Nos. MAZARIEGOS-LOPEZ; KENWUI A201-434-869 VICTORIA MAZARIEGOS-LOPEZ, A201-434-870 A201-434-871 Petitioners,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 10, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW, GOULD, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

Lead Petitioner Marta Maria Lopez Y Lopez de Mazariegos, and Adult Rider

Petitioner Robelsi Genaro Mazariegos-Lopez and Minor Rider Petitioner Kenwui

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Victoria Mazariegos-Lopez (collectively “Petitioners”) petition for vacatur of the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s

(“IJ”) order denying the applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and

protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Petitioners raise three

challenges: (1) that the agency’s decisions to deny the applications for asylum and

withholding of removal are not supported by substantial evidence; (2) that the

agency’s decision to deny the application for protection under CAT is not supported

by substantial evidence; and (3) that the agency violated Petitioners’ due process

rights when the IJ did not advise Petitioners of potential relief through an application

for Special Immigrant Juvenile (“SIJ”) status. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.

1. “Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we review both

decisions.” Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2023)

(citing Garcia-Martinez v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 2018)). We

review the denial of an application for asylum and withholding of removal for

substantial evidence. Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2021). We

also review the denial of CAT relief for substantial evidence. Tzompantzi-Salazar

v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 703 (9th Cir. 2022). The substantial evidence standard is

deferential, allowing reversal only when “any reasonable adjudicator would be

compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. (quoting Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d

2 24-7408 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added)). We review due process claims de

novo. Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000).

2. “To be eligible for asylum, a petitioner has the burden to demonstrate a

likelihood of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”

Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1059 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Substantial

evidence supports the agency’s finding that the violence Lead Petitioner faces from

her ex-partner is not due to her membership in a particular social group. Lead

Petitioner testified that the abuse from her ex-partner was due to disputes over Lead

Petitioner not taking birth control medication, bearing a third and fourth child, and

the ex-partner’s new wife. Because withholding of removal also requires a showing

that a petitioner’s “life or freedom would be threatened on account of [the

petitioner’s] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

political opinion,” Iraheta-Martinez v. Garland, 12 F.4th 942, 955 (9th Cir. 2021)

(internal quotations and citations omitted), the BIA and IJ’s determinations that Lead

Petitioner did not meet this standard are similarly supported by substantial evidence.

3. To establish protection under CAT, a petitioner must show that “it is

more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed.” Akosung v. Barr,

970 F.3d 1095, 1104 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)). And, the

torture must be “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or

3 24-7408 acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”

Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis omitted) (quoting

8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1)). “Acquiescence of a public official requires that the public

official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and

thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.”

Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.18(a)(7)). Here, again, the agency’s finding that Lead Petitioner could not

establish that the abuse she suffered from her ex-partner was inflicted with the

consent or acquiescence of the Guatemalan government is supported by substantial

evidence. Lead Petitioner testified that she called the Guatemalan police twice

regarding her ex-partner, and that both times the police responded to her call,

removed her ex-partner from the premises, but did not arrest him. Moreover, the

country conditions data demonstrates that Guatemala laws prohibit violence and that

there have been attempts to combat domestic violence in the country, even if those

attempts have not always succeeded. See also Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d

829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A] general ineffectiveness on the government’s part to

investigate and prevent crime will not suffice to show acquiescence.”).

4. Finally, we affirm the BIA’s conclusion that Petitioners were not

prejudiced by the IJ’s failure to inform Petitioners of potential Special Immigrant

Juvenile (“SIJ”) status. “An IJ is required to inform a petitioner subject to removal

4 24-7408 proceedings of apparent eligibility to apply for any of the benefits enumerated in this

chapter. One of the benefits listed in this chapter is SIJ status.” C.J.L.G. v. Barr,

923 F.3d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (internal quotations and citations

omitted). Although a failure to advise a petitioner of apparent eligibility for relief

can constitute a violation of due process, see United States v. Vidal-Mendoza, 705

F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 2013), we will only reverse the agency on due process

grounds if: “(1) the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the alien was

prevented from reasonably presenting his case, and (2) the alien demonstrates

prejudice, which means that the outcome of the proceeding may have been affected

by the alleged violation.” Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 620–21 (9th

Cir. 2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Here, the BIA correctly determined that Petitioners did not suffer prejudice

from the omission. The record reflects that Petitioners’ counsel knew of the potential

relief through SIJ status and discussed this with the IJ at an October 24, 2019 hearing.

The record further reflects that Petitioners’ counsel continued to discuss with the IJ

potential SIJ status filings in the state superior court, but did not ultimately file the

required documents with the agency. Because Petitioners were aware of the

potential relief through SIJ status, Petitioners were not prejudiced by the IJ’s failure

to advise of this potential relief.

5 24-7408 PETITION DENIED.1

1 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. The motion for stay of removal is otherwise denied. See Dkt. No. 3.

6 24-7408