Lopez v. Raygoza

CourtCourt of Appeals of Arizona
DecidedOctober 12, 2017
Docket1 CA-CV 16-0761-FC
StatusUnpublished

This text of Lopez v. Raygoza (Lopez v. Raygoza) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lopez v. Raygoza, (Ark. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

KRYSTLE N. LOPEZ, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

JOSE RAMIRO RAYGOZA, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 16-0761 FC FILED 10-12-2017

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. FC2016-000070 The Honorable Katherine M. Cooper, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Krystle N. Lopez, Phoenix Petitioner/Appellant

Robert D. Rosanelli Attorney at Law, Phoenix By Robert D. Rosanelli Counsel for Respondent/Appellee LOPEZ v. RAYGOZA Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Diane M. Johnsen joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1 Krystle N. Lopez (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s order granting Jose Ramiro Raygoza (“Father”) sole legal decision-making authority over the parties’ child, A.R., and limiting Mother’s parenting time. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Father never married. When A.R. was three years old, Mother filed this action seeking sole legal decision-making authority and asking the superior court to order that Father have no parenting time. In response, Father requested joint legal decision-making and equal parenting time. While the action was pending, the court entered a judgment establishing Father’s paternity and, based on the parties’ agreement, a temporary order for a week on/week off parenting time arrangement.

¶3 The superior court developed “significant concerns” about both parents after a Court-Appointed Advisor (“CAA”) reported that the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) was investigating allegations that one of Mother’s relatives had sexually abused A.R. Mother indicated to the CAA that she continued to live with the relative accused of molesting A.R. Father had returned A.R. to Mother despite DCS’ instructions that A.R. remain in Father’s care pending further investigation of the allegations. In addition, the court noted the CAA’s report detailed Mother’s criminal record and history of drug use and Father’s admission that he used marijuana illegally. The CAA also observed that the parties had a high level of conflict and had exchanged threatening and verbally abusive texts and emails.

¶4 After finding it was in A.R.’s best interests to reside with Father until further order, the superior court directed that Mother have reasonable supervised parenting time at least once a week. The court

2 LOPEZ v. RAYGOZA Decision of the Court

designated A.R.’s grandmother as a suitable supervisor of Mother’s parenting time but allowed the parties to agree on a different supervisor.

¶5 The superior court also ordered Mother to immediately submit to a drug test. Mother tested positive for several illegal drugs, and the court ordered her to submit to a weekly urinalysis until she provided eight consecutive negative samples. It continued the order that A.R. remain with Father and that Mother exercise parenting time once a week, supervised by A.R.’s grandmother.

¶6 Alleging Mother had violated the court order by conducting unsupervised parenting time with A.R., Father filed an expedited motion to modify Mother’s parenting time. The superior court, noting Father no longer agreed A.R.’s grandmother could supervise parenting time, ordered that, absent the parties’ agreement to another third-party supervisor, Mother would exercise her parenting time at Arizonans for Children, a non- profit organization offering such services. The court ruled it would continue Father’s motion to the upcoming trial on Mother’s petition for legal decision-making and parenting time.

¶7 Five days prior to trial, Mother filed a motion to continue, asserting she was beginning cancer treatment and had just received new documents she wanted to review before trial. The superior court denied the motion, and Mother appeared and presented evidence at trial.

¶8 After considering A.R.’s best interests and other relevant statutory factors, the superior court granted Father sole legal decision- making authority. It ordered A.R. would live with Father and granted Mother supervised parenting time at Arizonans for Children once a week.

¶9 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶10 Mother argues the superior court abused its discretion by granting Father’s motion to modify parenting time without first conducting an evidentiary hearing and by denying Mother’s motion to continue the trial. She also argues the court denied her due process of law at trial and challenges the basis for the court’s best interests findings.

3 LOPEZ v. RAYGOZA Decision of the Court

I. Motion to Modify Parenting Time

¶11 Mother argues the superior court abused its discretion by not conducting an evidentiary hearing before modifying her pretrial parenting time, thereby requiring Mother to conduct her parenting time at Arizonans for Children. The order at issue was a temporary order pending the October 2016 trial and is therefore not appealable. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 47(M) (stating “temporary orders become ineffective and unenforceable . . . following entry of a final decree, judgment, or order”); Villares v. Pineda, 217 Ariz. 623, 624-25, ¶¶ 10-11 (App. 2008) (accepting review of a special action challenging a temporary order regarding child custody, noting the order was not appealable).1

II. Motion to Continue Trial

¶12 Mother also argues the superior court abused its discretion by denying her motion to continue the trial. Once a matter is set for trial, the court may not grant a continuance “except upon written motion setting forth sufficient grounds and good cause, or as otherwise ordered by the court.” Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 77(C)(1). We will not disturb the court’s ruling on a motion to continue trial absent an abuse of discretion. Dykeman v. Ashton, 8 Ariz. App. 327, 330 (1968).

¶13 Mother asked the superior court to continue trial because she was beginning cancer treatment and had just received documents from the Department of Public Safety and the Phoenix Police Department that she wanted to review before trial. The exhibit attached to Mother’s motion did not support her contention that she was unable to attend trial for medical reasons; it showed only that she had a medical appointment set for a few days before trial. In addition, Mother did not identify the documents she had received or state why they might be relevant to her presentation at trial.

1 We note, however, that the superior court did not modify Mother’s parenting time, but simply affirmed prior parenting time orders. The court did not decide the merits of Father’s allegations that Mother conducted unsupervised parenting time, and stated Mother could address that issue at trial. Mother did not proffer any controverting evidence at trial and does not argue on appeal that she would have presented such evidence if the court had conducted a pretrial hearing on Father’s motion. See In re Marriage of Molloy, 181 Ariz. 146, 150 (App. 1994) (stating appellate court will only reverse superior court’s error if the complaining party suffered prejudice).

4 LOPEZ v. RAYGOZA Decision of the Court

We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of the motion to continue.

III. Due Process

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Related

Dykeman v. Ashton
446 P.2d 26 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 1968)
Brown v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
977 P.2d 807 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 1999)
In Re Marriage of Molloy
888 P.2d 1333 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 1994)
Villares v. Pineda
177 P.3d 1195 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 2008)
Cullum v. Cullum
160 P.3d 231 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 2007)
County of La Paz v. Yakima Compost Co.
233 P.3d 1169 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 2010)
Gamboa v. Metzler
224 P.3d 215 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 2010)
Jeff D. v. Department of Child Safety
367 P.3d 109 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 2016)
Wallace v. Shields
854 P.2d 1152 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 1992)
Nold v. Nold
304 P.3d 1093 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 2013)
Volk v. Brame
333 P.3d 789 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 2014)

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Bluebook (online)
Lopez v. Raygoza, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lopez-v-raygoza-arizctapp-2017.