Lopez v. Martinez

District Court, N.D. California·Decided March 31, 2025·No. 4:23-cv-02326·Unknown

Opinion

JESUS ANDRES LOPEZ, Case No. 23-cv-02326-KAW (PR)

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY v. JUDGMENT; AND DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR L. MARTINEZ, et al., APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL Defendants. Re: Dkt. Nos. 12, 20

Plaintiff Jesus Andres Lopez, a state prisoner incarcerated at the Correctional Training Facility (“CTF”) in Soledad, filed a pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that former CTF Warden L. Martinez and former Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) K. Allison violated his constitutional rights by exposing him to Valley Fever. On May 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed his initial complaint, which the court dismissed with leave to amend. Dkts. 1, 5. On January 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed his amended complaint, which is the operative complaint in this matter. Dkt. 7. Plaintiff alleges that he tested positive for Valley Fever for the first time on July 19, 2020. Id. at 4.1 He claims that he was high risk for a serious case of the illness because he has prior medical issues including diabetes, high blood pressure, and high cholesterol. Id. He was first made aware of Valley Fever on July 10, 2020, and of the fact that CTF was in a region where Valley Fever could be contracted. Id. Around May of 2021, Plaintiff was put on Valley Fever medication, which he has taken for three years. Id. at 5. He experiences daily pain because of the disease. Id. Plaintiff alleges that defendants were aware of the risk to him and failed to mitigate it or inform him of it upon his arrival at CTF and enable him to take his own precautions. Id. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 7. This action has been assigned to the undersigned magistrate judge. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), with written consent of all parties, a magistrate judge may conduct all proceedings in a case, including entry of judgment. Appeal will be directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3). The parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction in this matter. Dkt. 3; Dkt. 14. On June 14, 2024, the court found that Plaintiff had addressed the deficiencies identified in its prior order of dismissal with leave to amend. See Dkt. 8 at 2-3 (citing Dkt. 5 at 3-5). And the court determined that, liberally construed, Plaintiff stated a claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment against defendants for failing to mitigate and failing to inform Plaintiff of the risk of Valley Fever at CTF. Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (holding prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she knows that prisoner faces substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it)). Before the court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies as to his Eighth Amendment claim in the amended complaint. Dkt. 12. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion, and defendants filed a reply. Dkts. 21, 22. Also before the court is Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel. Dkt. 20. For the reasons set out below, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED as moot. A. Legal Standard Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a party may move for summary judgment on some or all of the claims or defenses presented in an action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)(1). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.; see Anderson v. establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (requiring citation to “particular parts of materials in the record”). If the moving party meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non- moving party to present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that must be raised in a motion for summary judgment. See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). The defendants have the initial burden to prove “that there was an available administrative remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.” Id. at 1172. If the defendants carry that burden, “the burden shifts to the prisoner to come forward with evidence showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Id. The ultimate burden of proof remains with defendants, however. Id. “If material facts are disputed, summary judgment should be denied, and the district judge rather than a jury should determine the facts.” Id. at 1166. A district court may only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). In support of the motion for summary judgment, defendants have filed a declaration and exhibits from their attorney, Deputy Attorney General Hannah Park, as well as declarations and exhibits from Associate Director of the Office of Appeals Howard E. Moseley, CTF Grievance Coordinator R. Monroy, and Chief of the Health Care Correspondence and Appeals Branch (“HCCAB”) of the California Correctional Health Care Services (“CCHCS”) S. Gates. See Dkt. 12-2 – 12-5. As noted, Plaintiff filed his opposition, which is verified as he signed it under penalty of perjury. Dkt. 21 at 6. The amended complaint is also verified, see Dkt. 7 at 3, and thus the court will construe it as well as the verified opposition as opposing affidavits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, insofar as they are based on personal knowledge and set forth specific facts In addition, the court will consider a declaration of the inmate who assisted Plaintiff in filing the relevant grievance, Anthony A. Sharp, see id. at 3, and the February 11, 2022 Institutional Level Response to that grievance, see id. at 4-5. B. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies 1. Legal Framework for Exhaustion of Available Administrative Remedies The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires a prisoner to exhaust all available administrative remedies before bringing an action with respect to prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve g

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