Lopez v. Lee

District Court, N.D. California·Decided September 16, 2025·No. 4:23-cv-03660·Unknown

Opinion

ANDREW LOPEZ, Case No. 23-cv-03660-HSG

Plaintiff, AMENDED ORDER ADDRESSING MOTIONS TO COMPEL v. Re: Dkt. Nos. 48, 57, 66 M. LEE, et al., Defendants.

Plaintiff, an inmate currently housed at San Quentin State Prison, has filed a pro se civil rights action regarding events that occurred at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”), while he was previously housed there. This order addresses Plaintiff’s three motions to compel. Dkt. Nos. 48, 57, 66.1 I. Complaint Plaintiff has sued Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”) officers S. Cupp, Hamner, Cross, M. Lee, Brewer, and K. Davis, alleging that, between May 2020 to March 2021, while he was housed in Restricted Custody General Population (“RCGP”), Facility B-1, they retaliated against him for his grievance activity by denying or limiting phone time, yard time, and shower time. Plaintiff alleges that the denials or limitations violated established policy and that other inmates housed in his facility in the same privilege group were allowed these privileges. See generally Dkt. Nos. 1, 12. In the complaint, Plaintiff specifies the dates that each individual defendant denied him either phone time, yard time, or shower time. See generally Dkt. No. 1; see, e.g., Dkt. No. 1 at 17 (defendant Lee denied Plaintiff phone time on January 11-15, 2021; defendant Hamner denied Plaintiff phone time on January 17, 2021). The Court screened the complaint as follows: Liberally construed, the complaint states cognizable First Amendment retaliation claims against defendants Cupp, Ham[n]er, Cross, Lee, Brewer, and Davis because it alleges that, on certain dates, these defendants denied Plaintiff phone calls, limited his phone calls to unfavorable times, rescheduled his shower time to an inconvenient time, told other inmates that their phone privileges would be limited because of Plaintiff’s grievance activity, forced him to end his call early, and refused to allow him to stay outside his cell; and specified that the restrictions were because of Plaintiff’s filing activity. Specifically, the following allegations state cognizable First Amendment retaliation claims: - On May 28, 2020, defendant Cupp told Plaintiff that if he wanted to file grievances, he could no longer have calls during work[] hours and would miss calls if he went to yard, and told other inmates that they would be denied phone calls during work hours because of Plaintiff’s grievance activity; - On June 3, 2020, defendant Ham[n]er told Plaintiff that he must skip yard if he wanted to use the phone, stating that he did so at defendant Cupp’s direction; - On December 9, 2020, defendant Lee cut short Plaintiff’s c[a]ll, and later told Plaintiff on December 29, 2020 that he would run the call program the way he wanted and that Plaintiff should “keep filing;” - On August 15, 2020, defendant Cross skipped Plaintiff for call time, stating that he made a new rule and referencing Plaintiff’s grievance activity; - On January 20, 2021, defendant Brewer restricted Plaintiff’s call time, telling him to “keep filing,” and defendant Lee told the inmates in Cell 101 that they would not get call time because of Plaintiff’s grievance activity; and - On March 27, 2021, defendant Davis told the porters no more double calls because of Plaintiff’s grievance activity. In addition, the allegations that defendants Lee and Ham[n]er repeatedly denied Plaintiff phone calls, out-of-cell time, and shower time on other days and indicated knowledge of, and irritation with, Plaintiff’s grievance activity state cognizable First Amendment retaliation claims. The allegations that defendants Cupp, Ham[n]er, Cross, Lee, Brewer, and Davis failed to respond to, or improperly handled, Form 22s or grievances regarding alleged mistreatment or failure to comply with prison regulations or state laws do not state a First Amendment retaliation claim because a prison official’s denial of an inmate’s grievance generally does not constitute significant participation in an alleged constitutional violation sufficient to give rise to personal liability under Section 1983. Liberally construed, the allegations that defendants Cupp, Ham[n]er, Cross, Lee, Brewer, and Davis threatened to deprive Plaintiff of phone calls, out-of-cell time, or showers because of his grievance activity also state a cognizable claim for violation of the Bane Act. See Allen v. City of Sacramento, 234 Cal. App. 4th 41, 66, as modified on denial of reh’g (Cal. Ct. App. 2015). Dkt. No. 12 at 6-7. II. Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel – Dkt. Nos. 48, 57, 66 The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s motions to compel. Dkt. Nos. 48, 57, 66. Plaintiff has served over 400 discovery requests and challenged every discovery response received. Id. The bulk of Plaintiff’s motions to compel are based on the following objections, which the Court addresses in this section. the defendant provided a substantive discovery response; (2) discovery responses where Plaintiff disagrees with the substance of the response, because he believes that Defendants are being untruthful or that Defendants have mischaracterized the relevant events; and (3) any qualified discovery responses. These particular objections are meritless and based on a misunderstanding of discovery. Plaintiff incorrectly presumes that discovery responses determine the legal relevance of issues, in a manner that is binding on future legal determinations in the case. Based on this misunderstanding, Plaintiff’s motion to compel requests that the Court “overrule”, i.e., strike, Defendants’ routine relevance objections; that the Court find that that his discovery requests are relevant; that the Court deem certain discovery requests admitted in all aspects, which by implication seeks a finding that certain discovery responses are false; that the Court find that Defendants’ discovery responses are evasive if the response is not consistent with Plaintiff’s understanding of events; and that the Court sanction Defendants for dilatory and evasive responses. These are not appropriate bases for a motion to compel, and the Court lacks authority to make factual determinations in this manner. With respect to Defendants’ relevancy objections, these objections are appropriate. Generally speaking, a responding party may propound any objections the party believes appropriate. In fact, the responding party must make the objection or it is waived. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4). Accordingly, in responding to Plaintiff’s discovery requests, Defendants begin by listing their objections to the request. In many of their responses, Defendants have objected on the ground that the request is overly broad because it seeks documents, or an admission or denial, or information, that is not relevant to the claim or defense of any party. This is a proper basis for objecting to a discovery response. With respect to Plaintiff’s belief that the discovery responses are false or evasive, a motion to compel is not a vehicle for the party propounding discovery to express his disagreement with the objection or to require the Court to make factual findings. A motion to compel under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 is appropriate where a party has a good-faith basis for believing that the responding party’s failure to respond or denial is unjustified or for believing that the discovery response was has reviewed the record and finds no indication that Defendants’ relevancy objections were made in bad faith, or that Defendants have lied in their discovery responses. With respect to Plaintiff’s request for the Court to find that his discovery requests are relevant or admitted in full, a motion to compel is not a vehicle for the party propounding discovery to require the Court to make factu

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Related

Allen v. City of Sacramento
234 Cal. App. 4th 41 (California Court of Appeal, 2015)