Lopez v. County of Santa Clara

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: November 19, 2020
• Docket: 3:20-cv-03425
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 | JAMES R. WILLIAMS, County Counsel (S$.B. #271253) MELISSA R. KINITYALOCTS, Lead Deputy County Counsel (S.B. #215814) 2 | ROBIN M. WALL, Deputy County Counsel (S.B. #235690) OFFICE OF THE COUNTY COUNSEL 3 70 West Hedding Street, East Wing, Ninth Floor San José, California 95110-1770 4 | Telephone: (408) 299-5900 Facsimile: (408) 292-7240 5 Attorneys for Defendants 6 | COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, ROBERT RUIZ, EPIFANIO REYNA, ANGEL KELLY, BEVERLY 7 | JARVIS, and RACHEL KING 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 (San Francisco Division) 10 11 | FRANCISCO LOPEZ, LORA LOPEZ, No. 20-CV-03425-MMC Individually, and CLARISSA LOPEZ as 12 | Guardian Ad Litem for S.L., fPROPOSED}ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 13 Plaintiffs. Date: November 20, 2020 14 |v. Time: 9:00 a.m. Crtrm.: 7, 19" Floor 15 | COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, ROBERT San Francisco District Courthouse RUIZ, EPIFANIO REYNA, ANGEL KELLY, 450 Golden Gate Avenue 16 | BEVERLY JARVIS, RACHEL KING, and San Francisco. California DOES 1-10, 7 Defendants. Judge: § Hon. Maxine M. Chesney 18 19 Having considered the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the parties’ briefs, and the pleadings 20 | and other papers on file in this action, the Court hereby: 21 GRANTS, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the motion 22 Ito dismiss (1) Plaintiffs’ First through Third Claims for Relief to the extent they are asserted 23 | against Defendant County of Santa Clara and (2) Fourth and Fifth Claims for Relief in their 24 | entirety. 2 ° ' Plaintiffs' claims are: (1) "Violation of Ist, 4th, and/or 14th Amendment Seizure of S.L., 26 || Violation of Familial Association Rights by Way of Judicial Deception - Removal, Warrant"; (2) "Continued Detention - 4th/14th Amendment Violation"; (3) "Unlawful Medical Examination 27 | 4th/14th Amendment"; (4) "Monell #1 . . . Judicial Deception"; (5) "Monell #2... Medical Examinations"; (6) "False Imprisonment"; and (7) "Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress."

1 Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (SAC) fails to state a claim against the County 2 | pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).” In the context of a Monell 3 claim, a complaint “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain 4 |sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defen 5 jlitself effectively.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) 6 |(citation omitted); see also Brown vy. County of Mariposa, No. 18-cv-01541, 2019 WL 1993990, at 7 ||\(E.D. Cal. May 6, 2019) (“Allegations concerning Monell liability based on the existence of a policy 8 |are subject to the pleading requirements of Twombly/Iqbal.”). The SAC does not plausibly allege 9 | facts supporting Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations that a County policy or practice was the moving 10 || force behind the alleged violations of Plaintiffs’ rights. 11 First, Plaintiffs’ SAC fails to show any County employee engaged in allegedly wrongful 12 “conduct pursuant to a formal or expressly adopted official policy.” Brown, 2019 WL 1993990, at *8 13 |\(citing Thomas v. Cnty. of Riverside, 763 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2014)). Plaintiffs have alleged a 14 formal policy, the “Operational Policies & Procedures Handbook” or “Handbook,” which is 15 ||incorporated by reference in the pleading (see, e.g., SAC at J 146), but the SAC does not allege 16 conduct pursuant to or motivated by that policy, let alone that adoption of such policy constituted 17 deliberate indifference to plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. 18 In particular, with respect to Plaintiffs’ judicial deception claims, Plaintiffs allege that the 19 | County’s child welfare employees were not “thorough, truthful, and accurate” in their submissions tc 20 ? To establish Monell liability, plaintiffs "must show that (1) [they] w[ere] deprived of a 91 | constitutional right; (2) the County had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to a deliberate indifference to [their] constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional 22 | violation." See Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal 93 | quotation and citation omitted). 3 Monell's policy requirement may be established in three ways: (1) "the plaintiff may prove that a city employee committed the alleged constitutional violation pursuant to a formal government 95 |/policy or a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity"; (2) "the plaintiff may establish that the individual who committed the 26 constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority and that the challenged action itself thus constituted an act of official government policy”; or (3) "the plaintiff may prove that an 27 . . . . . . . we . . official with final policy-making authority ratified a subordinate's unconstitutional decision or action 28 |/and the basis for it." See Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1083 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

1 |[the juvenile court (see, e.g., SAC at 22-23), but this alleged conduct would have been a violation 2 jlof the County policy identified by Plaintiffs, not conduct “pursuant” to that policy. The Handbook 3 |directs child welfare employees to “[b]e accurate and fair.” (Defs.’ Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 4 |Batp. 2.)* The Handbook also requires child welfare employees to provide “accurate, factual 5 |evidence” and to “back up every allegation with a witness or documentation” in their first submission 6 |to the juvenile court—the initial petition on behalf of a child pursuant to Welfare and Institutions 7 Code § 300. (/d. at Ex. A at p. 2; Ex. B at p. 2.) Thus, to the extent that the County’s child welfare 8 |lemployees were not truthful or accurate in their submissions to the juvenile court, their alleged 9 |conduct was in violation of—and not motivated by—County policy, and the SAC does not state a 10 ||Monell claim against the County based thereon. 11 Next, with respect to Plaintiffs’ medical examination claims, Plaintiffs identify one formal 12 |policy—the chapter in the Handbook on “Emergency Medical Orders”—but again they do not allege 13 ||conduct pursuant to that policy. (SAC 164-169.) In fact, Plaintiffs allege that the child welfare 14 workers were required to, but did not, submit a recommendation from a physician as allegedly 15 |\required by the Handbook. (SAC 4 165-166.) Again, Plaintiffs have alleged conduct in violation 16 lof, not motivated by, County policy, and have therefore failed to state a Monell claim. 17 Further, as to both the judicial deception and medical examination claims, to the 18 |/extent Plaintiffs also allege the Handbook contains a number of purported errors, the alleged errors 19 are not alleged to have anything to do with the purported constitutional violations in this case. 20 (See SAC at 155-156, 163, 173-174, 177.) Accordingly, any such errors could not have been the 21 |moving force behind the constitutional violations Plaintiffs assert. 22 4 The Court GRANTS defendants' unopposed Request for Judicial Notice, whereby 53 defendants seek judicial notice of the complete text of various sections of the Handbook cited in the SAC. See Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting, “a court can consider a 24 | document on which the complaint relies if the document is central to the plaintiff's claim, and no | Party questions the authenticity of the document”). > The Court also notes that, contrary to plaintiffs’ assertions, County social workers are 26 directed, under the Handbook, to include “any exculpatory evidence” in a warrant application for 27 || protective custody. See Handbook, Chapter 13-5 Protective Custody Warrants, 3g https://www.sccgov.org/ssa/opp2/13_ xp/13-5.html.

1 Plaintiffs’ SAC likewise fails to show any County employee engaged in allegedly wrongful 2 conduct pursuant to a practice or custom. Liability for an improper custom or practice “may not be 3 | predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents,” but must be “founded upon practices of sufficient 4 | duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out 5 |policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Brocato v. Riverside Cnty. 6 || Regional Medical, No. CV 19-1345-SVW, 2019 WL 7285280, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2019) 7 || (dismissing Monell claim, where plaintiff “merely describe[d] inadequate medical care provided to 8 ... on one occasion”). The single incident alleged here does not suffice to “evince a deliberate 9 | indifference to [any] constitutional right,” and thus does not suffice to establish municipal liability. 10 | See Edgerly v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 599 F.3d 946, 960 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation 11 | and citation omitted).° 12 Similarly, Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding "the need for further or adequate training" (see, 13 fle.g., SAC FF 156, 159, 173), are generic and conclusory and therefore do not state a claim. See 14 || McFarland v. City of Clovis, 163 F. Supp. 3d 798, 806 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (“Alleging that training is 15 |‘deficient’ or ‘inadequate’ without identifying a specific inadequacy is conclusory and does not 16 |support a plausible claim.”) (citing Young v. City of Visalia, 687 F.Supp.2d 1141, 1149 (E.D. Cal. 17 |2009)); Bini v. City of Vancouver, 218 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1202 (W.D. Wash. 2016) (“Absent 18 jlallegations of specific shortcomings in the training ... or facts that might place the City on notice that 19 |\constitutional deprivations were likely to occur, Plaintiff [cannot] adequately [plead] a § 1983 claim 20 ||... for failure to train.”). Moreover, even if plaintiffs’ allegations had been sufficient to plead an 21 > ® Plaintiffs argue that a practice or custom may be inferred where the municipality has taken no steps "to reprimand or discharge the offending social workers" or has “otherwise failed to admit 23 || that the conduct was in error." (See Opp. at 9:20-23); see also McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 784 (9th Cir. 1986). As defendants point out, however, plaintiffs’ allegations in that regard are a4 conclusory and, thus, are insufficient to state a claim for relief. (See SAC JJ 198, 207 (alleging 25 | “the consistent failure on the part of [County] to investigate violations of constitutional rights by social workers of a similar nature" and County "never investigates, reprimands, disciplines, and/or 26 discharges its social workers who engage in the type of conduct alleged herein")); see also Ashcroft 97 | ¥-Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” do not suffice to state claim for relief). 28

1 | absence of training, the one assertedly mishandled investigation alleged here does not suffice to 2 |/establish municipal liability, as plaintiffs have not shown “the need for more or different training is 3 ||so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the 4 ||policymakers of the [county] can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the 5 ||need.” See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989).7 6 For these reasons, Plaintiffs have failed to state a Monell claim against the County, and the 7 | Plaintiffs’ First through Third Claims for Relief, to the extent alleged against the County, and Fourth 8 ||and Fifth Claims for Relief are hereby dismissed. 9 Because Plaintiffs were given an opportunity to amend their initial complaint, but were 10 unable to address the deficiencies in their constitutional claims against the County, the 11 ||aforementioned claims are hereby dismissed with prejudice as against the County. 12 13 SO ORDERED. 14 1s |Dated: November 19, 2020 □ . M E M. CHESNEY 16 United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 ’ Although plaintiffs argue the County's conduct was "ratified by the ‘legal team," specifically, the County Counsel's Office, thereby "subject[ing] the [County] to Monell liability" (see 22 Opp. at 9:1-7; see also SAC ¥ 104), plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations that "County Counsel" and 93 |"senior County Counsel staff" are "final, official policymakers" (see SAC {| 161), are insufficient to state a claim for relief, see Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678; see also City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 24 1U.S. 112, 123 (1988) (plurality opinion) (holding "only those municipal officials who have 'final policymaking authority’ may by their actions subject the government to § 1983 liability"). Moreover, even assuming those attorneys have final policymaking authority, plaintiffs fail to allege they 26 ||knowingly approved the inclusion of false information in the warrant applications. See Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding, to establish municipal liability based on 27 policymaker's ratification of subordinate's decision, policymaker must "approve [the] subordinate's 9g |decision and the basis for it" (emphasis omitted)).