Lopez v. Breaux
This text of 462 So. 2d 1333 (Lopez v. Breaux) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Sandra Ann LOPEZ, Plaintiff-Appellee.
v.
Frank J. BREAUX, Defendant-Appellant.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
*1334 Reule P. Bourque, Kaplan, for defendant-appellant.
Broadhurst, Brook, Mangham, Hardy & Reed, Wayne A. Shullaw, Lafayette, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before GUIDRY, FORET and LABORDE, JJ.
GUIDRY, Judge.
The defendant in this suit for divorce appeals the judgment of the trial court insofar as it awards his former wife permanent alimony in the sum of $125.00 per month and child support in the amount of $375.00 monthly.
Frank J. Breaux and Sandra Ann Lopez were married on February 15, 1974. One child was born of the marriage, Frank J. Breaux, Jr. Sandra obtained a separation from bed and board on the ground of cruel treatment by default judgment dated June 10, 1982. This judgment awarded custody of Frank, Jr., to the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to pay $300.00 per month in child support. This judgment contained no provision requiring payment by defendant of alimony pendente lite. On December 16, 1982, plaintiff filed the instant suit seeking a divorce pursuant to La. R.S. 9:302.
Defendant answered the petition and requested a reduction in the child support payments to $100.00 per month. Plaintiff responded by filing a rule to fix permanent alimony and to increase child support. By judgment dated May 18, 1983, plaintiff was granted a divorce, permanent custody of Frank, Jr., subject to reasonable visitation rights of the defendant, and child support in the amount of $375.00 per month. A separate hearing was held on the issue of permanent alimony. Neither defendant nor his attorney were present in court at *1335 that hearing. The rule was taken up and tried nonetheless and judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay $225.00 per month to plaintiff in permanent alimony. Defendant thereafter moved for a new trial. This motion was denied by the trial court.
On September 20, 1983, defendant filed a rule to terminate alimony and to reduce the amount of child support. A hearing on the rule was held on September 26, 1983. The trial court denied defendant's motion to terminate alimony and to reduce child support. However, the trial court did reduce the amount of permanent alimony from $225.00 per month to $125.00 per month. Defendant appealed.
Defendant's principal argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in refusing to terminate permanent alimony in light of plaintiff's and defendant's respective employment situations at the time of the hearing. Defendant also contends that $375.00 per month in child support is excessive.
PERMANENT ALIMONY
Article 160 of the Louisiana Civil Code authorizes alimony after divorce "when a spouse has not been at fault and has not sufficient means for support." Article 160 then limits the award of alimony, to a spouse who has been without fault, to one-third of the former spouse's income.
To be entitled to permanent alimony under Article 160, the petitioning spouse must establish that she has insufficient means to support or maintain herself. Frederic v. Frederic, 302 So.2d 903 (La. 1974). A determination as to whether a spouse possesses "sufficient means" within the intendment of Article 160 is not determinable by precise formula. The courts look at various factors but the principal factor to be considered is the relative financial positions of the parties. Boisfontaine v. Boisfontaine, 357 So.2d 90 (La.App. 4th Cir.1978), writ denied, 358 So.2d 644, 645 (La.1978).
As we stated in Moss v. Moss, 379 So.2d 1206 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1980):
"The term `support' or `maintenance' has been interpreted to include food, clothing, and shelter, the basic necessities of life, Smith v. Smith, 217 La. 646, 47 So.2d 32 (1950), as well as reasonable and necessary transportation expenses, utility expenses (such as gas and electricity), medical and drug expenses, household expenses, and income tax liability generated by the alimony payments, Bernhardt v. Bernhardt, 283 So.2d 226 (La.1973)."
On May 16, 1983, the trial court initially awarded Sandra the sum of $225.00 per month in permanent alimony. The record reflects the respective financial positions of the parties at that time to be as follows. On the date of hearing, neither Sandra nor Frank were employed. Sandra had been laid off from her job with Coastal Chemical, Inc. for approximately one month. Frank was laid off by Sealand Contractors, Inc. on April 21, 1983. He had been employed with Sealand since January of that year. Frank was unable to continue crawfishing his uncle's 30-acre crawfish pond as of May 1, 1983. Frank was thus left without any source of income. He was living rent free at the time in a home owned by his mother.
On September 20, 1983, Frank filed a rule to terminate alimony and to reduce child support. A hearing on this rule was held on September 26th. At this point in time, Sandra had secured employment with a Lafayette law firm. Her salary was $1,300.00 per month. Her expenses, as listed in the affidavit which was admitted in evidence at the hearing, were $1,625.00 per month (an increase of $39.44 since the initial hearing). We note here that the affidavit included some expenses which are not within the scope of Article 160, such as the miscellaneous expense item of $200.00 per month which Sandra stated was for "any gifts, any parking fees, any unexpected expenses that might come up ...". Also listed was $250.00 per month in miscellaneous charge accounts. Assuming that this figure represents the purchase of items which are properly compensable under Article 160, then this amount had already been included in the itemized expenses. To allow this figure to be added along with the *1336 other expenses would be to duplicate some of Sandra's expenses. We thus find that her actual expenses, as reflected by her affidavit, as far as Article 160 is concerned, amount to $1,175.00 per month.
Frank, on the other hand, was still unemployed. He was collecting $793.00 per month in unemployment benefits. Frank had resumed crawfishing, but as of that time had not made any profits. Two days prior to the hearing, he began working for his uncle at the rate of $25.00 per day. He stated that his total income would remain at $793.00 per month despite these odd jobs since his unemployment benefits would be reduced by the amount of other income which he received. Frank was no longer living rent-free, but was paying $100.00 per month rent to his mother. He had also taken out two loans from Vermilion Bank and Trust Company in the amount of $300.00.
Frank contends that any award of post-divorce alimony, under the circumstances recited, is erroneous and contrary to Article 160, considering the respective financial situations of the parties.
A spouse who seeks the modification of an alimony award must show a change in circumstances of one of the parties from the time alimony was fixed. Green v. Green, 432 So.2d 959 (La.App. 4th Cir.1983); Ducote v. Ducote, 339 So.2d 835 (La.1976).
In the present case, Frank successfully met his burden of proving a change in circumstances justifying a termination of alimony. At the time of hearing, Sandra was gainfully employed at a salary of $1,300.00 per month, with expenses of $1,175.00 per month. Frank's income had increased to $793.00 per month, but so had his expenses.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
462 So. 2d 1333, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lopez-v-breaux-lactapp-1985.