Lopez Montes v. Bondi
This text of Lopez Montes v. Bondi (Lopez Montes v. Bondi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 11 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PABLO LOPEZ MONTES, No. 25-1118 Agency No. Petitioner, A206-411-129 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 9, 2026** Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW, M. SMITH, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Pablo Lopez Montes (Lopez), a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his
appeal from an order of an immigration judge (IJ) denying his application for
cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). We have jurisdiction under
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
“Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ decision and also adds its own
reasoning,” the court reviews “the decision of the BIA and those parts of the IJ’s
decision upon which it relies.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1027–28
(9th Cir. 2019). Because application of the statutory “exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship” standard is “a mixed question of law and fact that is primarily
factual,” the agency’s determination is reviewed for “substantial evidence.”
Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1002–03 (9th Cir. 2025). Under that
standard, the court “must uphold the agency determination unless the evidence
compels a contrary conclusion.” Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1028.
1. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in considering the hardship
factors. The BIA abuses its discretion when it “fail[s] to consider [the] cumulative
effect of all relevant [hardship] factors.” See Salcido-Salcido v. INS, 138 F.3d
1292, 1293 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Here, the agency considered each
factor both individually and collectively in the totality of the circumstances.
Specifically, the agency considered the potential emotional, financial, and
educational-related burdens to Lopez’s qualifying relatives—his two U.S.-citizen
daughters—both individually and cumulatively before determining that the
evidence did not surpass the ordinary hardship associated with the removal of a
2 25-1118 close relative to another country.1 See Ramirez-Perez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 1001,
1006 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that an alien must demonstrate hardship to a
qualifying relative “substantially beyond that which ordinarily would be expected
to result from the alien’s deportation” (quoting In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N.
Dec. 56, 59 (B.I.A. 2001))).
2. Contrary to Lopez’s assertion, the agency adequately considered the
hardship to his daughters resulting from the ten-year bar to reentry under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(9)(C).
3. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Lopez’s
removal would not result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his
two U.S.-citizen daughters. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that
either daughter has serious health issues or compelling special needs in school.
See Fernandez v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 965, 966 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“With
regard to hardship to a child, petitioners generally must demonstrate that they have
a ‘qualifying child with very serious health issues, or compelling special needs in
school.’” (quoting Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 63)). Moreover, the
1 While Lopez’s eldest U.S.-citizen daughter is now over the age of twenty-one, she was under the age of twenty-one at the time the IJ adjudicated Lopez’s cancellation of removal application and therefore is a qualifying relative. See Mendez-Garcia v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 655, 663–64 (9th Cir. 2016) (affirming that the qualifying child must be under twenty-one at the time the IJ adjudicates the cancellation of removal application).
3 25-1118 record lacks evidence that would indicate that Lopez and his wife would be unable
to support his two U.S.-citizen daughters upon his removal to Mexico. Because
the record does not compel the conclusion that Lopez’s qualifying family members
would experience “hardship that is substantially different from, or beyond, that
which would normally be expected from the deportation of an alien with close
family members [in the United States],” the agency’s hardship determination must
be upheld. See Gonzalez-Juarez, 137 F.4th at 1006 (quoting Monreal-Aguinaga,
23 I. & N. Dec. at 65).
PETITION DENIED.2
2 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. The motion for a stay of removal, Dkt. 4, is otherwise denied.
4 25-1118
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