Lopez, J. v. Crown Equipment Corp.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 21, 2024
• Docket: 3146 EDA 2022
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A26011-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

JOSUE PEREZ LOPEZ AND MAYELI : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF HERNANDEZ : PENNSYLVANIA : : v. : : : CROWN EQUIPMENT CORPORATION : OMNILIFT, INC., LIFT, INC., : No. 3146 EDA 2022 CLEMENS FOOD GROUP, LLC, : CLEMENS FAMILY CORPORATION, : HATFIELD QUALITY MEATS, INC., : HATFIELD QUALITY MEATS, LLC. : : : APPEAL OF: CROWN EQUIPMENT : CORPORATION :

Appeal from the Order Entered November 22, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 171204161

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED MAY 21, 2024

Appellant, Crown Equipment Corporation, appeals from the November

22, 2022 Order granting the motion for post-trial relief filed by Appellees,

Josue Perez Lopez and Mayeli Hernandez, and ordering a new trial in this

products liability action. After careful review, we affirm.1

____________________________________________

1 Following oral argument of this appeal, the parties submitted several filings.

Addressing Appellant’s filings, we grant Appellant’s December 11, 2023 Application for Leave to File Post Submission Communication and accept as filed Appellant’s “Motion to Strike [Appellees’ December 4, 2023 Post- Argument Submission] or, in the Alternative, Response to Post-Argument (Footnote Continued Next Page) J-A26011-23

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. On January

14, 2016, Mr. Lopez was injured in the course of his employment with Clemens

Food Group while operating an electric pallet jack manufactured and

distributed by Appellant. On December 28, 2017, Appellees filed a complaint

raising Negligence, Strict Liability, Breach of Implied Warranties,

Recklessness/Punitive Damages, and Loss of Consortium against Appellant2

asserting, inter alia, that the pallet jack was defective and/or defectively

designed.

The case proceeded through discovery. Shortly before the

commencement of trial, Appellees filed fifteen motions in limine seeking to

preclude the admission of certain evidence including evidence regarding

industry standards, Mr. Lopez’s or his employer’s negligence, and evidence

related to the operator manuals and warnings Appellant provides to users who

purchase the pallet jack at issue. The trial court denied each of Appellees’

Submission of Appellee” appended thereto. We deny Appellant’s Motion to Strike.

With respect to Appellees’ filings, we grant Appellees’ December 19, 2023 Application for Leave to File a Post-Argument Submission and accept as filed Appellees’ Post-Argument Submission appended thereto. In addition, we grant Appellees’ January 9, 2024 Application for Leave to File a Supplemental Notice of Authority and accept as filed Appellees’ Notice of Supplemental Authority appended thereto.

2 Appellant also asserted claims against the other captioned defendants, each

of whom the court dismissed from the case prior to trial.

-2- J-A26011-23

motions without prejudice to raise the objections again at the appropriate time

during trial.

Immediately prior to trial, Appellees filed a praecipe to withdraw their

negligence claim against Appellant, indicating that they wished to proceed to

trial only on their strict liability claim.3 Trial commenced on September 22,

2022, and ended in a mistrial seven days later when the number of available

jurors fell below the threshold required to continue. Thereafter, the court

ordered the immediate empanelment of a new jury and directed that all

evidentiary rulings made thus far would remain in place, and all evidence in

the record would be read to the new jury following presentation of counsel’s

new opening statements. The second trial began with jury selection on

September 30, 2022.

During both the first and second trials, Appellees reasserted certain

issues raised in their motions in limine. Ultimately, the trial court precluded

the admission of evidence of (1) industry standards; (2) Mr. Lopez’s or his

employer’s negligence, including the employer’s failure to train; (3) the

purported ubiquity or preference of customers in the marketplace for the

product; (4) the instruction manual and warnings that Mr. Lopez never saw;

and (5) lack of prior incidents.

Appellees made numerous objections during both the first and second

trials to what it characterized as Appellant’s counsels’ violations of the trial ____________________________________________

3 The trial court had dismissed, or Appellees had discontinued or settled, all

other claims against all other parties prior to the commencement of trial.

-3- J-A26011-23

court’s evidentiary rulings and, in three instances, requested that the court

grant a mistrial. In response, the trial court sustained the objections and

issued numerous warnings and admonitions to counsel to comply with its

rulings. The court, however, declined to grant a mistrial.

On October 7, 2022, the jury returned a verdict for Appellant. On

October 17, 2022, Appellees filed a post-trial motion for a new trial alleging

that Appellant’s counsel’s conduct in repeatedly violating the court’s

evidentiary orders during trial prejudiced the jury to the extent that it was not

capable of fairly weighing the evidence and entering an objective verdict.

Post-Trial Motion, 10/17/22, at ¶ 68. Appellees argued that Appellant’s

counsel’s repeated transgressions of the court’s evidentiary rulings resulted in

counsel eliciting impermissible testimony regarding: (1) employer negligence;

(2) the comparative negligence of Mr. Lopez; (3) industry standards; (4)

product warnings and instructions; (5) collateral source; and (6) lack of prior

incidents. Id. at ¶ 77. Appellees argued that the “cumulative nature of all of

[Appellant’s] counsel’s violations most certainly warrant a new trial [because]

each violation was improper and prejudicial [and] the cumulative effect

insurmountably prejudiced [Appellees].” Id. at ¶ 78.

On October 27, 2022, Appellant filed a response to Appellees’ post-trial

motion in which it argued that Appellees did not present a proper basis for a

new trial because Appellees did not identify in the motion any evidence that

the court improperly admitted at trial. Appellant asserted that Appellees

instead merely argued that the jury’s verdict was tainted by counsel’s

-4- J-A26011-23

questions to various witnesses; however, Appellees objected to those

questions and the trial court sustained the objections. Thus, according to

Appellant, the court prevented the admission of any evidence to the jury that

may have prejudiced the outcome of the trial and, thus, the court did not

commit any errors warranting a new trial.4

Following its review of the motion and based on its conclusion that

Appellant’s counsel engaged in “persistent and demonstrated intentional

efforts to mislead the jury and confuse the issues in this case[,]” the trial court

granted Appellees’ motion for a new trial. Trial Ct. Op., 5/22/23, at 1. Noting

that Appellant “persistently sought to shift the issues in the trial to defenses

prejudicial, unrelated[,] and unavailable to a defendant in a strict product

liability action, defenses that are not permitted under Pennsylvania law[,]” id.

at 4, the trial court explained that it found that Appellant’s “misconduct,

whether intentional or not, polluted the jury and had sufficiently violated the

court’s directives and repeated admonishments to have infected the

proceedings and prejudiced” Appellees. Id. Accordingly, the court found that

the only “just and proper remedy” to “cure the profound and pervasive taint

of [Appellant’s] efforts to end run around the court’s trial rulings” was to grant

Appellees a new trial. Id.

4 Appellant also denied that the questions counsel posed sought to elicit inadmissible evidence and asserted in the alternative that even if the court had not sustained Appellees’ objections, the evidence elicited by those questions was not the type that the court ruled inadmissible.

-5- J-A26011-23

This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

I. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in granting the [m]otion for [p]ost-[tr]rial [r]elief and [n]ew [t]rial[] because it failed to identify a single mistake or error that was made during the trial?

II. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in granting a new trial without identifying any inadmissible evidence or conduct of counsel that was actually presented to the jury and which unfairly prejudiced [Appellees]?

III. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in granting a new trial because its [o]rder was an abuse of discretion, manifestly unreasonable[,] and based upon a misapplication of the law and the [t]rial [c]ourt’s partiality and bias?[5]

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

A.

Appellant challenges the trial court’s order awarding a new trial to

Appellees. “The grant of a new trial is an effective instrumentality for seeking

and achieving justice in those instances where the original trial, because of

taint, unfairness or error, produces something other than a just and fair

result[.]” Harman ex rel. Harman v. Borah, 756 A.2d 1116, 1121 (Pa.

2000) (citation omitted). “Trial courts have broad discretion to grant or deny

a new trial[.]” Id. Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not overturn an

order granting a new trial. Id. at 1122. “A trial court commits an abuse of ____________________________________________

5 Appellant did not include this issue in its Rule 1925(b) Statement of Errors

Complained of on Appeal. It is, therefore, waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement . . . are waived.”).

-6- J-A26011-23

discretion when it rendered a judgment that is manifestly unreasonable,

arbitrary, capricious, has failed to apply the law, or was motivated by

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.” Mirabel v. Morales, 57 A.3d 144, 150

(Pa. Super. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). With

respect to our review of the trial court’s exercise of its discretion, we are

mindful that, “[a] trial judge is in the best position to observe the atmosphere

in which a trial is being conducted and to determine whether a statement in

the heat of trial by counsel or a witness has had a prejudicial effect on the

jury.” Clark v. Hoerner, 525 A.2d 377, 381 (Pa. Super. 1987).

This court has explained that a new trial is appropriate where:

the unavoidable effect of [counsel’s] conduct or language was to prejudice the factfinder to the extent that the factfinder was rendered incapable of fairly weighing the evidence and entering an objective verdict. If [counsel’s] misconduct contributed to the verdict, it will be deemed prejudicial and a new trial will be required.

Poust v. Hylton, 940 A.2d 380, 385 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted,

emphasis in original).

Moreover, where an attorney or party engages in conduct that judicial

instruction cannot cure, “the only remedy is a new trial, in order to promote

fundamental fairness, to ensure professional respect for the rulings of the trial

court, to guarantee the orderly administration of justice, and to preserve the

sanctity of the rule of law.” Mirabel, 57 A.3d at 151 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).

-7- J-A26011-23

Where the trial court orders a new trial “in the interests of justice,” we

apply a “broad scope of review, examining the entire record for any reason

sufficient to justify a new trial.” Harman, 756 A.2d at 1123 (citation omitted).

B.

In its first two issues, Appellant raises numerous grounds for its

conclusion that the trial court erred in granting Appellees a new trial. Initially,

Appellant asserts that the trial court erred because the court failed to identify

a single specific, factual, legal, or discretionary mistake at trial that would

warrant a new trial and, instead, awarded a new trial based on its

“unsupported and generalized conclusion that [Appellant] repeatedly violated

its orders in an attempt to ‘bombard’ the jury with inadmissible evidence.”

Appellant’s Brief at 26. Appellant argues, in particular, that the trial court

properly ruled on Appellees’ requests for mistrials and motions for curative

instruction and that, therefore, these rulings were not grounds for a new trial.

Id. at 27-31. It also argues that the court did not, in fact, improperly admit

any evidence at trial that resulted in unfair prejudice to Appellees and that

Appellant’s counsel did not, through its examination or argument, present any

unfairly prejudicial evidence to the jury. Id. at 31-33.

In the alternative, Appellant asserts that the court’s curative instructions

prevented any prejudicial conduct resulting from its examination or argument,

because “Pennsylvania courts have routinely held that juries are presumed to

follow the trial court’s instructions, including its curative instructions following

an improper question.” Id. at 34 (citation omitted). Appellant adds that its

-8- J-A26011-23

conduct was not “so offense or egregious” that the curative instructions issued

here would be insufficient to “obliterate the taint” to the jury. Id. at 41.

C.

The trial judge, an experienced and impartial jurist, presided over both

the first and second trials in this matter and, thus, had the opportunity to

twice observe the atmosphere of the trial and to determine whether counsel’s

conduct had a prejudicial effect on the jury. Following its observations of

counsel’s conduct, the court concluded that a new trial was warranted. As

noted above, the court explained that it reached this conclusion based on

Appellant’s counsel’s: (1) “persistent and demonstrated intentional efforts to

mislead the jury and confuse the issues in this case”; (2) “substantial and

prejudicial violations of the court’s rulings on admissible evidence” which

“suggest[ed] purposeful attempts to evade the court’s rulings despite

admonitions to counsel”; and (3) persistent attempts to “shift the issues in

the trial to defenses prejudicial, unrelated[,] and unavailable to a defendant

in a strict product liability action.” Trial Ct. Op. at 1, 3, 4. Following its

consideration of the verdict and the record as a whole, the court concluded

that Appellant’s counsel’s misconduct “infected the proceedings and

prejudiced [Appellees]” by “profound[ly] and pervasive[ly] tainting” the

proceedings.” Id. at 4. The court in its discretion, thus, determined that “the

only just and proper remedy” was to grant Appellees a new trial. Id.

Following our review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion. In

light of the unique circumstances of this case, the trial court’s decision to grant

-9- J-A26011-23

Appellees’ motion for a new trial was based on careful observation of the

proceedings and thoughtful consideration of the parties’ interests and their

arguments. Appellant has not persuaded this Court that the trial court failed

to apply the law or rendered a decision that was manifestly unreasonable,

arbitrary, or capricious. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order awarding

Appellees a new trial.

Order affirmed.

Date: 5/21/2024

- 10 -