Lopez Chavez v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 28, 2025
• Docket: 24-2496
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 28 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARIO EDGARDO LOPEZ CHAVEZ, et No. 24-2496 al., Agency Nos. A209-228-397 Petitioners, A209-228-396 A209-228-395 v. A212-901-171 A212-901-172 PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent. MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 7, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN, DESAI, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Mario Edgardo Lopez-Chavez, Blanca Estela Gonzalez-Munoz, and their

children (collectively, “Petitioners”), seek review of a Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) decision dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). (“IJ”) order denying their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and

protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.

“Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ decision and also adds its own

reasoning, we review the decision of the BIA and those parts of the IJ decision

upon which it relies.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1027–28 (9th Cir.

2019). “We review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo . . . . We review the

BIA’s factual determinations for substantial evidence, meaning we may reverse

only if the evidence compels a conclusion contrary to the BIA’s.” Umana-Escobar

v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023).

1. An applicant for asylum or withholding of removal must show that the

feared persecution would be “committed by the government or forces the

government [was] either unable or unwilling to control.” Doe v. Holder, 736 F.3d

871, 877–78 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Afriyie v. Holder, 613 F.3d 924, 931 (9th Cir.

2010)). Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Petitioners failed to

show local authorities in El Salvador were unable or unwilling to control crimes

committed by members of MS-13. The evidence reflects that the authorities

investigated the crimes, including the murder of Mr. Lopez-Chavez’s parents.

After Ms. Gonzalez-Munoz’s son was allegedly kidnapped, local authorities

promptly found and returned him to the custody of his guardian. Although the

2 24-2496 authorities did not arrest anyone for the murder of Mr. Lopez-Chavez’s parents or

in connection with the alleged attacks and threats against Mr. Lopez-Chavez and

Ms. Gonzalez-Munoz, neither reported their interactions with members of MS-13

to law enforcement. See Bringas–Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th

Cir. 2017) (“Whether a victim has reported or attempted to report violence or

abuse to the authorities is a factor that may be considered . . . .”).

The country conditions reports submitted by Petitioners further reflect that

the Salvadoran government had recently increased its efforts to reduce the

influence of criminal gangs. See Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 648 (9th Cir.

2021) (“[A] country’s government is not ‘unable or unwilling’ to control violent

nonstate actors when it demonstrates efforts to subdue said groups.”). While

Petitioners presented some evidence showing local authorities had difficulty

controlling gang violence in El Salvador, the evidence does not compel a finding

that local authorities would be unwilling or unable to control future persecution by

members of MS-13. See Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir.

2014) (“[T]o reverse the BIA, we must determine that the evidence not only

supports [a contrary] conclusion, but compels it” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).1

1 Because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Petitioners failed to show local authorities in El Salvador were unable or unwilling to control their alleged persecutors, we need not decide whether the BIA erred in determining

3 24-2496 2. To qualify for protection under CAT, a petitioner “must demonstrate a

chance greater than fifty percent that he will be tortured if removed,” and that the

torture will occur “with the acquiescence” of public officials. Castillo v. Barr,

980 F.3d 1278, 1283 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). For the

reasons discussed above, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that

Petitioners failed to show that they would more likely than not suffer torture with

the acquiescence of public officials. See Andrade–Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829,

836 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[A] general ineffectiveness on the government’s part to

investigate and prevent crime will not suffice to show acquiescence.”). Petitioners

also had limited interactions with MS-13 members when they lived in El Salvador,

and have family members living in the country who have not been harmed. The

evidence also indicates that Petitioners could relocate within El Salvador to avoid

torture. Ms. Gonzalez-Munoz lived for several months in El Salvador outside of

her hometown of Usulután, during which she did not suffer any harm or receive

any threats from members of MS-13. See Xochihua-James v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1175,

1183–84 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining that relevant evidence includes “[e]vidence

that the applicant could relocate to a part of the country of removal where he or she

is not likely to be tortured” (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3))). Thus, the

Ms. Gonzalez-Munoz and Mr. Lopez-Chavez failed to establish a nexus between their alleged instances of past harm and a protected ground.

4 24-2496 evidence does not compel a finding that Petitioners would “face a particularized

and non-speculative risk of torture” if removed. Park v. Garland, 72 F.4th 965,

980 (9th Cir. 2023).

PETITION DENIED.

5 24-2496